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The marked disintegration of the UK banking system in 2008 led to significant 
Government ownership in two major banks: The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and 
Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) (National Audit Office, 2009).  The banks are termed 
‘quasi-nationalised’ due to the retention of stock exchange listings alongside 
Government ownership  The thesis offers a documentary analysis on the public 
accountability of these banks.  The research themes are: 
 The impact of Government intervention on the accountability of the quasi-
nationalised banks 
 The banking crisis through the lens of financial reporting for RBS and LBG 
 Newspaper reporting of the banking crisis in RBS and LBG 
A multiple theory framework is utilised in the study.  Property rights (Alchian, 1974; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Demsetz, 1967) and agency theory (Fama, 1980; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) explore the implications of Government Intervention.  Impression 
Management and Stigma (Goffman, 1968; Goffman, 1956a) are used to critique financial 
reporting since the crisis.  Critical Discourse Analysis assesses newspaper reporting of 
the banks’ finances (Fairclough, 2010; Fairclough, 1995).   
Summary findings for the three research themes are as follows.  Quasi-nationalisation 
has been a positive response to the banking crisis.  Banks acknowledge they must 
consider societal responsibilities as well as corporate profits.  Yet the increased 
accountability mechanisms have been difficult to define and enforce.   Property rights 
theory applauds the retention of private sector scrutiny.  Agency theory, however, 
identifies the muted disciplinary effects of the markets in the circumstances.  
The banks’ financial reporting gives an alternative perspective on the banking crisis.  
Both banks acknowledge their role in the crisis but simultaneously distance themselves 
from it.  RBS highlights the virtues of a ‘new’ bank different from the failed one. LBG 
explains poor results through ‘market dislocation’. The statutory accounts themselves 
are relegated in favour of managerially defined pro forma numbers and promotional 
materials.  In this way, the statutory numbers can be seen as part of the ‘dirty work’ 
(Goffman, 1956b) of the crisis. 
Using critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2010; Fairclough, 1995), findings are that 
newspaper reporting of the banks’ accounting results occurs across a broad spectrum of 
titles and articles.  Headlines favour big numbers for impact.  But constant focus on 
banking pay endures.  The accounts provide an important counterpoint to the news 
context of the banks.  Positively, accounting is portrayed as a neutral challenger to the 
public relations news process and fulfils democratic accountability.  Critically, however, it 
is in the interests of papers to create and sustain media panics (Leach, 2006). 
The thesis responds to calls for literature on the financial crisis (British Accounting 
Review, 2012; Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2011; Arnold, 2009), multi-
theoretical research in the public sector (Jacobs, 2012; Kurunmäki et al., 2003), linguistic 
theory in accounting (Evans, 2010) and accounting in the tabloids (Jeacle, 2012) as well 
as interpretive research in financial reporting (London School of Economics, 2011; 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis explores the public accountability of two quasi-nationalised UK banks.  In this 
introductory chapter, the context of the banking crisis is outlined first to locate the rationale 
for the research.  The three main research themes are then outlined as well as the 
contribution to knowledge of the thesis.  The structure of the thesis then follows. 
The banking crisis in the UK was part of the global financial crisis which has affected the 
markets since 2007.  The crisis itself had been building up for some time.  Throughout the 
early 2000s, interest rates had been low and credit rules in the USA became looser.  
Mortgages became available to a greater number of people, including those for subprime 
borrowers, who had low or no income (Ackermann, 2008).  Borrowing was made to these 
people on the belief that house prices in the country would only ever go up (ibid, p331).  
Banks were using the ‘originate and distribute’ model of funding.  This meant that as 
mortgages were agreed, they were sold on to financial institutions who repackaged them 
with other mortgages and sold them on again as asset backed securities (ABS) in the 
wholesale money markets (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). The original idea of the ABSs was 
to diversify risks, rather than attract it. Yet the underlying assets in the instruments became 
so remote from the ABSs on the market, that it became extremely difficult to decipher what 
assets and risks each institution actually held  (Cukierman, 2011).  A loss of trust occurred in 
the markets, as the exposure to the US subprime housing market was impossible to 
determine for any counterparty to a transaction (ibid.).  ABSs were hard to value and had to 
be written down on the back of credit rating agency downgrades and fair value accounting 
(Laeven & Valencia, 2008 p25).     The first major collapse in the UK was Northern Rock, 
who had made extensive use of the ‘originate and distribute’ model.  It experienced the first 
bank run in the UK for 140 years on September 15, 2007.   
1.1 The Beginnings of the Banking Crisis: Northern Rock 
Although Northern Rock had little direct subprime exposure, the bank’s position became 
perilous with the collapse in wholesale markets, as only 23% of its funding came from retail 
bank deposits (Shin, 2009; Northern Rock plc, 2007).  The Bank of England agreed to act as 
a lender of last resort to rectify the bank’s short term liquidity problems on 14 September 
2007 (Bank of England, 2007). After a Press Leak (Peston, 2007), Northern Rock 
experienced a mass withdrawal of its retail deposits (Song Shin, 2009). On Monday, 17th 
September the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, announced that the deposits of 
2 
the bank were to be covered by a Tripartite Authorities guarantee to curtail the bank run 
(HM Treasury, 2007b).   Northern Rock was for sale, and it was made clear that its buyer 
would have to fulfil the principles laid down by the State:  to protect taxpayers; promote 
financial stability; and to protect consumers (HM Treasury, 2007). No successful buyer was 
found and it was announced on 17
th
 February 2008 that the bank would be taken into 
temporary public ownership to recuperate its failing business and liquidity problems.  There 
would be a view to an onward private sector sale after the market’s recovery (HM Treasury, 
2008b). Parts of the bank were sold to Virgin Money plc in 2011 (HM Treasury, 2011).  The 
remaining mortgage assets would be serviced as they were run down by a Government 
company called UK Asset Resolution Ltd (UK Asset Resolution Ltd, 2013b). 
1.2 The Height of Crisis: September and October 2008 
The nationalisation of Northern Rock in 2008 set a recent precedent for investing in failing 
banks.  It also was an indicator of much larger, systemic problems to come in the UK 
banking crisis later that year.  The nature of difficulties for the two banks of interest here, 
RBS and HBOS, are considered briefly before outlining the nature of Government 
intervention.   
1.2.1 RBS 
In October 2007, at the very precipice of the crisis, RBS was involved in a hostile takeover 
bid of ABN Amro.  The successful purchase of ABN Amro would transform the RBS group 
into one of the largest banks in the world.    Previously a domestic retail bank in Scotland, 
RBS had grown substantially through a number a of high profile acquisitions. The CEO, Sir 
Fred Goodwin, had been complimented on his execution of the reverse takeover of NatWest 
in the early 2000s (BBC, 2011; Kerr and Robinson, 2011).  Eager to continue the success of 
acquisitive growth, RBS, in a consortium with European banking giants Santander and 
Fortis, led a joint takeover bid for ABN Amro.  The deal captured the great confidence the 
bank had in the potential for its markets and businesses (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2007e).  
Nonetheless, the proposed takeover was complicated and based on a very little due diligence.  
As a result, RBS paid a large amount of cash for  ABN Amro as financial markets were 
contracting. RBS was unprepared.  It was thinly capitalised and had little liquidity as 
financial markets dried up (Smit, 2010; Larsen Simon Thai, 2008).   When financial markets 
contracted entirely, RBS was unable to continue trading.  It required Government 
intervention to meet its obligations, along with another Scottish bank: HBOS.   
3 
1.2.2 HBOS and Lloyds Banking Group 
HBOS was heavily exposed to the market dislocation and its impact on the property sector 
(HBOS, 2009).  HBOS tried to raise £4bn in a rights issue in July 2008 to strengthen its 
capital base but this was unsuccessful (HBOS, 2008b).   There continued to be widespread 
rumours in the market regarding HBOS’ ability to trade through the crisis (Seib, 2008; 
Flanagan, 2008; Guardian, 2008; Croft J, 2008a; Croft J, 2008b) 
The collapse of Lehman brothers on 15
th
 September 2008 created widespread panic in the 






.  On 17
th
 
September, HBOS announced it was in talks with Lloyds about a possible merger (HBOS, 
2008a).    On 18 September 2008, the merger was formally announced (Lloyds TSB, 2008c).   
By 30 September 2008, the share price of HBOS had slid to 120p, well below the pre-merger 
announcement price of 147p (Lloyds Banking Group, 2013c).  There was still concern in the 
markets generally about the worldwide economic situation.  There was also an expectation 
that the HBOS treasury book would be written down again due to the downturn in the 
property market.  Then, on 29 September, Bradford and Bingley, another UK banking 
institution was taken into full public ownership and wound up.  Icesave, the Icelandic bank, 
was also put into administration (Lloyds TSB, 2008b).  The deteriorating market conditions 
meant that both Lloyds TSB and HBOS would have to raise capital under Government 
recommendations (ibid.)  The official merger for Lloyds TSB and HBOS occurred on 19 
January 2009 (Lloyds Banking Group, 2008).  From the time of the announcement in 
September, the HBOS and Lloyds TSB had a coordinated strategy.  This was necessary due 
to the involvement of the UK Government just 3 weeks after.   
1.3 Government Intervention in HBOS, Lloyds and RBS 
By the end of September 2008, the banking crisis had reached a crux.  The systemic distress 
in the financial markets was causing an ‘adverse spiral’ (Bank of England, 2008).  The banks 
were calculating losses on their toxic assets; the ability to attract wholesale funding was 
hampered by illiquidity in the markets; there were a number of failed institutions in Europe 
and the US; and the responses by nations globally were inadequate to stem market fear 
(Bank of England, 2008).   This led the UK Government to offer the domestic banking 
                                                     
1
 299.75p at 10 Sept; 147.1p at 17 Sept 2008(Lloyds Banking Group, 2013c) 
4 
industry a voluntary rescue package.  The Government aimed to free up liquidity in the 
markets, with an ultimate goal to aid the real economy by keeping credit lines open (Bank of 
England, 2008, p32).  The most significant part of the rescue package was State ownership 
of banks. The participating institutions could apply to the State to receive equity capital to 
restore their finances.   The rescue package was primarily directed towards the most 
distressed banks but offered across the whole industry: 
“This was necessary because unless we could show that the action was being taken 
across the board, the risk was that the markets, satisfied, say, RBS was adequately 
capitalized, would turn their attention, to, say, Barclays, if it had not raised more 
capital.  If they did not stand together they would be picked off one by one.”(Darling, 
2011)  
Funds would be in the form of equity capital to meet BASEL
2
 requirements (HMT, 2008a). 
As it was, only RBS and LBG participated in the rescue scheme
3
.  After the injection of 
equity capital, the UK Government had an economic stake in the bank of over 84% (RBS, 
2009a)
4
.  Government ownership in LBG rested at 43% (NAO, 2011).   The nature of the 
investment was to be temporary and at arm’s length: 
“The long-term future of UK banks lies in the private sector, and we will aim to sell 
the public share in the participating banks as soon as is feasibly possible, but our 
objective today is to stabilise and rebuild, and we will maintain our stake for as long 
as it takes to do that.” (Hansard HC, 2008) 
Both banks retained London Stock Exchange Listings.  With simultaneous listings and 
Government shareholdings, the banks became quasi-nationalised.  The accountability under 
quasi-nationalisation is explored in this thesis. 
 
                                                     
2
 The Basel II framework is an international standard on capital adequacy for banks. 
3
 Barclays was another major contender for UK Government support.  However, they financed an 
increase in the capital base through private markets, primarily the sovereign wealth funds of Qatar and 
UAE (Barclays, 2008b) .  
4
 The Government entered a commitment not to exceed a proportion of 75% of ordinary listed shares.  
The investment exceeding this proportion is contained within alternative share classes and 
agreements, such as the Asset Protection Scheme.  In total, the proportionate economic interest of the 
Government in the bank is thus 84%   
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1.4 Rationale for Investigation 
Quasi-nationalising the banks was a major component of Government spending in 2008.  
The Government injected £45bn in to RBS and over £20bn in support of LBG (National 
Audit Office., 2012).  This was half the total cash outlay during the crisis by the State 
(National Audit Office., 2012).  Including guarantees and commitments, the peak support of 
the State stood at £1,162bn (ibid).  The Government involvement affected the UK economy.  
The country emerged from the (first) recession in 2009 with higher public and private debt 
and higher unemployment (OECD Economic Survey, 2011). Growth in 2012 was flat 
overall.  The growth since the recession of 2008 after the crisis has been the slowest post-
recession recovery in output in the past 100 years (National Institute Economic Review, 
2013).   Public Sector net debt is expected to peak at 79.9% in 2015 (Office for Budget 
Responsibility, 2012). Successive UK Budgets have announced spending cuts, benefit cuts, 
reduced pension entitlements and public sector pay freezes to manage the large public debt 
(HM Treasury and Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2012).  VAT has risen, 
affecting all sectors of society as an unprogressive tax (HM Treasury, 2009a).  It is important 
that this turbulent period of financial events is investigated. 
As well as the impact on Government finances and economic growth, the quasi-
nationalisation of RBS and LBG has implications for accounting.  During times of crisis, 
financial accounting has been involved in corporate failure globally (Carnegie and 
O'Connell, 2013; Hamilton and Micklethwait, 2006; Clarke, 2004).  In particular, Enron 
adversely affected the reputation of the accounting and auditing profession (Marnet, 2007; 
Benston and Wall, 2005; Cullinan, 2004; Benston and Hartgraves, 2002).   
For failed and successful corporations alike, accountants and auditors are important 
facilitators in fulfilling corporate accountability to the public.  A part of public accountability 
lies in financial accounting.  Financial accounting is presented mainly through the annual 
report in the form of financial statements whose aim:  
“…is to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to 
existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions 
about providing resources to the entity” (IASB, 2010c) 
Other parties may find the financial statements useful but the reports are not primarily 
directed towards them (IASB, 2010c).  Determining who is the ‘owner’ then is critical in 
helping determine what information is produced, how it is presented, to whom and at what 
time.   By extension, the imagined owner in the mind of management will inform the 
decisions made about what is produced, and to justify their choices.  
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Taking into consideration the financial and economic impact on the UK Government and 
economy, the relationship accounting itself has with corporate failure and the resultant 
impact on the profession’s reputation, there is a clear rationale for investigating RBS and 
LBG in depth.  The next section extends the rationale for this study by specifying the themes 
of the study. 
1.5 Research Themes and Rationale 
The three research themes of the thesis centre on the public and financial accountability of 
the quasi-nationalised banks RBS and LBG.  The themes are introduced below along with 
the rationale for investigation.  The rationale has been based on a combination of the unique 
features of the quasi-nationalised banks and the academic literature which has problematized 
the nature of accountability. 
The quasi-nationalised banks, by the virtue of their distinct ownership structure present a 
fascinating setting for studying accountability. The accountability of these banks goes 
beyond the established expectations of shareholders in the listed enterprise.   Public sector 
enterprises face more complicated reporting lines than private corporations.  Public sector 
accountability can be on multiple levels and shift over time (Luke, 2010). Public Sector 
CEOs face numerous forms of accountability from diverse bodies (Sinclair, 1995).  Meeting 
one set of demands from a stakeholder may result in other forms of accountability being 
compromised (ibid, p231).  Furthermore, the very notion of accountability is constructed and 
redefined in reference to managerial perception and political processes (ibid, p234).  This 
ambiguity produces an additional complexity to accountability procedures, which remain 
dynamic, compared to regulated markets. 
Information can become inherently political, and may be adapted to anticipate the needs of 
users (Christensen & Skærbæk, 2007).  The rise of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 
1991) has heralded the adoption of private sector accountability techniques in the public 
sphere to achieve best use of the limited financial resources received.  This has included the 
wholesale adoption of IFRS by the UK Government (HM Treasury, 2007a).    The UK quasi-
nationalisations may create an arena for cohesion between private and public sector 
accountability.    As a result, the scope for examining accountability in the two banks has 
been left deliberately wide. 
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There are three research themes to the thesis which consider the accountability of the quasi-
nationalised banks.  The first research theme examines Government ownership and the 
creation of new accountabilities.  It considers: 
1. The impact of Government intervention on the accountability of the UK quasi-
nationalised banks 
From the outset, quasi-nationalisation encompassed an inherent conflict in the banks.  On the 
one hand, there was a requirement to invest Government capital to continue trading.  On the 
other, lending commitments required the capital to be invested in customers in a challenging 
economic environment.  The former concentrated on the stability of the bank, whilst the 
latter was concentrated on protecting consumers and in assisting the wider economy recover 
from the crisis (House of Commons - Treasury Committee, 2009a).  Thus, the aims of State 
investment did not rest exclusively upon financial stability.  The State sought to implement 
economic assistance to the UK through bank ownership.  
The creation of new accountabilities with Government intervention was in addition to 
established monitoring mechanisms. Government ownership in RBS and LBG was intended 
to be temporary.  Both banks retained London Stock Exchange Listings.  The banks were to 
maintain the commercial orientation to their activities, allowing recovery and return to profit 
(HM Treasury, 2008a).  This in turn would allow the Government to exit from the 
investment. Modelling private sector shareholder behaviour, HM Treasury created an 
independent agency, the UKFI, to manage its shareholdings in LBG and RBS (UKFI, 2009).    
Thus, the next empirical part of the thesis investigates the impact of quasi-nationalisation on 
the established accountability mechanisms of the annual report and accounts.  The second 
research theme considers: 
2. The banking crisis through the lens of financial reporting for RBS and LBG 
The annual report is a cornerstone of financial accountability in listed companies.  Even if 
this mechanism of accountability remained identical to the pre-crisis status of these banks, 
there remains the extensive Government influence on strategy, pay, appointments and 
customer service. The banks are subject to political influence which has been a feature of 
state owned enterprises previously (Jenkins, 2004; Ashworth, 1991; Tivey, 1966).  For RBS 
and LBG, there is the potential for the annual report to develop in response to the economic 
and political context in which it operates (Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012; Clatworthy and 
Jones, 2006).   
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Consequently, the final empirical part of the thesis considers the role of the Press in 
communicating financial information of the quasi-nationalised banks:  
3. Media reporting of the banking crisis for RBS and LBG 
Part of the political context of the banks is the media interest.   The Government have 
acknowledged that the media have had considerable influence on how the banking crisis was 
reported to the public.  The media may have no formal powers of investigation but they can 
exert considerable powers of influence on State owned enterprises (Mulgan, 2000) and are a 
powerful stakeholder in organisations (Rowley, 1997).   Prior to quasi-nationalisation, the 
run on Northern Rock begun with  a press leak and exposure by a BBC journalist (Peston, 
2007), who was accused of exacerbating the crisis with the exposé.  The UK Parliament 
investigated the role of the media in the banking crisis (House of Commons - Treasury 
Committee, 2009b) which highlighted concerns about journalistic quality during the crisis 
but did not recommend any regulatory changes.   
Taken together, the three research themes are designed to consider the public accountability 
of the quasi-nationalised banks RBS and LBG.  There are a number of contributions to be 
made by the thesis, which are considered in the next section. 
1.6 Contribution 
The research themes aim to address a number of gaps in the literature.  First of all, they 
respond to the calls for research into the global financial crisis in accounting. Despite a 
number of calls in journals mentioning the financial crisis, to date there have been relatively 
few papers published.  The British Accounting Review called for papers on the topic of ‘The 
Global Financial Crisis and Accounting’ for a future special issue (BAR, 2012). The Journal 
of Accounting and Public Policy call on corporate governance and accounting directly 
mentioned the global financial crisis as an attractive research topic (JAPP, 2011) yet resulted 
in no paper abstracts or titles referring to the global financial crisis being presented (London 
School of Economics, 2012).  The Comparative International Governmental Accounting 
Network is also producing a conference and special issue on “Public Sector Accounting, the 
Financial Crisis and Austerity” (CIGAR, 2013).  Moreover, the thesis contributes to the 
literature responding to calls for alternative methodologies for exploring the crisis (Arnold, 
2009) 
Secondly, it explores impression management in financial reporting in the context of 
Government ownership. Impression management has been considered in the context of 
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business performance in many studies previously (e.g. Beattie & Jones, 1992, 1999; Neu et 
al 1998; Smith & Taffler, 1992; Merkl-Davies et al 2011).  However, quasi-nationalisation is 
an opportunity to consider impression management under different ownership arrangements. 
Moreover, there have been relatively few in depth studies on impression management in 
particular companies over time (Laine, 2010; White and Hanson, 2002).   
Thirdly, the thesis contributes to qualitative research in financial reporting.  It responds to 
recent calls for alternative methods, theories and approaches to financial and external 
reporting (Parker, 2007; Brennan & Solomon, 2008) and sits amid limited research on 
financial reporting from an interpretive standpoint (Laine, 2010).  This has been particularly 
important as the global financial crisis forces scholars to ‘re-evaluate research agendas’ 
(Arnold, 2009). In addition, the thesis contributes to calls for further multi theoretical 
research in the public sector (Kurunmäki et al, 2003; Jacobs, 2012) as well as in financial 
services (Collins et al, 2009).   
Fourthly, the thesis extends the field of analysis of research to media dissemination.  It has 
been increasingly recognised that the media affect annual report content (Islam and Deegan, 
2010; Deegan et al., 2000) and share prices (Andrew, 2007; Patten, 2002). Finally, it 
considers how accounting is presented in the popular media (Jeacle, 2012; Smith and Jacobs, 
2011; Evans, 2009), including the broadsheet and tabloid press. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 considers qualitative research in bank failures 
previously and considers the role of accounting within them.  Chapter 3 investigates the 
political ramifications for public ownership in failed banks by considering the UK’s 
experience with accountability in previous State owned enterprises.   
Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical frameworks used, explaining why these have been chosen 
and the implications of a multi-theoretical approach.  Chapter 5 considers the application of 
the theories in prior research.   Chapter 6 details the research methods adopted in 
investigating the thesis.   
Chapters 7 – 10 make up the empirical work of the PhD, addressing in turn each research 
theme.  Chapter 7 gives an introduction to the case histories of RBS and LBG.  It also 
explains the basis for calling the banks quasi-nationalised and analyses the interested 
stakeholders under the new ownership structure.    Chapter 8 assesses the impact of public 
sector ownership on negotiating public sector accountability for the quasi-nationalised banks.  
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Chapter 9 analyses the sizeable annual reports created during the crisis for RBS and LBG. 
Here then, it is the substance of financial accountability in established market mechanisms 
which provides the topic of interest.   
Chapter 10 extends this analysis by researching the headline and leaders generated in 
newspapers by the banks’ annual accounting results.   Ultimately, it is in the media that the 
accountability of the banks can be realised through mass dissemination.  Chapter 11 
concludes the thesis by reflecting on the empirical work completed and promoting a further 
research agenda.  
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Chapter 2: Crisis, the Banking 
System and Accounting 
The aim of this chapter is to locate the impact of accounting and auditing during banking 
crises via the literature.  It is argued here that the State is a key user of accounting during 
banking crises.  The State can use accounting to help expose wrongdoing, change regulation 
to hide or reveal financial problems, or to rely on the quasi-regulatory function of audit.  The 
chapter is laid out as follows.  The first section considers the regularity of crisis in economies 
and corporations in general.  Accounting and auditing are part of these phenomena.  Section 
2.2 considers how the State uses accounting as part of its regulatory prowess to help respond 
to banking failures.  Finally, there is an overview of the 2008 global financial crisis and the 
particular accounting controversies occurring then.  All of these processes are relevant for 
the discussion of the quasi-nationalised banks and the potential impact accounting and 
auditing may have had on them.   
2.1 Financial Crisis and Corporate Failure are Regular 
Phenomena 
Financial crisis is not unusual. Longitudinal analyses of financial crises corroborate the 
regularity and causes of financial distress. Since 1970, there have been broadly 124 systemic 
banking crises from 37 different countries around the world (Laeven and Valencia, 2008).  
These have transferred wealth from taxpayers to large banks (ibid, p4).  In developed 
countries, there have been nearly 50 major economic bubbles and market panics since the 
seventeenth century (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) meaning that crises are a feature of 
markets generally: 
‘The standard model of the sequence of events that leads to financial crises is that a 
shock leads to an economic expansion that then morphs into an economic boom; 
euphoria develops and then there is a pause in the increase in asset prices.  
Distress is likely to follow as asset prices begin to decline.  The pattern is biological 
in its regularity.’ (ibid, p77) 
Pro-cyclical availability of credit increases economic expansion which can lead to an 
economic bubble (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005).   Banks and lending institutions are eager 
to be involved in the good returns so risk assessments of the investments decrease and the 
borrowers’ own risk aversion declines. The money supply in the country or asset type 
therefore increases significantly (ibid.).  When the bubble implodes, panic occurs, distress 
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selling takes place and a crash can follow.  Crashes can then reverberate in different markets 
and nations (ibid. chapter 2).   
At the corporate level, crises may be explained by enduring agency and stewardship 
problems (Clarke, 2004).  Corporate governance mechanisms bear less scrutiny during the 
times of substantial profit making.   Crises occur when corporations seek to expand wealth 
rather than retain it, reflecting different attitudes to capital (Clarke, 2004).  An economic 
downturn occurs and the frequent response to downturn is an increase in regulation.  The 
authors argue that the appropriate defence against crisis is not regulation per se; rather, the 
market should be actively risk managing at all times, whatever stage of the economic cycle 
they are at.  There will always be the opportunity to exploit others in dynamic markets 
(Clarke, 2004).   Clarke thus expands on the analysis of bubbles that Kindleberger and Aliber 
(2005) discuss, by including regulation as part of the cycle.  
The downturn in the economic cycle may result in the accountancy profession having to 
defend itself.  Thus, accounting and auditing are drawn into the process of cyclical change 
and regulation: 
“Repeated unexpected corporate collapses lead to further governance change that is 
intended to ensure, as far as possible, that the errors, misjudgements and 
negligence of past actors do not recur. Governance change typically encompasses 
legislative reforms relating to financial reporting or audit involving amendments to 
corporations/companies legislation and other pertinent laws. The reforms may also 
involve the issue of new or amended pronouncements by professional accounting 
bodies or the establishment by the profession of standard-setting agencies as well 
as amendments to stock exchange listing requirements or codes of governance”. 
(Carnegie and O'Connell, 2013) 
By examining four significant periods of corporate collapse in Australia, Carnegie and 
O’Connell show the connections between failures through 1) misleading financial reporting; 
2) lax or ineffective accounting rules; 3) lack of auditor independence and audit quality.  The 
authors state that the reforms which have followed crises have resulted in little substantive 
change, either in terms of corporate ethos or the means by which audit is conducted in 
practice.   The authors argue that more radical approaches to accounting and auditing reform, 
such as mandatory rotation of auditors, may assist in prevent future crises (Carnegie and 
O'Connell, 2013). 
A feature of economic crises may be an increase in corporate failures.  At the organisational 
level, common features have been identified when creative accounting or fraud are involved 
in corporate failure (Jones, 2011).  Fraud and creative accounting can be viewed as parts of 
the same continuum. Creative accounting is usually defined as the application of particular 
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accounting policies which portray a picture of financial health which is in line with what 
directors believe investors want to see rather than what is a true and fair view of the financial 
position of the organisation.  Fraud, in contrast, is illegal misapplication of accounting 
policies (Jones, 2011). Creative accounting and fraud both involve increasing income on the 
income statement or assets on the SFP to inflate book value.  Likewise, decreasing expenses 
on the income statement or SFP liabilities can artificially sustain book values in the face of 
real life challenges (ibid).  Incentives for undertaking fraud or creative accounting include 
disguising bad financial/ management performance to help keep share prices high, and also 
for personal benefit.  It was often the case that over strong individuals allowed the creative 
accounting to persist whilst persuading the market all was well (ibid, p497).  The charismatic 
leader, weak internal controls and the failure of the external auditors to identify fraud were 
persistent characteristics (ibid).  Reducing the potential for creative accounting and fraud 
could occur by creating appropriate management incentives; creating and enforcing further 
regulation; and corporate governance.  However, historical experience suggests that 
corporate collapse endures despite the introduction of preventative measures (Jones, 2011).  
Taking a multiple case study approach, Table 2.1, adapted from Hamilton & Micklethwait (  
2006), documents the authors’ framework which helps them to analyse 10 recent corporate 
failures. In every case, 2 or more causes are attributed to each ‘scandal’.  The authors argue 
that failure is rooted in poor management first, rather than creative accounting or fraud, 
which are mechanisms to hide unsatisfactory performance.  The aspects of poor management 
which can lead to corporate failure are listed in the table below.  These are then attributed to 





















        
Dominant 
CEOs 
        
Greed, hubris & 
a desire for 
power 
        
Failure of 
internal control 
        
Ineffective 
boards 
        
Adapted from Hamilton & Micklethwait, 2006 
The preceding literature builds up an historic analysis of crises which have common factors.    
The build up to a crisis rests in the excesses of liquidity or in poor management decision 
making.   Accounting and auditing do not rectify excessive risk taking.  Yet the accounting 
profession is connected to corporate collapse through its use as a mechanism to disguise bad 
performance.  After the crisis, an enduring response to corporate failure is to increase 
regulation.  Politically, the nation State is then intervening in markets.    The next section of 
the chapter considers the State response to the failure of banks in particular.  Similar to the 
above, there exists a complex relationship between the State, banks and the role of 
accounting and auditing. 
 
2.2 States Expose Corporate Failure 
This section discusses some bank failures whereby State intervention resulted in the 
exposure of corporate failure.  It also reflects on the failure of Enron. In all the cases 
summarised below, the collapse of the company was down to fraud perpetrated by staff 
members.  However, the fraud was often facilitated by the political context in which the 
entity operated.   This may have implications for how preventative devices such as regulation 
are implemented in the future (Froud et al 2004, p885) and may not be considered if only the 
causes of corporate failure are the sole focus of investigations.  
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 In Turkey, a bank called  Imarbank was allowed to continue in operation for many years 
despite uncertainty over its financial stability (Omurgonulsen and Omurgonulsen, 2009).  
Regulatory systems were outdated and weak.  When the Governing State party changed, the 
bank’s license to accept deposits was revoked (ibid,).   At the same time, the Government 
instigated the liquidation of the entity and guaranteed savers’ deposits.  The liquidation 
proceedings uncovered large scale fraud at the bank, sustained through accounting which had 
covered up illegal activities.  The ‘real’ accounting numbers were only accessible to a select 
number of executives (Omurgonulsen and Omurgonulsen, 2009).  The State socialised the 
losses by honouring guarantees (ibid.).     
The political environment of Fiji was also costly for its National Bank (Lodhia and Burritt, 
2004).  This state owned entity collapsed in the mid-1990s.  The introduction of New Public 
Management (NPM) in the public sector was an imported Western ideal whose aims 
conflicted with the country’s corrupt Government.  A feature of NPM is heightened 
accountability but this was eradicated under the corrupt regime, resulting in fraudulent 
accounting and the breakdown of the audit process (ibid p353).  The article demonstrates that 
the political environment might act as a catalyst for creative accounting to cover up acting in 
political rather than commercial, interests (ibid p354). 
In the United States, politics was attributed partial responsibility for the collapse of Enron 
(Froud et al., 2004).  The authors argue that Enron bought Government approval by generous 
political donations and cultivating relationships with senior politicians, including the 
president (ibid pp 905 – 907).  These connections helped sustained the share price and image 
of Enron.  
The chapter to date builds up a picture which suggests that there are connections between 
banks, the State and the accounting of these banks which could be investigated further.  The 
next section considers the uses of accounting in the face of banking crises.   
2.3 Accounting Regulation Used as an Instrument to Pursue 
State Ends 
Accounting regulation may be used to highlight or hide problems at banks.  During the US 
savings and loans crisis in the 1980s, regulations were altered for institutions that helped 
them appear solvent for longer (Young, 1995).  This helped justify non-intervention by the 
State.  To achieve this, accounting for the institutions started to diverge from US GAAP.  
Accounting rules were flexed so that total income on long term loans was immediately 
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recognised, losses could be deferred and assets could be revalued (ibid. p61 – 63).  However, 
the crisis could not be averted.  At this point, the role of accounting became concerned with 
transparency to reveal the scale of the problems (ibid p67).   
The audit process was used to deflect blame from the State Regulator after the collapse of 
Canadian Commercial Bank (Wright, 1994) .   The auditors in this case were caught up in a 
‘chain of reliance’ over the loan portfolio valuation.  The valuation was prepared by the bank 
itself and the auditors assessed it for reasonableness only. Although it was noted that the loan 
loss provisions were now considerably less prudent than in the past, the auditors did not 
insist on updated figures. The chain of reliance continued with the state regulator of banks 
relying upon the audit report to gain assurance about the financial statements as a whole and 
particularly the loan valuations (ibid. pp376 – 379).   These valuations were found to be too 
optimistic and the bank failed.   
Accounting techniques may also impact on international banking practice.  The Japanese 
campaigned for underlying changes in the Basel regulations in the interests of its domestic 
financial institutions (Sawabe, 2002).  Japanese banks persuaded regulators to include the 
‘Latent Reserves Revaluation’ in the calculation of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) when it 
was introduced (ibid, p413).  The CAR minimum levels were set by the authorities to help 
rein in an economic bubble by requiring banks to have enough capital in proportion to 
customer borrowing.  Due to the Western focus of the ratio being mooted, Japan’s banks 
would have relatively lower capital adequacies than banks in the US or UK.  Japan therefore 
bargained with the regulators to include the Latent Revaluation Reserve in the calculation as 
part of Tier 2 capital (ibid p417).  Latent Revaluation Reserves were not a visible part of the 
bank’s financial statements; rather, it was unrealised economic gains of the bank which had 
accrued by virtue of stock holdings or property which had increased in price.  This made up 
a significant part of the Japanese industry’s CAR and meant that the banks were on a level 
playing field internationally (ibid, p414).  However, it also meant that the ratio ultimately 
became pro-cyclical and allowed the expansion of loans to increase during the Japanese 
property bubble in the early 1990s.  Japan’s property prices remain much lower today 
compared to the height of the bubble in the nineties. 
The relationship between failure and the State was further analysed in the case of BCCI 
(Arnold and Sikka, 2001) .   BCCI was designed to evade regulation by operating in a 
complex international organisational web.  The diffuse operations served as a smoke screen 
for illegal activities such as money laundering (ibid, p481).  After extensive treasury losses 
and rumours of misconduct, the Bank of England closed down BCCI UK in 1991. Thus, the 
17 
authors argue that the State still is an influential regulator of companies, despite increasing 
globalisation and the rise of multi-national companies.  In this instance, the Bank of England 
was able to shut down the bank; it did not have to gain approval of any other State to achieve 
this.   However, the closure was delayed because of the involvement of other countries in 
trying to recapitalise and restructure the bank before the Bank acted.  The international 
context contributed to the cause of the scandal (ibid, pp483 – 484).   
The case studies of the UK, Japan and the USA demonstrate that national and international 
regulation has an effect on both preventing failure in banks and responding to it.  Accounting 
techniques assist for both parts.   Furthermore, auditing provides a regulatory function for the 
markets.  Audit failure can thus also have large implications in the markets when it results in 
unexpected corporate collapse.   
Enron’s unsatisfactory audits are among the best known.  The Enron failure can be viewed 
an audit process breakdown (Cullinan, 2004).  A model is developed of three stages of the 
audit process which is then applied to other recent corporate collapses.  The 3 steps are as 
follows:  1) awareness of the transaction 2) recognition that the transactions results in a 
misstatement, 3) willingness to modify the audit opinion if the misstatement does not get 
rectified.  Breakdowns at all audit levels are demonstrated in corporate collapse.  Despite 
this, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) regulation introduced in response to the Enron failure 
has concentrated on the audit independence issue, which only addresses level three of the 
model. As a result, the author argues that US regulators missed the opportunity to legislate 
meaningfully on other identified deficiencies in the audit process (Cullinan, 2004).  
This highlights an important component of regulation, anticipating where and how to 
implement rules based on likely activities taking place.  It recognises that auditors may not 
always act rationally on jobs and regulation may move beyond the sole reliance on rational 
choice (Marnet, 2007).  It also demonstrates that everyday processes should be considered in 
the light of corporate failures.   
Moving on from auditing to the scrutiny of accounting processes, work on Enron has also 
focused on fair value accounting.  The increasing use of this technique was used to 
manipulate profits and assets by employees and ultimately led to the demise of the company 
(Benston, 2006).  The decision not to consolidate the special purpose entities into Enron’s 
financial statements was perhaps the most important manipulation of all (ibid).In addition, 
fair value accounting was based on spurious models which allowed inflated profits to be 
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realised and there was a failure to disclose all related party transactions (Benston and 
Hartgraves, 2002).    
These case analyses above show that further knowledge can be gained from investigating the 
regulatory response to corporate failures.  Some cover up of failure may occur as accounting 
is subjected to the political will of those who regulate the preparation of financial statements.  
But misleading financial statements can be produced under accounting rules with the best of 
intentions as well when fraudulent intent is uncovered (Clarke and Dean, 2007). And 
accounting’s capacity to reveal the objective truth may not be questioned (Young, 1995).  
The regulatory process of accounting and auditing is thus an important area to consider when 
investigating the financial accountability in the banking industry.  
In the current crisis, fair value accounting rules have been central to regulatory debate.  This 
is discussed next. 
2.4 Controversies in Accounting during the Global Financial 
Crisis: An Overview 
The global financial crisis from 2007 onwards has caused much heated debate in corporate 
regulation.  Fair value accounting, off balance sheet finance and poor corporate governance 
were blamed for exacerbating the spiralling crisis (Barth & Landsman, 2010; Magnan & 
Markarian, 2011).    Moreover, the largest shake up in the audit market regulation has also 
been promoted by the EU (EC, 2011) and audit market concentration was also investigated 
by the House of Lords and competition commission (House of Lords, 2011).  Whilst auditors 
and accountants have been attributed far less ‘blame’ in the global financial crisis of 2008 
than the crisis following the failure of Enron (Sikka, 2009; Humphrey et al 2009), there has 
been considerable pressure to alter accounting standards.  There was an impetus to consider 
the impact of financial accounting on the financial stability of economies (Tweedie, 2009).  
Banking Regulators and the EU were concerned at the potential losses faced by banks during 
the crisis.  As most assets would be valued at fair value following IAS 39, the collapse of the 
markets meant that a large proportion of assets would be impaired.  Losses would directly 
impact the income statement as well as the balance sheet.  EU leaders and ministers were 
particularly worried that this would give European companies a significant disadvantage to 
US companies who had the option of reclassifying certain instruments in rare circumstances.  
The EU lobbied for the IASB to consider this when examining IAS 39 in the context of the 
crisis (Europa, 2008).   In response, the IASB updated IAS 39 permitting certain 
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reclassifications of financial instruments in rare circumstances (IASB, 2008)
5
.    This meant 
that banks could remove instruments from being designated at measurement of fair value to 
one of amortised cost by reclassifying instruments as Loans and receivables or Held-To-
Maturity (ibid.). Alternatively, the loss on fair value could be recognised through the balance 
sheet rather than impacting upon the income statement under the Available-for-Sale 
category.    This could have a large impact on the reported performance of the banks. 
These changes caused widespread concern about the quality of financial reporting disclosure 
during the crisis, including within the UK Banking Industry. The G20 attributed the financial 
crisis to failures of financial regulation as well as within institutions.  The leaders called for 
an improvement in accounting standards on valuation and provisioning (G20, 2009). In 
response, the FSA (2009, p24) released a consultation document to discuss the transparency 
of banks. This culminated in a voluntary code by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) to 
ensure financial disclosure information remained of high quality (British Bankers' 
Association, 2009).  Both RBS and LBG agreed to implement this for the 2009 annual report 
and beyond.  This was updated in 2010 after further FSA evaluation of its effectiveness 
(British Bankers' Association, 2010).  An important component of the updated disclosure 
code was to be in discussion with the FSA prior to the publication of the annual report 
(British Bankers' Association, 2010). 
2.4.1 The Historical Context of the 2008 Regulatory Developments 
The quick onset of developments and regulation at the height of the crisis are likely to have 
increased the compliance costs required in UK banks at a time when there were huge 
commercial challenges to overcome.  Arguably, these regulations have been developing even 
before the UK banking crisis.  Stepping back from the technicalities of the fair value debate, 
it has been argued that the fair value controversies are rooted in a differing ways of thinking 
about accounting.  Financial economics as the intellectual basis for financial reporting 
represents a shift in the concept of reliability in accounting.   The cultural authority of 
financial economics has helped to deal with the very real problem of derivatives accounting 
(Power, 2010). However, the use of fair value has shifted the use of the Balance Sheet from a 
legal transactions basis to an asset and liability valuation statement.  As a result, the income 
statement carries less relevance (ibid, p205).  Revisions to IAS 1 exemplified this shift in 
priorities by the change in name of the Balance Sheet to ‘Statement of Financial Position’ 
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 Subsequently deleted from the IAS.   
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(IASB, 2007).  Standard setting has become increasingly isolated from the rank and file 
accountants implementing the IASB policies who relevance is defined in the terms of the 
market rather than transactions (Power, 2010).    
Moreover, the new ways of thinking about accounting have enabled regulatory mechanisms 
to improve disclosure quality in banks.    Previously, UK banks’ disclosures were criticised 
by displaying generic rather than specific content with incomplete numerical data.   
Moreover, the relationship between narrative and numerical data was regarded as spurious 
(Woods and Marginson, 2004).  As financial reporting disclosure has moved on through IAS 
32 (IASB, 2009b) and IFRS 7 (IASB, 2010a) and from January 2015, IFRS 9 (IASB, 
2010b), there has been a general perception that disclosure quality has increased, although 
not uniformly across Europe (Bischof, 2009).  Whilst fair value was called into question 
during the crisis, Barth and Landsman (  2010) argue that changes in fair value 
measurements had a negligible impact on banks’ reporting during the downturn.   There were 
other important aspects of the crisis, including derivatives, securitisations and loan loss 
provisioning which, it is argued, had a greater impact on results (ibid).    What can be taken 
from the arguments over fair value is the sheer complexity of disclosures necessary to banks, 
which can cause problems even for experienced financial statement users.  In the case of an 
income statement movement arising on financial liabilities linked to a company’s credit 
status – a decline in credit status results in a gain recognised in the financial statements 
which is a counterintuitive result.  Further disclosure describing the relationship between the 
credit status and income statement effect has been effective (Gaynor et al., 2011) whilst 
overall disclosure generally has been asserted to rectify issues associated with accounting 
identified (Barth and Landsman, 2010; Woods and Marginson, 2004).  
Regulation can also be directed at professionals rather than at disclosure.  This can have 
mixed results.  On the one hand, the FSA’s powers to ratify appointments to senior positions 
in financial services under the approved persons regime has appeared to increase senior 
staff’s perceptions of responsibility (Collins et al., 2009).  It has been recognised that 
regulation may be a process of socialization with requirements internalized by the 
management.  Yet at the same time accountants may become mere agents for the State, 
acting as directed by these regulatory regimes (Mitchell, 2008).  The improvement of 
corporate governance may be alternatively achieved through increased autonomy and the 
expertise of the market (Mitchell, 2008).  Moreover, voluntary rather than mandatory 
disclosure can act as a ‘soft law’ with voluntary take up to prevent further regulation being 
implemented (Richard and Xiaoli, 2010).  This may also be an easy way out, with the 
21 
intended practical impact on business limited whilst the organisation benefits from the 
impression of responsibility created by disclosing their compliance to voluntary codes (ibid).  
Overall regulation both shapes and is shaped by a historical and professional context.  The 
2008 crisis has been no exception.  Fair value accounting has caused market confusion and 
regulators have had to refine the parameters in response to the banking industry.  However, 
the increase in regulation has been seen as a positive outcome for financial statement users. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
The controversies in the global financial crisis resonate with previous State intervention into 
banking crises.  The use of accounting and auditing both as a cause and as a means of 
responding to crisis have been discussed in this chapter.   Corporate failure is not an unusual 
phenomenon and the first part of the chapter looked at characteristics of corporate failure. 
The second part then considered some instances where Governments had intervened to 
expose corporate failure.  The State response to crisis was then discussed.  The literature 
demonstrated that the underlying basis accounting rules could be altered to correspond to 
domestic conditions regarding banks. Finally, the 2008 global financial crisis is discussed 
with regard to accounting rules.  Again, these rules took on a political slant when the 
techniques of accounting were questioned by authorities. 
The next chapter considers further the relationship between corporations and the State.  The 
focus moves to the political relationship with business.  Starting with a historical look at UK 




Chapter 3: Nationalisation in the UK 
 
This chapter reviews the background literature on banking and nationalised industries.  It begins by 
discussing banking.  Banking has largely been a private enterprise since the first banks were set up in 
the 17
th
 Century.  There have been a few notable nationalisations of UK banks since then.  The Bank 
of England was nationalized in 1946 and Johnson Matthey, a relatively small bank, was nationalised 
in 1984.  Not all bank failures result in nationalisation.  There have also been some notable bank 
failures in the UK, including Barings and BCCI.  Nationalisation can be seen very much as a last 
resort for banks in response to corporate distress.  In contrast, other industries - railways, coal, steel, 
power and airlines- have been extensively nationalised in the UK, particularly post-World War II.  
During the 1980s and 1990s many of these industries were privatised under Conservative Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher.    These prevailing winds of privatisation may advance an understanding 
of why the Labour Government of 2008 may have been reluctant to nationalise RBS and LBG 
outright, even though it fitted well with the ‘old’ Labour ideology.   
The chapter journeys through previous UK bank nationalisations and reviews the Labour party’s 
position on bank nationalisation.  It then turns to the actual performance of those industries which 
were deliberately nationalised and the rationale for reprivatizing these industries some decades later.  
By understanding the fate of nationalised industries further, the implications of a change to 
Government ownership can be analysed as part of the empirical work of this thesis. 
3.1 Bank Failures and Bank Nationalisations 
As previously stated, there are very few banks that have been nationalised in the UK.  With the 
exception of the Bank of England, the bank nationalisations have been in response to corporate 
failure.  However, the Bank of England did begin life as a private enterprise and was nationalised to 
mutual advantage. It has been described as a process of forming in law what was already in substance 
the relationship between Government and Bank.  The nationalisation was more of symbolic 
importance than actual control (Bopp, 1946).  It reflected the recent experiences of the Great 
Depression and the Second World War.  There was a political desire to increase the supply of money 
during and after financial crisis in England and France.  However, the private banks were much less 
willing to ease the supply of credit (Bopp, 1946). A change of Governor in the Bank of England led to 
an increased recognition of the relationship with the State (Bopp, 1946).  An ownership arrangement 
allowed State interests to be directly realised by the Bank of England in its monetary policy.    
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Almost forty years later in 1984, the Bank of England became the agency on behalf of the State to 
rescue Johnson Matthey Bank.  Johnson Matthey was one of five banks trading in gold bullion.  The 
bank had got into difficulties with two very large loans relating to Pakistani companies.  These loans 
consisted of 76% and 39% of the bank’s capital base in 1984 (Bank of England, 1985).  The 
exposures were deliberately understated on returns to the Bank (ibid, p35).  A poor internal control 
environment meant exposures were not managed sufficiently and loan loss provisioning was not 
adequate.  It was clear after a review by independent auditors that the bank was insolvent and would 
be unable to continue in business (ibid, p37).  
The Bank of England tried to find buyers for the bank but was not successful in negotiating a deal.  It 
then bought the bank for the nominal value of £1, after the parent company of the bank, Johnson 
Matthey, invested £50m into its banking subsidiary.  The parent company was unable to fund any 
more of the recapitalisation without getting in to its own difficulties.  The Bank of England agreed to 
indemnify Johnson Matthey bank for up to £150m.  Other clearing banks agreed to counter indemnify 
for half of such losses (Hansard HC, 2013). Nonetheless, it took the Bank of England considerable 
effort in getting support from the private sector (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995).   Significantly, it 
was the wider concerns on the banking system that necessitated the rescue: 
The Bank’s fundamental reason for rescuing JMB was a deep concern for systemic 
consequences if the bank was allowed to fail…London is probably the most important 
international gold market and is involved in placing and taking gold deposits with a large 
number of institutions all over the world.  The members of the market also do a substantial 
amount of business with each other.  The failure of one of the five main participants would 
therefore have created a situation of extreme uncertainty.” (Bank of England, 1985) 
A new banking supervision enquiry was announced.  The ability of the auditors and their share of the 
market in the UK was also debated by the House of Commons when the Johnson Matthey rescue was 
discussed (Hansard HC, 1984).  This resonates with the cycles of crisis and regulation discussed 
previously (Carnegie and O'Connell, 2013; Laine, 2010; Clarke, 2004). 
Although the bank was taken into public ownership by virtue of the Bank of England rescue, it was 
distanced from the UK Parliament.  Indeed, it took 10 weeks before the rescue of the bank was 
debated in the House of Commons, and then only in relation to a review on banking supervision 
(Hansard HC, 1984).  Yet it too resulted in direct equity ownership, even by virtue of the £1 nominal 
sum paid for it (Bank of England, 1985).   The differences perhaps were that the systemic failure was 
related to a certain part of the banking markets; and that there was no need for direct Treasury 
involvement.  Here, the process of trading continuing was an indemnity against any losses that may 
have been incurred through Johnson Matthey failing to continue as a going concern.  The discourse 
never discussed the nationalisation of Johnson Matthey Bank. 
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In contrast to Johnson Matthey, The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was not 
rescued by the State or the Bank of England.  It managed to conceal fraud and mismanagement for a 
number of years due to its large international and diverse organisational structure (Arnold and Sikka, 
2001).  It did not identify with any one country regulator and as such regulation was disjointed 
(Arnold and Sikka, 2001).  A secretive rescue of the bank via restructuring and guarantees by the 
United Arab Emirates was negotiated into the run up of its closure.  There was some disagreement 
about whether input should be made from the banking supervisors as well (Bingham, 1992).  In the 
interim, a statutory report was commissioned from the auditors, Price Waterhouse, which brought 
together all suspected fraud and misappropriations in one place (ibid, p41).  This led to the conclusion 
that restructuring was not possible and at a meeting, the Bank of England on behalf of the disperse 
regulators told the BCCI representatives that the bank would be wound up, with assets frozen from 
that day (Bingham, 1992).  Liquidation ended in 2012 with 90% of losses having been recovered 
(Croft J, 2012). 
Like BCCI, the failure of Barings in 1995 in the UK also did not receive State rescue.  Barings had 
failed due to a system of poor internal controls which allowed a trader in Singapore to build up huge 
losses (Leeson and Whitley, 1997).  Poor internal controls at the bank meant that these trades were not 
identified timeously (Banking Board of Supervision, 1995).  The Bank of England took the view that 
there was no systemic risk to the failure of Barings (Bank of England, 1997).  Commenting on the 
reasons behind levels of supervision, the deputy governor commented: 
“If the state guarantees the existence of individual banks that can create incentives which 
encourage irresponsible behaviour. The prize for taking excess risk may—if things go well—
be excess returns (and telephone number bonuses) while, if things turn out badly, the state 
steps in and picks up the tab. This is known as a one-way bet” (Bank of England, 1997) 
Thus, moral hazard is the rationale for declining to intervene in bank failures.  Where there was 
systemic risk as with Johnson Matthey, the UK Government did intervene.   Likewise, the Bank of 
England provided a public good in the form of financial stability, contributing to the strength of the 
UK’s financial system.  Nonetheless, there has previously been considerably public appetite for the 
nationalisation of industry, including the banks.  This is discussed next. 
3.2 ‘Old’ Labour and Nationalisation  
A large scale nationalisation programme began in the mid 1940s.  The left wing Labour party formed 
a Government immediately after the end of the Second World War.  The economic conditions and the 
electoral mind-set at this time was favourable of nationalised industry (Millward, 1997).  State owned 
industry was part of Labour Party Ideology.  Clause IV of the Labour Party constitution had sought: 
"To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most 
equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership 
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of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the best obtainable system of 
popular administration and control of each industry or service." (Labour Party, 1945) 
Central planning was seen as the socialist ideal of efficiently managing the economy, by directing 
resources to the areas of greatest need. For a number of socialists nationalisation was the only way to 
reach economic stability and full employment (Singleton, 1995, p14).  By nationalising the 
‘commanding heights’ of the economy, including fuel, transport and even banks – these sectors could 
be used effectively as levers through which all areas of the economy could be controlled and regulated 
(ibid, p 16). 
3.3 Nationalising Industry, but not Banking 
For a small contingent of the Labour party left, nationalisation of the banks was a natural and essential 
step to securing the Socialist State.  However, it was never enthusiastically pursued by the wider Party 
over the long term.  The far left views advocating banking nationalisation were realised for a brief 
period in the 1930s, when the entire Labour party officially advocated the total nationalisation of all 
banks.  Philosophically, common ownership of the means of production included State ownership of 
the banks.  This would further the socialist agenda of displacing the capitalist system.  It would also 
allow central planning of prices, production and employment, as well as the direction of credit.  
Nationalisation was based upon greater security for depositors and to realise economies of scale.  
Total credit control would allow full employment to be secured.  The economy had suffered greatly 
with the World recession in the early 1930s (Pollard, 1979).   
Yet the appetite for nationalising fully the financial system diminished considerably after the mid-
1930s.  The Bank of England’s own nationalisation in 1946 (Bank of England Act 1946) perhaps 
fulfilled left wing ideals.  Bank nationalisation was rarely discussed in the Labour Party after 1950 
(Pollard, 1979).   
In contrast, nationalisation of other industries, such as steel, coal and railways, occurred from the 
1940s onwards.  The model for State Owned Enterprise (SOE) during this time was a public 
corporation and its champion was MP Herbert Morrison.  The Morrisonian model envisaged a high 
degree of independence for the leading team of management, taking advantage of the corporate 
expertise to maximise efficiency and customer service (Morrison, 1933).  In a bid to buffer the 
enterprises from any political interference in operations, the Minister concerned with the SOE was 
accountable to Parliament only on matters of policy, upon which they had a direct influence, rather 
than operations.   The corporation was legislatively enacted but only the bare bones of objectives and 
targets were laid out in the Acts.  Instead, Morrison envisaged that informal relationships would 
develop between the Government department and the corporation which would allow corporations to 
be under the successful stewardship of the State (Morrison, 1933). 
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3.4 Privatisation of SOEs 
Over the next 30 years, nationalised entities did not live up to all expectations and became perceived 
as inefficient, draining economic resources and providing poor customer service (Ashworth, 1991).  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Conservative Government sold a number of State industries to 
private ownership.   
Privatisation in the late twentieth century fulfilled the Conservative ideal.  Economic freedom for 
individuals was enhanced through selling off SOEs.  Wealth would be transferred back to taxpayers 
and workers (Lapsley, 1993; Heald and Steel, 1986).  Publicly owned industry left the electorate with 
an implied shareholding in these businesses.  If the entities were sold, the population could keep a 
higher proportion of their wealth and spend or use it as they chose. Privatising industries would 
therefore allow individuals to pursue their own goals.  This was not viewed as just favouring the 
privileged.  All employees would now be able take part in the ownership of their own industry by the 
ability to buy shares in the companies in which they worked (Heald and Steel, 1986). 
Publicly, it was the economic arguments that framed the backdrop for the wide scale privatisation 
programme by the successive Conservative Governments during the late 1970s and 1980s: 
 “At the end of the day, the heart of the matter is that a nationalised industry does not have to 
succeed in order to survive.  Even if left to their own devices, the industries have no real 
incentive to improve their performance or to strive for great efficiency.  If the Government 
stands behind the industries and is viewed as possessing a bottomless purse, it is no wonder 
inefficiencies flourish and market responsiveness does not stand very high in an industry’s 
scale of priorities”   (Moore, 1986) 
Financially, privatisation was an attractive option.  The public sector borrowing requirement was large 
and there was a need to reduce borrowing.  For the Tories, raising taxes as a means of reducing 
borrowing was unattractive.  Asset sales provided injections of cash into the public purse.  Moreover 
privatisation would allow national industries access to financing at need rather than consider the 
public sector borrowing requirement (Moore, 1983) 
3.5 Nationalised Industries: An Assessment 
The following section considers the assessment made of the UK’s experience with SOEs in the 
twentieth century.  The efficiency of SOE leads the discussion.  Following this, the political features 
of SOE are reviewed, turning attention first to ideology before examining accountability at a 




3.6 Efficiency of SOEs 
The efficiency of SOEs has been controversial.  Comparative studies using regression analysis have 
identified that private sector firms have been more efficient than State owned counterparts generally 
(Cragg and Dyck, 1999), resulting in consumer benefits such as reduced fares for airlines (Eckel and 
Vermaelen, 1986). Case studies present an inherently more complex story.  What emerges is an 
acknowledgement that efficiency has been notoriously difficult to determine, with differing criteria 
applied resulting in markedly different analyses. For instance, efficiency is often narrowly determined 
on financial grounds with little regard to technical efficiency (Pryke, 1971).  Pryke argues that SOEs 
should be assessed on technical efficiency rather than on accounting disciplines such as surplus or 
deficits.  Technical efficiency is concerned with maximum services for the amount of finances 
invested.  Viewed from the vantage of technical efficiency, SOEs have been an efficient 
organisational structure (Pryke, 1971).   
 Even for financial information in most SOEs, it must be considered against the economy as whole; 
performance is difficult to measure as inflation became very high in the 70s and there was a 
movement to current cost from historic cost accounting and back again (Ashworth, 1991).  More 
recently, there has been the move to accruals accounting (Pina et al., 2012).  Furthermore, the finances 
must be set in the context of changes in Government and Government policies, affecting the targets 
set for the industry and the sort of borrowing/financing requirements for each SOE (Ashworth, 1991). 
In a broad based international study, the decision to buy or sell SOEs stems much more from the 
political ideology of the ruling Party rather than from the economic considerations of the time 
(Zahariadis, 1999).  Domestically, there is a mixed picture.  The nationalisations in the 1940s in the 
UK were concentrated in the fuel and transport industries.  This was partly a practical response of the 
Labour Government to help improve both efficiency and service (Millward, 1997).  A number of key 
industries were left alone during this period, including the banks.  The later Conservative privatisation 
programme was part of the inherent Tory ideology (White, 1987).  However, privatisation was 
sometimes confused with competition (Mayer, 1989).  The creation of Network Rail is the ‘Third 
Way’ ideology.  The third way was associated with ‘New’ Labour, associated with the leadership of 
Tony Blair (Labour Party, 2014).  For Network Rail, there is no State ownership.  Rather, power is 
concentrated into a number of board members who administer the company (Network Rail, 2013; 
Jupe, 2009).  
Correlating performance of SOEs directly to ownership must be treated with caution, as there may be 
an inherently more complex relationship. Indeed it is an established critique of the Conservative 
privatisation programme that private sector ownership was confused with the efficiency of 
competition, leading to some unsuccessful privatisations which did not operate in a competitive 
market (Simpson, 1989).   
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Controls rather than ownership may be the cause of inefficiencies in SOE (Heald, 1985).  The 
inefficiencies identified could thus be eliminated through development within the organisational 
structure rather than necessarily changing the ultimate owner of the enterprise (ibid). For British 
Airways it was the anticipated change of ownership before privatisation which created change in 
management style and a move to consumer orientation, rather than the privatisation itself (Balmer, 
Stuart & Geyser, 2009).  At British Steel improvements in performance arose from the 
implementation of commercial management techniques, rather than a move to the private sector 
(Dudley, 1999).    
Overall, it has been difficult to define the parameters for measuring efficiency in SOEs.  Yet 
efficiency was not the only concern of the Government owned corporations.  For staunch left wing 
supporters, the SOEs were also fulfilling political ideals and to attain full employment.  Thus, the 
accountability of the SOEs was very important.  The next section discusses the issues arising in 
accountability. 
3.7 Public Accountability of the SOE  
The relative independence of public corporations set up under a Morrisonian model limited 
Parliamentary accountability of the SOEs to areas of policy which were under the remit of the 
relevant Minister (see, for instance, Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, s 3; Bank of England 
1946, s4). In an early piece of writing examining fledgling SOEs such as the BBC, it was observed 
that oral debate in full Parliament was infrequent and poor quality.  There was just not enough time in 
Parliament, nor was the expertise of MPs sufficient, to examine issues through oral debate.  MPs thus 
made extensive use of the written questions to ministers.  This was also problematic as ministers 
would only answer on their limited role in the administering of the SOE policy, rather than on 
operations.  The written questions of MPs relied greatly upon the goodwill and discretion of the 
minister for any responses (O'Brien, 1937).  Many of the written questions were rejected for being 
outside the minister’s remit and went unanswered. 
There was recognition in the 60s and 70s that the accountability of the SOEs was particularly weak. A 
select committee was set up to examine and hold them to account.  However, the committee was only 
partially successful (Kelf-Cohen, 1973).  SOEs were examined on a rota every few years.  However, 
this prevented the dominant topics of the day being examined.  Furthermore, the reports scrutinising 
industries were often too long and delayed. 
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As features of NPM developed, KPIs became a tool for assessing performance.  Previously, SOEs 
were obliged to cover costs with the subsidies or revenues earned, ‘taking one year with another’
6
(UK 
Parliament, 1947).  Yet this did not cover other objectives of the SOEs (Barberis P and May T, 1993).  
KPIS were unable to effectively distinguish between good management on the one hand and sheer 
luck or the external environment on the other (Jenkins, 2004; Woodward, 1986).  In departments 
where social, rather than financial targets were set, Day and Klein (1987) viewed KPIs as strong and 
constructive.  The availability of numbers in addition to social objectives allowed more for the 
politician to observe and ask about.  KPIs also shaped the behaviour of civil servants.   
Accountability remains problematic for organisations even if Government ownership is implicit, 
rather than formal.  The ‘third way’ solution to the collapse of Railtrack was to create a company 
limited by guarantee.  Ownership is through members of the public, rather than private shareholders 
or the State.  However, member owners do not have a financial stake in Network rail, thus weakening 
accountability of the executive managing staff (Jupe, 2009).  Indeed, its overall structure meant that 
“the company is, in practice, a very expensive mechanism for channelling large amounts of public 
money to private companies” (Jupe, 2009).  Structurally, network rail is unable to take advantage of 
lower interest rates available to the public sector for borrowings.  However, financial risk in the 
company ultimately resides with the State. 
The problems associated with the accountability of the SOEs revolved around the processes for 
Parliamentary scrutiny of operations.  Nonetheless, the minister could choose to answer questions on 
the SOE.  Investigations, however, would then be based on personal or political interests, rather than 
enshrined in a formal framework.  Personal ministerial intervention is discussed further next.  
3.8 Ministerial Interference 
Ministerial involvement with SOE was to be rather informally structured and left to civil servants for 
the day to day scrutiny of policy.  As experts in the relevant industry, managerial discretion in 
operations was to be observed.  Ad-hoc political interference in SOEs has nonetheless been observed 
in studies over the decades, even though the ministers were often not in place long enough to develop 
a deep understanding of the SOE operations and challenges (Davies, 1988; Dell, 1973).  Moreover, 
interference carried political dangers for them.  Some ministers preferred to be uninvolved in daily 
activities (Davies, 1989).   
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 Taking one year with another was a general principle applied to nationalized industries (Peacock and 
Wiseman, 1961) 
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The intervention of ministers in SOEs occurred if there was a perceived political advantage (Davies, 
1989).  It was also due to personal interests of the ministers in charge (Dudley, 1994).  High profile 
political interference embarrassed civil servants (Dell, 1973).  A popular intervention concerned the 
price of rail tickets.   Limiting price rises caused dismay in the rail industry (Ashworth, 1991). Fuel 
industries were also subject to intervention on their pricing policy (Jenkins, 2004).  Indeed, even 
under regulated private ownership, utility companies still have their pricing policies scrutinised 
(Ofgem, 2012). 
Ministerial interest also had far reaching effects on the SOE itself. The political set up of British Rail 
contributed to inefficiency and underinvestment in capital projects (Shaoul, 2004).  Yet there may be 
benefits to intervention as well (Foster, 1992).  Privatisation loosened the relationship between State 
and industry in railways and utilities, meaning less communication between the parties.  As a result, 
the State lost its influence on industrial policy for the relevant sector and the sector also lost its access 
to influential Government figures.   
The chequered history of SOE provides an important context for RBS 
and LBG.  This revolves around perceptions of accountability and 
efficiency, as well as the individuals involved in the Parliamentary life 
of these organisations.  Ministerial influence may affect both policy 
and operations.  3.9 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has considered response to bank failures in the UK.  There is a mixed precedent for 
allowing failure and taking banks into public ownership to stem systemic failure.   In contrast, there 
existed political will to nationalise industries in commodities and communications.  This trend was 
reversed in the 1980s as a privatisation agenda was carried out under the Thatcher Government.   
Research on SOE demonstrates that it is the organisational and political aspects of SOEs that provide 
a convincing case for regarding identity of the owners as important.   This is analysed further in the 
relationship between the quasi-nationalised banks and those to whom they are accountable.  This can 
be approached in a number of ways and the next chapter discusses some theoretical frameworks with 
which to analyse them.  
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Frameworks 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the theories used in analysing the public accountability of 
the quasi-nationalised UK banks. The different theories – Property Rights, Agency, Impression 
Management, Stigma and Critical Discourse Analysis – are used.  The choices reflect their use as 
established explanatory tools in accounting and their power to analyse the complex events over time.  
The aim is to understand and explain the issues addressed through theory.  The theories are used in a 
standalone fashion, rather than to bridge or merge them.  A discussion of the five different theories 
and the literature discussing them are presented below. The challenges of using a multiple theory 
approach then follows.  The potential contributions of the theories are outlined in section 4.6, which 
compares and contrasts the main features of the theories.  The rationale for choosing these theories 
against other suitable theoretical frameworks is also discussed here. 
4.1 Property Rights Theory 
The rescue of RBS and LBG by the State was realised through significant equity ownership and 
makes a theoretically informed analysis based on ownership relevant.  Whilst property rights theory 
considers impacts at the macro level, agency theory penetrates to the organisations and individuals 
concerned.  In this way, a fuller analysis is provided. 
Property rights are a critical factor in the creation and development of institutions and organisations 
within a society, establishing a context within which transactions are negotiated (Mahoney JT, 2005).  
Property rights’ potential reach for analysis of organisations is wide, conveying normative insights as 
to maximising welfare through the creation and maintenance of property rights; explaining the 
evolution of property rights within an economic system; and providing insights into why 
inefficiencies in economies persist. 
Property rights are attached to attributes of assets within our society.  Their existence allows 
individuals to use and enjoy resources in a meaningful and enforceable way, thereby increasing 
overall social welfare (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).  The absence of property rights, as demonstrated in 
common property, creates inefficiencies as individuals seek to maximise their own utility without 
consideration for the sustainability of the resource.  This ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) is 
rectified by the creation of property rights.  Externalities become embodied and internalised within the 
property rights with the result that individuals utilise resources more efficiently.  Transaction costs are 
reduced as property rights become enforceable with the assistance of the State and cultural backing 
(Alchian, 1974; Coase R, 1960). 
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The classical property rights literature is critical of State ownership.  For property rights theory, public 
ownership has three negative implications.  Firstly, the managers of the SOE are less efficient than 
those of privately owned counterparts.  Managers are not incentivised to create maximum profits for 
the corporation as they do not get any direct benefit from their efforts (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1974; 
Alchian, 1974; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Roland, 1972).  In the private sector, management may 
be offered share based incentives.  In the public sector, profits are absorbed into the public purse for 
benefits of all citizens (Armen A.Alchian, 2008; O'Hara, 1981; Alchian, 1974).  Management respond 
by expropriating resources from the firm in other ways, such as a nice office (Armen A.Alchian, 
2008; Alchian, 1974). On a related matter, there is the possibility that some resources are directed 
towards political ends for securing or winning votes, rather than directly for the objectives of the SOE 
(Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978). The benefits for political firms then are concentrated in the individuals 
but the costs, which are not closely monitored, are a burden on all citizens (Lee, 2004; Eggertsson, 
1990).   
Secondly, monitoring is less rigorous.  The citizen owners are unable to transfer their property rights 
in SOE to create specialisations for market advantage (Eggertsson et al., 1996; Eggertsson, 1990; 
O'Hara, 1981; Davies, 1977; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973).  Any management inefficiencies in the 
SOE are not sought out because there is no individual incentive to do so; there are numerous other 
free riders to their efforts. The citizen owners do not provide sufficient monitoring compared to 
private corporations.   
Finally, the ownership structure encourages short termism in management style.  Managers cannot 
gain from any future prospects of the SOE which matches the possibilities in a privately owned 
corporation.  In the private sector,  an increase in share price may reflect the net present value of the 
future earnings of the company (Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978).  Management are then rewarded for any 
increases in share prices through various incentive mechanisms.  This is not available in SOE.   
Without these incentives available, management will expropriate benefits from the SOE now.  A short 
term profit is preferred by management compared to a longer term investment perspective.  This could 
mean that expensive projects with large gains in the future may not be conducted by the SOE manager 
(Clarkson, 1972).  To compensate, the State is obliged to move towards ever increasing regulation of 
behaviour (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Clarkson, 1972).  This leads to greater costs for organisations 
(Demsetz, 1967). 
Ownership and property rights, whilst related, are not identical; owners of an asset do not necessarily 
enjoy 100% of the property rights pertaining to it and nor do property rights necessarily reside with 
the owner of the asset.  Property rights over the same asset may be delineated many times.  However, 
it is expensive to fully delineate the property rights in a resource, resulting in disputes and higher 
transaction costs.  This means that when resources are exchanged, some attributes of the resource may 
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become part of the public domain.  Individuals will try and maximise their utility through capturing 
the wealth entering the public domain.   Inefficiencies in allocation are thus regarded as incomplete 
delineation of property rights and help explain the extant structures of the property rights (Barzel, 
1997). A strength of property rights theory is thus its ability to consider multiple ownership of 
resources.  It recognises that attributes of property ownership in organisations can be transferred.  In 
an organisation, some of these rights are given up by owners of a corporation to the responsibility of 
managers who will manage on an owner’s behalf (Foss and Foss, 2001; Barzel, 1997). In a SOE, the 
managers are appointed by Parliament and represent wider society. 
More recent theoretical contributions to property rights theory challenge the assumption that ever 
increasing delineation of property rights will result in efficiency.  There remain stagnant and 
inefficient economies (North, 1994).  This is explained by the nature of institutional change which is 
incremental, rather than revolutionary.  Institutions act as constraints on behaviour allowing structure 
in everyday life and may be formal or informal.  Whilst formal institutions are important, they are also 
more easily malleable.  On the other hand, informal institutions contain embodied customs and 
traditions which are resistant to sudden change as they represent social norms and ideology.  When 
individuals make decisions, the basis of this rests on incomplete information including their own 
subjective models of customs and culture.  Thus, decisions to allocated property rights are enduringly 
inefficient in the long term. 
Eggertsson (1994) also observes inefficiency in property rights structures, which are likewise affected 
by time, location and technological attributes of the resources.  Property rights depend on internal 
factors of the actor, such as investments designed to gain control, and external factors, the institutional 
environment.  However, property rights never provide actors with full protection and full certainty.  
Enforcement is necessary to exclude others from using the resources and the value of owning the 
relevant property rights.  However, it is costly to delineate property rights and their pervasiveness may 
be affected by a weak State or rapid institutional change. 
The State is central to the enforcement of property rights.  It supports the individual through contract 
laws and helps to lower the cost of exchange.   Economies of scale make social control a more 
effective enforcement arrangement than reliance on private or individual control.  Yet the State does 
not always act in a way that minimises costs or maximises value. The effect is that politically, 
property rights serve narrow self-interests and yet may cause substantial losses to the community as a 
whole, through transactions costs or free riding.   
Property rights theory thus allows a consistent framework to analyse both the macro level institutions 
and micro-level organisations and behaviours which nationalisations affect, helping to analyse 
development over time, without expecting that equilibrium can be achieved even in the long term.   It 
also emphasises the importance of ‘path dependence’, the term given to the incremental nature of 
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change in institutions.  It is useful therefore to reflect on the historical experience of SOE discussed in 
chapter 3.  This may help understanding the response of Government in quasi-nationalising the banks 
during the recent banking crisis.   
Nonetheless, the incomplete nature of public ownership means that the banks retain features of a 
privately owned corporation.  Corporate governance in the UK is underpinned by the logic of agency 
theory.   Agency theory arguably is the basis for political thinking about the banks.  There remains a 
belief in the private sector markets (Darling, 2008) and the monitoring achieved by the Government 
agency, the UKFI, as similar to an institutional investor (UKFI, 2009)
7
.  Moreover, the nature of the 
response to the crisis was shaped by concerns over ‘moral hazard’ by the Bank of England (Bank of 
England, 2009).   
Due to this, the empirical work also makes use of agency theory to analyse the new ownership 
arrangements.   
4.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is a well-established explanatory medium for accounting research, for which property 
rights theory and agency are highly congruent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p308).  In this theory of the 
firm, the Agents (Directors) act on behalf of the Principals (Shareholders) to run the day to day 
business operations.  In return, the principals receive a share of profits and the agents receive 
remuneration for their efforts.  There are two problems associated with agency theory.   
The first is that the agents are self-interested utility maximisers and will act in their own interests 
rather than the principal’s (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p308).   If ownership is less than 100%, any 
expenditure of $1 of company resources will only dent the wealth of the owner-manager by the 
proportion of his own holding in the company.  The owner-manager with less than 100% ownership is 
thus incentivised to use company resources for perks (ibid, p311).  A larger problem is whether the 
agent is actually working hard to seek profit maximising opportunities (ibid, p313).  This is termed 
adverse selection, as the principals are uncertain whether the agent is doing the work for which he is 
paid.   
                                                     
7
 Institutional investors themselves adhere to the provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2008).  The 
UK Markets are generally accepted as part of the Anglo-American system with a diversified shareholder base, 
and the concept of the separation of ownership and control under agency theory is applicable to these 
corporations  
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Any prospective owner of the firm will be aware of these issues and will adjust the price they are 
willing to pay for a shareholding accordingly.  As a result, the firm value is reduced from that of a 
100% owner manager and any prospective shareholders will pay less for the firm.  The difference 
between the value to the 100% owner and that of a part owner results in the existence of agency costs.  
Agency costs are borne entirely by the owner-manager (ibid, p319).    
The model captured is one of corporate ownership structure rather than capital structure, because the 
agent’s relative wealth and monitoring costs change as the proportion of ownership falls (ibid, p349).  
100% ownership is not often a desirable outcome for the entrepreneur as they are risk averse and want 
to diversify their wealth in the face of positive bankruptcy costs (ibid, p349).  Furthermore, agency 
costs arise due to information asymmetry.  Agency contracts mean that agents are much more aware 
of all the activities of the business than the principals.  In order to overcome the problem of 
information asymmetry, the principal requests audited financial accounts to help assess how the 
resources they have provided have been put to use. In addition, the principals will incentivise the 
agents in such a way as to align their interests, such as share payments options or in terms of profit 
targets (ibid, p323).   
With disparate ownership in large corporations the owner may not have significant interest in the 
well-being of the corporation. Knowing this, agents may act in a way which is contrary to the best 
interests of the principal (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p304).   The decision process is split into two to 
mitigate this risk. The two aspects of decision making are decision management, made by agents, and 
decision control, those who monitor the decisions.  Decision control is often carried out at the top 
level by the board (ibid, p311).  The existence of a delegated board who carry out the decision 
ratification process limits the power of the managers to deviate from the interests of the residual 
claimants (ibid, p309). Outside directors in the board do not collude with management as they have 
their own personal reputations to consider (ibid, p315).   At lower levels, mutual monitoring occurs 
through managers working together and learning about their colleagues (ibid, p310).    Furthermore, 
the agent will actively accept monitoring costs and restrict any ‘perks’ they may have otherwise 
enjoyed because it results in a lower dent in wealth than no monitoring costs would.  The agent is also 
incentivised to ensure monitoring costs are as low as possible (ibid, p338).   
There are also market mechanisms which help to control for agency costs.  These could be through 
the openness of the stock markets, whereby unsatisfied principals can sell their shares onwards.  The 
price may drop as a result (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p313).  Moreover, the takeovers market will mop up 
any inefficiently performing organisations whose share price has dropped below their potential (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983, p313). 
The takeovers market, split decision making and information asymmetry rely on robust information 
and communications from agents.  Monitoring can be achieved through the use of financial statements 
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and the audit process.  The next section considers the agency implications of financial monitoring 
before moving on to consider managerial incentives further.  
4.2.1 Agency Implications of Financial Monitoring 
Financial monitoring comes in two forms: the financial statements and the audit process.  There is a 
benefit under agency theory for the credibility of financial information.  Incentives between principals 
and agents are not aligned if the agent has complete discretion over the reported accounting numbers 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  Financial statements are more useful if the rules under which they 
have been prepared are already known and can be viewed as unbiased accounts (Benston, 1985).  
However, agents may choose accounting standards which will increase their compensation for 
management of the company, thereby acting opportunistically.  Increased compensation may be 
achieved via increasing cash bonuses or improving results with a concomitant effect on the 
corporation’s share price (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Investors can anticipate that the agents will 
act opportunistically and will negotiate with the agents ex ante to minimise this.  Nonetheless, it can 
be beneficial to give limited discretion to the managers to choose accounting policies so that 
subordinates may be motivated and firm value is maximised (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  The 
management and shareholders voluntarily agree on the accepted accounting procedures used by the 
firm (ibid, p137).   
The audit process helps to confirm that agents are in fact following contracts to limit resource 
divergence away from the objectives of the principals (Benston, 1985). An audit will reduce the 
opportunistic behaviour of the management only if the principal reasonably expects that breaches of 
contract will be reported by the auditor (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983).    The auditors can provide 
this assurance at a smaller cost than alternative monitoring schemes (ibid).   The audit helps to 
reassure investors that the internal controls of the company are also robust (ibid.). The agents will also 
want to actively distribute the audited information to reassure other interested parties, such as 
creditors, as well (ibid, p40).  From the perspective of the audit firm, the auditor is interested in 
maintaining a good reputation on audit performance to retain and expand on future business 
opportunities (Benston, 1985). 
Investors may also be interested in the employment of auditors, particularly where the agents are 
unknown or not trusted.  The auditors could help in reducing any expected losses associated with the 
bankruptcy of the firm or misuse of resources (Benston, 1985).  
Agency theory thus places accounting and audited information as a central component of reducing 
information asymmetry.  This has given rise to considerations of the quality of that financial 
accounting via credible standards and the impact of audit on adding value to financial information as 
37 
discussed in this section.  In turn, financial information often influences performance related pay for 
management.  Likewise, agency theory considers pay in further detail.    
4.2.2 Managerial Incentives: Pay 
Risk capital bearers can shift their investments elsewhere at relatively low transaction costs.  
Therefore, it is often the manager who is more interested in the success or failure of the firm, as 
she/he invests a greater proportion of personal wealth in the form of human capital (Fama, 1980, 
p291). If the firm is viewed as a nexus of contracts where the risk capital is viewed as part of the 
factors of production (Fama, 1980, p290) the separation of ownership and control can be viewed as an 
efficient structure. Management look to monitor each other, below and above them, in order to 
ascertain their own marginal product. This  helps determine their own wages (ibid, p293).  On the 
assumption that there is an efficient labour market, the manager will be paid for his own marginal 
product over his entire working life, smoothing out the results of his efforts, shirking and noise as his 
performance is assessed at each wage period (ibid, p301).  It is the self-regulating nature of the 
managers and the discipline of the labour markets which form for the basis for efficiency in agency. 
Political factors may also impact on agent negotiations, particularly towards pay.  Media and public 
outrage has been noted to dampen the upper echelons of top management pay.  Pay is not a private 
contract, but published for top executives.  Other stakeholders – labour unions, consumer groups, 
Government, and the media  may create forces which constrain top executive pay (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990b).  
“Since the subjective "reasonableness" of a compensation package is strongly influenced by 
the political process, it is natural that well-intentioned but risk-averse board members will 
resist innovative incentive contracts” (ibid). 
The political processes of pay have a flattening effect on the pay-performance relationship, as poor 
performance is more generously rewarded than would be the case under a freer paying regime (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990b).  The approach then would be to allow higher pay for the top performing CEOs 
and lower rewards/ increased chances of dismissal for poorly performing executives (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990a). 
The UK banking crisis has stimulated a critical look at banking executive pay.  Agency theory 
provides some analysis of incentives and pay with which to look at these issues.  Moreover, the theory 
gives insight into the particular issues of the banking industry and those with block ownership 
structures.  These are discussed next. 
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4.2.3 Agency Theory, the Banking Industry and Type II Agency Problems 
The agency framework needs to be considered in light of the particular industry which is being 
researched (Grove et al., 2011).  In looking at the US banking industry, the special role of regulators 
has been identified, who may be incentivised to intervene in the banks.  Moreover, depositors are also 
important stakeholders to whom the bank has a duty to protect as well as maximise profits for 
shareholders(Grove et al., 2011). This could also cause an increase in moral hazard as deposit 
insurance insulates management from effects of risk taking (Houston and James, 1995).  Finally, 
banks are extremely complex, exacerbating agency problems under information asymmetries (Grove 
et al., 2011).  Empirical research, which is discussed in the next chapter, examines the specific 
banking issues under agency theory.   
Type II agency problems arise when there is a conflict of interest occurring between the principals –
particularly controlling shareholder owners and non-controlling shareholders.  Large shareholdings 
often arise in State ownership or in family owned firms (La Porta et al., 1999).  There are a number of 
implications with controlling and non-controlling owners.  With diverse minority shareholders, there 
can be a lack of incentive to monitor and engage with corporations (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). In 
contrast, large shareholders may be more motivated to monitor performance. They may also have 
enough power to oust poorly performing management (Grove et al., 2011; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
This reduces the risk of management extracting non-pecuniary benefits and leads to a better 
organisational performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) .   Improved corporate performance may 
benefit all interested parties.   
In contrast, these gains may be subject to a biased distribution.   The controlling shareholder may be 
able to extract benefits from a corporation that minority shareholders do not receive. These include 
taking a disproportionate amount of the corporation’s earnings or by freezing out minority 
shareholders.   The corporation may be obliged to transact with the controlling shareholders under 
terms which favour the shareholder rather than the corporation.  An example would be supplying 
goods or services to the corporation by the controlling shareholder above market prices (Gilson and 
Gordon, 2003).  Thus large owners may oblige management to align with their own private interests, 
meaning minority shareholders lose out (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
In addition, majority shareholders are set to gain a large amount of money from the takeovers market 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  Moreover, they can benefit by selling the block holding at a premium to 
non-controlling shares (Gilson and Gordon, 2003).  In such circumstances, the minority shareholders 
can be subject to freeze out deals, where the controlling shareholder bids for the remaining shares 
from the minority.  These bids do not take place as an arm’s length transaction and result in a conflict 
of interests (Bates et al., 2006).  So although controlling shareholders may increase monitoring and 
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decrease managerial benefits, they can create their own private benefits which are not in the interests 
of the minority shareholders (Gilson and Gordon, 2003).   
The controlling shareholders’ full power may not be entirely transparent.  Powers may be greater than 
expected through the use of ‘pyramid holdings’ comprising of parent and subsidiaries.   The 
protection of minority shareholders is therefore recommended through increased legal protections (La 
Porta et al., 1999).   
Block ownership is often a feature of State owned Enterprise.  State owned enterprise may comprise 
of 100% ownership or a controlling interest with minority shareholders.  The State interest in RBS 
and LBG may be characterised as block ownership.  Agency theory may be critical of state ownership 
as a result of SOEs not achieving social objectives any better than privately run firms and SOEs’ 
‘extreme inefficiency’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  In fact, bureaucrats control the firms and have no 
associated cashflow incentives, leaving only strong political incentives to determine the management 
of the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The above discussions show the multifaceted insights agency theory has produced in areas pertinent 
to this thesis, ranging from information asymmetry and accounting, to pay, moral hazard and State 
ownership.  Its applicability in the UK banking crisis is thus extensive.  However, agency theory and 
its assumptions are also widely critiqued.  Due consideration of its overall usefulness is worthwhile 
and is reflected upon now.   
Generally, agency theory has great potential to enrich research in organisations.  Its unique 
contribution comes from its treatment of information as a commodity (Eisenhardt, 1989, p64, Jensen, 
1983, p325) and its consideration of various risks in contracting.  It remains an excellent theory for 
empirical studies.  Qualitative information will be necessary to consider the characteristics of the 
contracts being produced (Jensen, 1983, p332).  It is particularly appropriate for research where there 
are substantial goal conflicts between the principal and agents or sufficient uncertainty to ensure risk 
considerations are utilised (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Nonetheless, it remains a partial view of the world and 
it is well placed to be used with other theories (ibid, p71).   
Notably, its concepts of self-interest, opportunism and congruence of economic goals between 
principal and agent, taken to its logical extreme, would result in higher contracting and monitoring 
costs within the firm.  This would erode its competitive advantage and depress its share price in the 
markets (Wright & Mukherji, 1999, p300).  On the other hand, the consideration of the loss to 
reputation from poor managerial behaviour means that agents may not act opportunistically even 
when it may otherwise be possible to do so (Donaldson, 1990, p377). Whilst this gives the theory a 
great deal of flexibility, it does mean it suffers from a lack of falsifiability.   It also leaves no room to 
explain actions through positive motivations such as altruism (Donaldson, 1990, p379).   
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Yet altruism does not lead to the perfect agent, who will do the bidding of others (Jensen, 2004, p6).   
Rather, agency theory is designed to consider conflicts which arise and how these are best dealt with 
through incentives, whether monetary or not.  In this way, everyone can share in the gains (Jensen, 
2004, p15).  Jensen contends that the self-interest does not equate to rationality, nor does it mean that 
altruism is not part of self-interest.  Indeed, humans are not rational beings, and engage in behaviour 
which is self-harming as well as value maximising (Jensen, 2004, p11).   
Agency theory offers explanations to corporate behaviour and performance based on an established 
and multi-layered platform.  For this reason, the first research theme, which explores negotiation of 
accountability in the quasi-nationalised banks post crisis, utilises agency theory and property rights.  
Property rights theory predicts public sector management is less efficient than the private sector.  
Agency theory does not have a theoretical stance on the identity of owners per se, although there is 
some work on block holdings which may be pertinent to the current capital structure of the UK banks.  
Its continuing relevance to the business world means it is an important tool of analysis for the current 
study. 
The chapter now turns to the second research theme which seeks to examine accounting in a different 
light.  In contrast to agency theory’s perception of accounting as an information commodity, the 
second research theme considers the nature of presentation.  To this end, the accounts are analysed 
using Erving Goffman’s work.   
4.3 The Management of Impressions and Stigma Management 
The intellectual foundation for the second research theme is Goffman’s The Presentation of the Self in 
Everyday Life (1973) and Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1968).  Goffman’s 
work has been extremely influential within the social sciences and beyond.  It concentrates on social 
interaction ‘where most of the world’s work gets done’ (Burns, 1992, p18).  While it is often 
acknowledged that Goffman’s works focuses on the individual, there is some consideration of groups 
(Goffman, 1956b p27 - 33).  This thesis embodies the assertion that ‘corporate self’ is one facet of the 
‘self’ that Goffman considers, as individual human nature is another (White & Hanson, 2002).    This 
section details some aspects of Impression and Stigma Management that Goffman considers and that 
resonate with features of the current study.  Impression management as constructed in The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956b) is first considered.  Then additional means of managing 
interaction identified in Stigma (1968) are discussed.   
At its most basic, impression management involves the process of acting in such a way so as to be 
perceived favourably (Goffman, 1956a).  Using a stage as metaphor, Goffman theorises that every 
individual plays a role in interactions with others which projects an impression.   There are three 
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components to the dramaturgical metaphor described here.  These are the ‘front stage’ arena where 
the individual projects the impressions required.  On the receiving end, the audience are critical in 
allowing the impression to be played out by respectfully allowing the performance to take place. 
Finally, there exists a ‘backstage’ area where invisible processes take place, particularly in the work 
required to cultivate the impression being projected.    
Goffman begins by acknowledging that the majority of the time, the impression being projected will 
be favourable to the performer, who is the person they strive to be (ibid, p19). Indeed, most acts will 
encompass accepted societal values within the performance (ibid, p37).   Impressions remain dynamic 
throughout the performance, with adaptations employed as situations and audiences change.   
Impressions allow the performer to set the agenda of the performance and control the impressions 
received by the audience.  In this way, the performer can define the situation of the interaction.  
Routine fronts may become institutionalised in terms of an abstract stereotype, in the manner of a 
professional vocation (ibid, p27).   The front then becomes a ‘collective representation’ which acts as 
a shorthand for individuals.  However, there is also difficulty within conforming to stereotypes as 
some situations may make a bad fit with current roles (ibid, p29).   
At the receiving end of the impressions, the audience are requested to take seriously the impression 
‘given off’ (ibid, p17).  However, the performance is inherently fragile and can be upset by even 
minor mishaps (ibid, p66).  The audience will look to less controllable aspects of a performance to 
assess sincerity of the performer and their authority in giving the impression performed (ibid, p58 – 
59).  They may also take a more active role, acting in concert with an individual to validate and 
reinforce the impression to other members of the audience (ibid, p76).   As a result, the audience is 
critical in allowing impressions to be successfully managed.  With that in mind, the performer is ever 
mindful of the audience and will necessarily anticipate audiences’ reactions when on stage.  In doing 
this successfully, any one individual has multiple impressions that they create, and will engage in the 
segregation of their audiences to ensure that these are consistently presented as necessary to various 
groups (ibid, p49). If time or resources are short, some ideals may need to be compromised in the 
performance so that most legitimately important ideals are preserved (ibid, p45).  
The impression that is received by onlookers is one which encompasses concealment as well as 
disclosures.  Concealment occurs in the backstage arena where ‘dirty work’ or secrets are kept away 
from the eye of the audience at front stage.  Thus, the impression is necessarily a finished product and 
may not show secret pleasures or economies in which the person is engaged (ibid p43).  This helps 
add an air of mystification to the role of the performer, where society expects that they be wholly the 
role that they are playing and that the performer engages with (ibid, p74).  
Good impressions are thus a constant and fragile means of everyday interaction, with concealment 
inbuilt into it.  Whilst the focus in The Presentation of Self remains with projecting a good impression, 
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Stigma considers the presence of discrediting information and how this information is managed in 
interaction with others.  This resonates with the deeply discrediting events occurring in RBS and LBG 
at the peak of the banking crisis. 
In Stigma, (1968) Goffman’s builds upon many of themes first identified in The Presentation of Self 
in Everyday Life (Manning, 1992, p99).  Like good impressions, it is a continuous and precarious 
project to keep control of the stigmatising information and generated impressions (ibid: p100).  The 
work is released from the dramaturgical metaphor previously employed.  Here stigma refers to ‘an 
attribute which is deeply discrediting’ (1968 p3).  As a result, the stigma leads to ramifications in 
interactions with ‘normals’, i.e. those without stigma.  The stigmatised suffer rejection from others or 
receive specialised (perhaps unwanted) treatment.  This leads to a number of techniques to help 
manage interactions.  These include the correction of the stigma (ibid, p9) or if possible, the 
stigmatising attribute is concealed.  Goffman terms this ‘passing’ (1968, p74). As individuals interact 
with the world around them, considerable private effort goes into considering the response of those 
interacting with others, even if the other has accepted them (ibid, p14).  Thus the individual is trying 
to manage the discreditable by concealing their existence as much as possible.  This may be done 
through careful management of potentially exposing situations (ibid p91) or complete removal from 
the conventional everyday existence, through moving towns or neighbourhood (ibid, p92).  Yet these 
same individuals may move beyond concealing the discrediting fact into open disclosure.  Here the 
techniques move from concealment to managing potentially awkward social situations, much in the 
line of a stigmatised person with a physical impairment (ibid, p100).  Importantly, the extent of 
concealment can range from complete suppression if the stigma is not visible to covering/dressing up 
the stigma to make it less visible and thus to help make interaction easier (ibid, p95). 
Although the primary focus of the book is on the social interaction with the stigmatised, Goffman 
does also consider the social systems in place to assist the stigmatised individual.  They may align 
themselves with a group who help support each other and give advice to coping with the difficult 
situations (ibid, p108).   Those who are closely associated with the stigmatised may also collude with 
the individual to avoid exposure occurring (ibid, p95).   
Yet those closest to the stigmatised may suffer consequences by association.   Intimates may suffer 
their own stigma, even if the associate does not share that particular discreditable attribute.  It is called 
‘courtesy stigma’ (ibid, p30).  Those suffering from courtesy stigma face a double edged separation.  
They are outsiders to the group who directly suffer the stigma, yet may not enjoy the same rights as 
those unblemished with the attribute in the wider world (ibid, p31).  It will lead to further techniques 
to manage the identity of both the stigmatised and those associated with them.   
Whilst stigma suggests a strong discrediting attribute, such as physical impairment or a weakness of 
character (ibid, p4), Goffman concludes his writing with the observation that stigma is in fact 
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commonplace.  It is a general feature of society, and he urges his readers to reflect that we all 
probably fall short of societal expectations in some capacity of our lives (ibid, p130).   Viewed in this 
sense, the work on Impression Management in The Presentation of Self (1956b) and in managing 
Stigma (1968) resonate with the regular communication of between people, which can include the one 
way communication in the form of TV and radio (Burns, 1992), as well as financial communications 
from organisations.  Goffman’s work is suggestive that the human is but one form of self, and there is 
a ‘corporate self’ which evokes the themes that he uses in his studies of individual interaction (White 
& Hanson, 2002, p 290).  It has been the foundation for a number of papers which look at the 
financial reporting process.  It is very relevant for the quasi-nationalised banks that have suffered 
considerable reputational damage and must repair damaged relations with wider stakeholders.  Thus, 
Goffman’s work is used to analyse the banking crisis through the lens of financial reporting. 
4.4 Critical Discourse Analysis and the Language of Newspaper 
Headlines 
The third research theme considers the possible fulfilment of public accountability through the 
newspaper reporting of accounting results.  Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis is the theoretical 
lens used (Fairclough, 1995).  Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) sees linguistic construction as an 
important instrument in representing events and institutions (ibid, p14; Montgomery, 1995, p223), 
which may highlight societal values and ideologies (Thornborrow, 2006, p618) and is a tool which 
can highlight inequalities of power (McKay, 2006).  It has become increasingly interdisciplinary in 
nature and considers other socio-cultural contexts alongside the consideration of media text (McKay, 
2006, p598, Fairclough, p16).  In this way, social construction of knowledge is profoundly impacted 
by language and guides our comprehension of the world around (Montgomery, 1995, p250).   
The stance taken in this paper is that newspapers contribute to a construction of reality rather than just 
mirroring a reality (Fairclough, p18).  In this way, mass media becomes a part of the event itself, 
rather than just reporting on it (Leitner, 1997, p187).  As an important social institution holding 
Government bodies to account, the printed media have an important and powerful discourse within 
public life.  The very nature of this discourse – unidirectional and delayed in time, means that the 
press have a very powerful role in shaping the discourse that occurs (ibid, p 188).   
The normative proposition of CDA is to correct social wrongs in the world (Fairclough, 2010, p7).  
The emphasis on critique is to provide opportunities and analysis to strategies designed to improve the 
world (ibid.).  The Global financial crisis provides an opportunity for CDA to critique the strategies of 
transforming neo-liberal capitalism into a more socially just capitalism (ibid, p18).   
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There are two levels of analysis in Fairclough’s theory of CDA.  These are the Communicative Event 
(e.g. a newspaper article or headline); and the Order of Discourse.    Discourse is a key component of 
CDA, linking the individual texts of the study to the wider discussions and institutions about which 
the text refers.  CDA is thus a relational study between actors and it contributes to the meaning of the 
world and how these meanings are made (ibid, p3).  It is also dialectical, as it explores relations 
between two distinct entities.   
Textual analysis is used to consider the discourse and ‘genre’ of the text to which it refers.  Finally, it 
uses linguistic theory to analyse how the world is portrayed through its semiotic choices (ibid.).   For 
CDA, the linguistic construction of events contributes to the understanding of how that event is 
represented in the press:  
“by studying the minute details of linguistic structure in the light of the social and historical 
situation of the text, to display to consciousness the patterns of belief and value which are 
encoded in the language – and which are below the threshold of notice for anyone who 
accepts the discourse as natural…any aspect of linguistic structure, whether phonological, 
syntactic, lexical, semantic, pragmatic or textual can carry ideological significance:” (Fowler, 
1991, p67). 
In other words, linguistic analysis may help to excavate the ideology of the writer and to some extent, 
the reader.  Ideology works by becoming part of ‘common sense’ (ibid, p67).   Whilst lexical 
meanings are important, presuppositions, metaphors and coherence all are implied in texts 
(Fairclough, 2010). For media, this also includes sensationalism (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013).  CDA 
embraces all these considerations by taking into account both the order of discourse and the 
communicative event being analysed. A full understanding of the communicative event requires an 
extensive knowledge of the order of discourse to which it is related.  In a media setting, this includes 
the context of the press industry itself.   
Fairclough’s analytical framework draws upon the inherent tensions which are managed by media 
journalists between its public sources of information and its private target recipients (ibid, p63).  The 
journalists must report on events which are part of public discourse and translate that to make it 
relevant for a domestic, individualised setting.  He also notes the increasing competition for the media 
industry against 24 hour broadcasting news, the internet and other publications which have resulted in 
public information, useful for democratic purposes being increasingly turned into a mixture of 
information and entertainment ( ibid, p10).  Competition encourages newspapers to cater for the 
prejudices of their readership in order to strive for a larger part of business.  This can result in bias as 
to what is reported in the news (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). 
CDA has been criticised for being overly theoretical rather than empirical (Thornborrow, 2006) and 
not considering the reception of readers on the discourse displayed.  Yet the reader will always bring 
individual ideals to the construction of texts so the analysis of the actual text remains important 
45 
(Fairclough, p16).  Moreover, the voice of the public is now increasingly recognised in the media 
output (Thornborrow, 2006, p616) as the printed press increasingly feel the pressure to entertain as 
well as inform in their outputs (Fairclough, 1995, p10; McKay 2006, p600).  Another form of tension 
highlighted by Fairclough is the public/private nature from sources in the public domain to appealing 
to the predominantly private audience of individuals (ibid, p63).      
Thus language has a profound effect on the way that reality is constructed by this privileged media 
discourse.  In the discussion that follows, this study and other literature concerning newspaper 
headlines will be used to illuminate why and how such linguistic devices can contribute to readers’ 
perceptions of the outside world.  Various aspects of linguistics - Phonology, Syntax, Lexicon, 
semantics, Pragmatics and Text - are considered in turn next. 
4.4.1 Phonology 
Phonology in linguistics considers the speech sounds and pronunciation of a language.  This occurs 
most obviously in speech interaction, but the internal monologue produced when reading text means 
that phonology plays a role in textual analyses as well.  Indeed, phonological structure remains an 
extremely important part of the way that newspaper headlines are constructed.  Arguably, phonology 
is particularly used in the tabloid end of the market where punning and clichés are well known. It has 
been argued that this is all designed to grab readers’ attention and lure a purchase (Schaffer, 1995).   
However, punning and clichés also find their way into the broadsheet newspapers as well, despite the 
relatively meagre status puns are given in literary circles (Chovanec, 2005).  Playing with words 
draws the reader in by giving the headlines a metaphorical meaning and interpersonally allows the 
reader to deconstruct the communicated meaning (ibid.).   
Punning and clichés can be constructed in a number of ways.  A common device is homonymy– 
words which are spelt differently but sound the same.   These can then be reinforced later in the 
headline by further words related to the same lexical field as the pun.  Clichés can be reinforced by 
collocation based on cultural references (Chovanec, 2005). 
4.4.2 Lexical Devices 
Lexical devices relate to the vocabulary employed in speech and text.  This is particularly important in 
a language such as English where vocabulary is diverse and can be chosen for various subtle changes 
in meanings.  Instruments which use lexical devices include connotation rich vocabulary, which are 
chosen for their impact on the readers, to literary and poetic devices, such as alliteration, rhyming and 
assonance.  In tabloids, literary techniques may serve to give warning about the potential inaccuracies 
of the stories that follows (Schaffer, 1995), although studies commonly highlight the similarities of 
linguistic approach from qualities to the tabloids (Jucker, 1992; Chovanec, 2005).  Vocabulary is 
often hugely illuminating about the cultural attitudes of society as it allows categorisation of the news 
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items within (Fowler, 1991, p82).  The representation of women in a sexual capacity and nuclear 
weaponry provide examples of lexical divergences (Montgomery, 1995).     
4.4.3 Syntax 
Syntactic analysis is concerned with positional make up of elements in a sentence and is not so 
concerned with the meanings of the phrases involved (Fowler, 1991, p77).  Positions of the subjects in 
a passive and nominal syntax help imply responsibility on part of the agent and can reorient the 
subject of the story (ibid, p78).   
Syntax has also found to be important in distinguishing different types of news stories from one 
another.  A study into noun phrases suggested that syntactic structure contributed to flags which 
demarked each type of news section within papers and that this was also variable across market 
segments of the Press (Jucker, 1992).   
4.4.4 Semantics 
Semantics is a particularly important part of the linguistic creation of headlines and helps to direct the 
reader to the important points of the story.  The study of semantics refers to the construction of 
meaning in a sentence, whether spoken or written. Indeed, it has been argued that the construction of 
the sentences rather than the lexical choices made is more illuminating as the choice of structure is 
less consciously chosen by the writer (Montgomery, 1995, p236).  To this end, the transitivity of a 
verb is very important.  Transitive verbs are often classified as one which takes an object, whereas 
intransitive verbs are ones without objects.  However, there is further analysis in examining the 
process that the verbs designate, including whether they have an effect on another entity or which 
only affect the actor (Fowler, 1991, p 70 – 71).  These may have certain connotations in reinforcing 
power or powerlessness in news subjects (ibid, p132 – 133); designating responsibility or blame (ibid, 
p79); and in reinforcing discrimination in gender (ibid, p96).  In this way, the subtle choices in 
structure in a sentence can lead to quite powerful shifts in emphasis over time or from newspaper to 
newspaper (Montgomery, 1995, p238).  This isn’t just about reflecting ideologies, but in some ways 
contributes to these ideologies and beliefs systems held (ibid, p245).   
Another important part of semantics is the use of nominalization, where a verb is made into a noun.  
This shortens the required information for a headline, which loses some of its informational value as a 
result but offers ‘substantial ideological opportunities’ (Thornborrow, 2006; Fowler, 1991).  
Nominalization omits participants and time out of the headline but retains its sense.   This can turn an 
active state into a passive one (Fairclough, 1995).  However, nominalizations can then act as 
participants in other processes; such as ‘hunger’ or ‘crisis’ and keep the actual subjects at a distance 
and abstracted (Fairclough, 1995). It may also add a sense of mystification or even reification for the 
relevant stories (Montgomery). 
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4.4.5 Pragmatics 
Pragmatics involves the study of linguistics in actual situations.  Pragmatics predominantly relates to 
oral interaction and is less of a concern in textual analysis.   However, previous empirical work on 
pragmatics can be illuminating in understanding the linguistic theory behind the newspaper headlines.  
Dor (  2003) argued that the construction of the headline was a more artistic endeavour than a 
scientific approach.  Knowledge in producing the headlines were of a practical rather than theoretical 
variety (ibid, p707).   This involved having an intimate acquaintance with the readership of the 
publication – their thoughts, beliefs, prejudices – as well as a thorough understanding of the story 
being published.   
All aspects of linguistic devices – phonological, lexical, semantic, grammatical and pragmatic can 
impact on the construction of newspaper headlines.  The above discussion illustrates the reasoning 
behind why these items may be important in the current study.  Overall, linguistics points to the 
creation of reality through newspaper headlines and not just reflecting, like a mirror, events that have 
occurred.  Language is not neutral, in the same way that accounting is also not neutral.  These studies 
demonstrate that the media reinforces cultural and institutional stereotypes perceived in the wider 
world, which reflect the dominant views of society (Chovanec, 2005; Leitner, 1997; Schaffer, 1995; 
Jucker, 1992; Fowler, 1991).  However, critical discourse analysis does not reveal the ‘truth’ of a 
matter as semantics and syntax can be variable depending on context.  Thus the researcher must have 
deep understanding of the context to work with the data such as newspaper headlines (Fowler, 1991, p 
90).  
Critical discourse analysis offers a unique perspective on accounting and its role in fulfilling 
accountability to the public via the medium of the Press.  There is an opportunity to discern the 
ideologies surrounding the publication of corporate results by considering the newspaper headlines 
generated.     
Four separate theories are being utilised in the analysis of the three research themes identified at the 
beginning of the thesis.  Property Rights and Agency theory are used to interrogate accountability post 
crisis; impression management and stigma are being used for the banking crisis through the lens of 
financial reporting; and CDA is being used to consider newspaper headlines generated from corporate 
annual results.  These theories are disparate.  The relationship between theory and method is an 
essential consideration for all projects (Blaikie, 2000: 182) as differing epistemological parameters 
impact on the empirical focus of the work. This has implications for how the theories are handled with 
the data, and this is considered further below.   
  
48 
4.5 The Multiple Theory Approach 
The use of multiple paradigms in organisational research has been advocated as a means of capturing 
the complexity and multifaceted nature of organisational life and may arrive at a more complete set of 
knowledge than single paradigms being employed (Gioia et al, 1990: 599).  It appears that the UK 
banking crisis is complex and to allow a fuller version of events to be studied, multiple theories have 
been introduced into the thesis.  However, the use of multiple paradigms remains a controversial 
issue, facing particular rejection from both functionalists, who favour the political influence of their 
own theory and postmodernists, who adopt a more flexible approach to research (Lewis & Grimes, 
1999).   
The thesis straddles the subjective/objective paradigms (Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2008; Burrell G and 
Morgan G, 1979).   Recent discussion in management accounting has suggested that research projects 
can successfully bridge this divide (Lukka, 2010; Modell, 2010; Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2008).  The 
differences between paradigms can sometimes be overemphasised without due consideration of the 
similarities (Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2008).  These include implicit hypothesis making in qualitative 
work (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006) and the establishment of causality in fieldwork (Lukka, 2010).  
This means that interpretive research has great potential: 
“Interpretive researchers can do considerably more than simply describe and explore 
subjectively held meanings; often they can advance theoretically informed 
explanations”(Modell, 2010) 
The researcher must decide whether the theories will sit on the boundaries of their respective 
paradigms, or sit at opposite ends of a spectrum.  The latter allows the possibility of meta-theorising 
to be considered, though it poses the potential for considerable dispute if markedly different theories 
are chosen (Gioia et al, 1990).   Even if no bridging work is built in to the design plan, the actual 
process of analysing data driven by the theories employed must be considered, particularly whether 
the two theories will inform the research sequentially or in parallel.  Furthermore, how these findings 
then sit beside one another to form a coherent whole in the results of the study needs addressing. 
The analytical process will utilise the theories separately in a sequential rather than parallel fashion.  
The sequential process offers the outputs of one theoretical analysis to inform the next, “allowing 
theorists to grasp their disparate yet complementary points” (Lewis & Grimes, 1999: 275).   This 
potentially would allow a degree of dialogue between theories to occur and allow a more coherent 
thesis to develop.   The price of complementary is the possible loss of distinctiveness between 
theories.   
The sequential approach enjoys pragmatic merits as well.  It allows in-depth analysis and absorption 
to occur with one consistent framework over a sustained period of time, reducing the risk of analytical 
and methodological confusion between theoretical stances.  Parallel studies, with more frequent 
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switching of perspectives may be more open to such confusion.  Secondly, findings from one 
perspective do not have to be fully unlearned in order to proceed with the second theory, which 
potentially allows a greater flexibility to occur in choice of perspectives utilised.   Research findings 
may bring to light a particularly relevant framework which not been considered prior to the beginning 
of empirical work, which offer comparatively improved insights in the subject of study. 
4.6 Justification of Theories Selected 
The selection of theories used in the thesis was focused primarily on the identification of a problem in 
practice, rather than on the identifying of gaps in the theoretical literature.  This gives the thesis 
practical relevance and prevents theory being driven forward solely because theoretical gaps exist 
(Corley and Gioia, 2011).  This helps to contribute to the overall progress of theory in management 
research generally (ibid ) and eliminating theory from social sciences whose usefulness is 
questionable (Cole, 2001).  Nonetheless, it is appropriate to reflect upon the theories being utilised 
and their appropriateness for the research context.   
Therefore, this section outlines the rationale behind choosing of the theories.  Each one is discussed in 
turn, considering the merits of the theory and their relevance to the particular research theme being 
pursued.  In addition, rival theories which may offer explanatory potential are also briefly considered.  
The rationale for not using these theories is explained subsequently.   A summary of the main 
attributes of the theories used, and other theories considered, are given in the tables 4.1 and 4.2 below. 
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Table 4.1: Attributes of Theories Selected in the Thesis 
 
 
Property Rights Theory Agency Theory Impression Management & 
Stigma 
Critical Discourse Analysis: 
Media Discourse 
Research Philosophy 
Positivism Positivism Phenomenology Phenomenology 
Method of Analysis  
Predictive Predictive Interpretative Interpretative 
Research Approach 
Deductive Deductive Abductive Abductive 
Critical/Neo Liberal 
Neo liberal Neo Liberal Critical Critical 
Focal Dimension 
Property Rights (Demsetz 
1967) 
Goals of principals and agents (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
Impressions; Stage; stigma; 
management of social interaction 
Order of discourse and 




Ownership of attributes of 
property (Barzel, 1997) 
Self-interest (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976); Contracts (Fama and Jensen, 
1983) 
Performer ‘gives off’ best 
impression or to minimise social 
awkwardness (Goffman, 1968; , 
1956a) 
Semiotic make up of texts 





(Garmin, 1960; Lee, 2006) 
Goals of principals and agents can be 
aligned via contracts and incentives 
An explanatory rather than 
normative theory 
Critique of neo liberal capitalism 
(Fairclough, 2010, p3). 
Sources of Friction 
Unclearly defined property 
rights, externalities, 
transaction costs (Coase, 
1960; Eggertsson, 1994) 
Misalignment of goals between 
principals and agents (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976); Conflict of interests 
between principals 
Front stage and back stage 
performances; different 
audiences; visibility of stigma 
Representation of events reinforces 
societal values and prejudices 
Role of Government 
Protect and enforce property 
rights 
Enforcement of contracts Every day interaction - no 
specific role identified. 
Enforcer of free speech; institution 
who represents events. 
Perspective on public 
corporations 
Inefficient; restriction of 
individual freedoms on 
investment preferences 
(Geddes, 1997) 
State ownership may not achieve 
social objectives any better than 
private enterprise (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997) 
There are many facets of 'self' 
(Goffman); Corporations have 
'selves' (White & Hanson, 2002). 
News media influence perception 
and understanding of public 
corporations through language and 
representation 
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Table 4.1 shows the main features of the theories which have been utilised in this thesis.  The 
following discussion justifies their use, based on the nature of the cases which are being studied.   
4.6.1 Property Rights Theory 
Property rights theory considers that public ownership of organisations leads to inefficiency in 
monitoring and organisation.   Quasi-nationalisation allows this to be considered further as the 
implications of public ownership are discovered with a new ownership structure.  Even though quasi-
nationalisation is ostensibly a short term solution to the banking crisis with the aim of Government 
exit as soon as possible, this does not impact on the nature of public ownership identified by the 
theory itself.   Despite Government intentions, the use of SOE for social or political objectives is still 
frequent (Kole and Mulherin, 1997).  For instance, the negotiation of post crisis accountability is 
primarily centred on economic or political objectives, such as lending to SMEs and householders; and 
bankers’ pay.  This makes the case of the banks an excellent setting in which to consider the nature of 
public ownership through new accountabilities created by the Government as a major investor in the 
banking system. 
In addition, the evidence supporting property rights theory at a detailed level remains conflicting.  
This suggests that there is a need to consider the applicability of the theory in more unconventional 
cases of public ownership, such as  in the context considered here of quasi-nationalisation. 
4.6.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is one of the most influential theories used in accounting research.  In this particular 
case, the nature of ownership has changed in terms of identity of the owners, but the overriding 
ownership structures have remained constant in that investment is achieved via equity ownership.  
Shares continue to be freely traded on the stock exchange.  The banks continue to have equity 
ownership which influences management behaviour.  Therefore, the negotiation of accountability post 
crisis based on economic and political objectives can be attributed to individual interests rather than 
the nature of the ownership per se.  Agency theory offers a useful counterfoil therefore to analyse the 
implications of quasi-nationalisation for the banks. 
Agency theory arguably is the basis for political thinking about the banks.  There remains a belief in 
the private sector markets (Darling, 2008) and the monitoring achieved by the Government agency, 
the UKFI, as similar to an institutional investor (UKFI, 2009)
8
.  Moreover, the nature of the response 
                                                     
8
 Institutional investors themselves generally adhere to the provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2008).  The UK Markets are generally accepted as part of the Anglo-American system with a diversified 
shareholder base, and the concept of the separation of ownership and control under agency theory is applicable 
to these corporations  
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to the crisis was shaped by concerns over ‘moral hazard’ by the Bank of England (Bank of England, 
2009). 
4.6.3 Impression Management 
Impression management is associated with the financial reporting literature and its attempt to interpret 
disclosure.  Nonetheless, there exists a gap in the research carried out to date, as described in chapter 
five.  This centres on the means by which the theory has been deployed.  In other words, it has been 
used to look at attributes of annual reports, such as graphs or pictures.  There is potential to join up 
these attributes and look at the annual report as a whole.  The current case studies offer the potential 
to examine the usefulness of this theory by applying it in a holistic manner to the annual reports of the 
banks.   
4.6.4 Critical Discourse Analysis 
The analysis of the media communication in the financial reporting context is still relatively new.  The 
empirical analysis conducted on newspaper headlines in fact extends the realm of accounting research 
beyond the annual report or the press releases produced by corporations.  As a result, the accounting 
displayed in the media is not controlled by the accountants who produce these numbers.  Therefore, 
an understanding of how media discourse is created is essential for researching the forms of 
accounting featured in the press.  
Critical discourse analysis does not give an explanation for events as they stand.  Rather CDA offers 
up the idea that the representation of these events contributes to our construction of knowledge.  
Without an explanatory context, critical discourse analysis is a useful descriptive theory for the 
research agenda.  Further research in the future could consider the use of additional theories to help 
explain the phenomena considered. 
Now that the rationale for using these theories have been discussed, the chapter turns briefly to some 
other possible theories which showed potential for being used in the analysis.  These are shown in the 
table below.  A very brief introduction to these theories is also shown, with reasons for excluding 
these from the analysis.   
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Table 4.2: Attributes of Alternative Theories Not Used in the Thesis 













Abductive Deductive Abductive Deductive (Bryer, 1999) 
Critical/Neo 
Liberal 
Critical Neo liberal Critical Critical 
Focal Dimension Individual understanding  of 
situations based on 'frames' 
(Goffman, 1974, p21) 
Innovations; Risk 
Avoidance; business 
performance (McKinley et 
al, 2014) 
Blame Avoidance Techniques; claiming 
credit; negativity bias (institutionalised 
in the media) Hood, 2010, p 10 
Commodities; Capital Means of 
Production(McLennan, 2001; 
Antonio, 1999, p22) 
Focal Dimension 
characteristics: 
Frames based on prior experience 
which help understand present 
situation: keys (Goffman, 1974, 
p45) 
Business response to 
decline may cause further 
downward spirals or may 
allow organisation to turn 
around. 
Preference in politics in avoiding blame, 
even at the cost of claiming credit.  
Blame avoided through three strategies: 
presentational, agency & policy Hood 
(2010, p16) 
Exploitation of the Proletariat by the 
bourgeoisie  (Antonio, 1999, p17) 
Normative Basis The frames by which the 
individual is convinced of truth in 
a situation can be manipulated to 
a fabrication (Manning, 1992, 
p126) 
The study of decline and 
turnarounds is of practical 
use to businesses 
Blame avoidance has negative effects, 
but also helps to regulate behaviour 
(Hood, 2010, p184). 
Critique of neo liberal capitalism; 
freedom occurs in post capitalist 




Keying, rekeying and fabrication Deciding when to use 
innovation or risk avoidance 
as a turnaround strategy 
Negativity bias in institutions; credit and 
blame 
Conflicts of interests between the 
capitalists and labour (McLennan, 
2001; Antonio, 1999, p28) 
Role of 
Government 
Part of social interaction; provider 
of 'keys' 
Regulator and enforcer of 
markets 
Blame Avoidance an important aspect in 
understanding Government 
To help improve situation of 





Public corporations may help 
shape 'keys' e.g. military 
behaviour in social interaction 
(Manning, p134) 
Public sector corporations 
also subject to decline and 
turnaround projects 
Blame Avoidance is a feature of 
bureaucratic and political life, at all 
levels of the institutions (Hood, 2010, 
p22) 
Communist system will replace 






Table 4.2 above shows the attributes of some alternative theories not utilised in the thesis.  A 
brief introduction to each of these theories is given below, along with the reasons for not 
using them for the empirical research of the thesis.   
4.6.5 Frame Analysis  
 Frame Analysis (Goffman, 1974) can be seen as an extension of many of the principles that 
Goffman used in the Presentation of Self (1956) (Manning, 1992).  The basic tenet of the 
theory is that ‘Frames’ allow individuals to define the observations of what is going on 
around them.  Frames provide a way of organising experience (Manning, 1992).  Goffman 
uses observations and metaphors to expound the validity of his theory: for example, otters at 
a zoo may fight with each other, or they may pretend to fight; understanding which is 
occurring depends on ‘keys’ (Goffman, 1974).   Keys arise whenever the frames’ meanings 
are transformed into something patterned on, but independent of, them (Manning, 1992, 
p123).  Goffman discusses five different types of key (1974, p48) but he also identifies how 
keys may be wilfully deployed in order to create a fabrication for an unsuspecting individual 
(ibid, p84). 
Framing has been used to understand the nature of financial reporting and auditing in the 
public sector (Christensen and Skærbæk, 2007; Skaerbaek, 2005).  Nonetheless, impression 
management and stigma are more often associated with the private sector corporate reporting 
context and a gap in this literature will be identified, justifying its use on theoretical, as well 
as empirical, grounds.     
4.6.6 Corporate Decline and Turnaround 
The notion of corporate decline and turnaround has been increasingly adopted in the 
literature, which strives to explain successful corporate responses to declining organisations.  
Turnaround literature is used to describe and model organisations facing substantial decline 
and their response in order to improve performance.  The descriptive model, in various 
iterations, has been tested against large scale studies in empirical analysis (Trahms et al., 
2013). 
Turnarounds may be based on innovations within the organisation.  Alternatively, they may 
arise through risk avoidance (McKinley et al., 2014).   However, the path towards increasing 
success is challenging, as both risk avoidance and innovation may cause a further downward 





theoretical development of turnarounds in organisations, including within the public sector 
(McKinley et al., 2014; Jas and Skelcher, 2005).  The turnaround model may also use other 
theories to explain and analyse managerial responses to organisational decline (Trahms et al., 
2013).  These include stakeholder theory, resource management theory and agency theory 
(ibid).    
The HBOS and RBS situations are well suited to giving interesting insights into the 
management of organisational turnaround.  However, the purpose of this thesis is to consider 
the public accountability of the organisations, rather than focus on the operations put in place 
to counteract challenges.  For this reason, the turnaround literature could be seen as 
tangential to the primary research themes in focus here. 
4.6.7 Blame Game 
The notion of blame and its avoidance has been advanced as a key tool for understanding 
Government actions and policy, which may otherwise appear as ‘baffling’ behaviour (Hood, 
2010).  Blame avoidance may be understood through three techniques: Presentational 
strategies, such as ‘spin’; agency strategies, where a person is used as a direction for blame if 
failures occur; and policy strategies, whereby policy is formulated so as to attract as little 
blame potential as possible (ibid, p19). 
The technique of blame avoidance through presentation strategies such as media 
management and spin could be useful in the analysis of accounting data in the headlines.  
However, the blame literature is primarily focused on public organisations and their response 
to blame, rather than on the phenomena creating that blame in the first place.  As a result, 
blame has not been utilised in this thesis, although it may offer potential for further research 
in accounting and the media.   
4.6.8 Marxism 
Marxism also considers the properties of ownership under the capitalist system.  The 
problems of capitalism largely stem from the class system.  The owners of capital, the 
bourgeoisie, exploit the working class’ labour for their own ends.   Marx and Engels 
predicted that the capitalist system would be replaced in the long term as the proletariat were 
able to accumulate power.  However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s 
called the accuracy of these predictions into doubt.  Moreover, Marx’s concept of class was 





Whilst the banking crisis has created a huge challenge for Western capitalism, the concept of 
defining class is problematical for this thesis.  For instance, some of the bankers involved 
have accumulated high net personal worth.  Moreover, they may act as both capital providers 
to the banks and as part of the proletariat giving up their labour. For this reason, the use of 
Marxism has not been used in this thesis.  
 4. 7 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter introduced the theoretical frameworks for the thesis.  These are property rights 
and agency theory to assess the negotiation of accountability in the quasi-nationalised banks; 
impression management and stigma to analyse financial reporting of the banks; and critical 
discourse analysis and the language of news to consider newspaper coverage of the banks’ 
financial results.  How the theories are handled has also been discussed, with a sequential 
process considered appropriate.  Now that the theoretical frameworks have been introduced 
for studying the accountability of the quasi-nationalised banks has been established, previous 






Chapter 5: The Theoretical 
Frameworks and Accounting 
Research  
This chapter is concerned with the theoretical tools by which the quasi-nationalised banks 
can be analysed.  The works cited employ relevant theories to this thesis.  These will be used 
to evaluate the contemporary situation for the banking industry. 
The chapter is structured as follows.  The first section considers the application of property 
rights theory in public sector settings.  In the second section, agency theory is considered, 
with a particular emphasis on its public sector implications.  Ownership and governance 
structures contribute to the understanding of how financial reporting may be affected in RBS 
and LBG. Thus, research in Impression Management and Stigma is discussed in section 
three.  This establishes a solid empirical base from which financial reports in the banks can 
be analysed.  Finally, the means by which finances are reported via the media are discussed. 
Media coverage encompasses both the political and financial status of the banks and 
contributes to fulfilling the banks’ public accountability.  
5.1 Empirical Studies using Property Rights Theory 
Property Rights Theory is critical of common ownership of resources.  A number of studies 
thus have tested the applicability of property rights by comparing private and public sector 
companies.    However, some studies go further and consider the management motivations 
within the companies as well.  Part of this is recognising that Government is also essential in 
enforcing the structure of private property rights.   
Whether a private or a public corporation is more efficient has been a central concern under 
the remit of property rights theory.   Empirical results are varied. Large scale studies tend to 
conclude that private corporations are more efficient than other forms of ownership 
(Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Boardman and Vining, 1989).  
As a hybrid of private and public, mixed enterprises also are less efficient than singularly 





productivity in the SOE but even controlling for this factor, the private corporations still 
outperform.  The difference in efficiency can be dramatic (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001).  
 In addition, there is evidence that the market reacts negatively to Government interference 
through share ownership.  When private company Domtar was suddenly and secretly taken 
over by the Quebecois Government there were significant abnormal returns in the share price 
(Boardman et al., 1986).  The market was anticipating socio-political objectives of the 
Government impacting on profitability(Boardman et al., 1986). Expenditure on political 
campaigns and priorities may also contribute to the expense in public corporations (Crain 
and Zardkoohi, 1978). 
Private corporations consistently outperformed SOE and mixed ownership companies, even 
for controlling for factors such as size, country and regulation (Boardman and Vining, 1989).   
Likewise, an examination of water utilities in the US found that the companies who switched 
from public to private ownership increased productivity (Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978).  The 
same study demonstrated that the public water entities have higher operating costs and a 
lower marginal product than the private counterparts (Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978), thus 
reinforcing that the privatisation process encouraged efficiency.  In a comparison between 
two very similar airlines operating in the same market, the privately owned enterprise also 
fared better in terms of productivity and revenue per employee (Davies, 1977; Davies, 1971).  
Arctic exploration ventures were often more successful when privately funded (Karpoff, 
2001).  Achievements were generally greater and crew members suffered less ill health and 
deaths than publicly funded ventures.  They were also much smaller.    The findings were 
attributed to poor leadership, slow adaptability to new information and diverse incentives 
amongst expedition members and the public funders (Karpoff, 2001).   
The impact of competition rather than ownership seemed to be an important factor in other 
studies.   The Canadian Government took over several failing railroad companies and ran 
these competitively alongside another privately owned corporation.  After the initial years, 
there appeared to be no discernible difference in the relative efficiency of the two corporate 
forms (Caves and Christensen, 1980).   Likewise when the US Government was an arms-
length shareholder in companies in the immediate post war period, it appears to have made 
little impact on efficiency compared to privately owned corporations (Kole and Mulherin, 
1997).  Re-privatisation did incur some initial efficiencies but these were attributed to 





former SOEs’ productivity generally arrived in the three years leading up to privatisation 
(Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001) and did not increase largely beyond the change in 
ownership.  The relationship between ownership and efficiency is thus still controversial, 
particularly when competition and change are carefully examined. 
Studies using property rights theory extend to the impact on management under differing 
corporate ownership structures.  These have found that managerial incentives are also altered 
by the ownership structure of the corporation.  Management do not consider long term 
benefits from investments as the future benefits of these projects will not be represented in a 
present value of the firm (Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978).  There will be opportunity costs as 
management cannot directly benefit from any increase in efficiency in the firms.  To 
overcome this, further controls and rules are required to regulate behaviour (Clarkson, 1972).  
Without an overarching incentive to maximise their own wealth, workers will engage more 
in the pleasant aspects of the job even if these are not as valuable as other activities 
(Clarkson, 1972).  In the hospital setting, jobs such as monitoring and credit control were 
less intensively carried out when there is no profit incentive (Clarkson, 1972).  Collective 
decision making was also found to have resulted in less publication outputs in a university 
setting.  Exam results and publications were down when faculty in the university also had 
managerial responsibilities (McCormick and Meiners, 1988). 
The Government’s role as enforcer of private property rights is also critical.  Unclearly 
defined property rights can lead to inefficiencies and multiple negotiations in order to 
capture new aspects of property.  Libecaps’s (1978) study of mineral extraction 
demonstrated an increase in lobbying activity by mine owners if opportunity arose.  
However, this lobbying had to provide a net benefit to them.   Once property rights were 
sufficiently delineated, lobbying and other activities were curtailed.  Riker & Sened’s (1991) 
research on airport slots demonstrated the importance of there being political incentive for 
the property rights to be recognised by the State.  For these airport slots, the Government 
would benefit financially.       
Thus, property rights have considered carefully the relative efficiency of public, private and 
mixed ownership enterprise.  Overall, the large scale studies have found the private sector to 
be the most efficient, but particular circumstances in case studies presented alternative 
considerations as well.   The next section considers agency theory and its relevance for 





5.2 Empirical Studies in Agency Theory 
Agency theory(Jensen, 1994; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is one of the most influential theories in accounting (Pina 
et al., 2012).  Each facet of the theory of the firm has generated streams of pertinent 
literature and there is a large body of evidence confirming its applicability to organisational 
life (Eisenhardt, 1989).  This section considers previous empirical research on agency theory, 
with a particular focus on the public and banking sectors.  The emphasis is on the 
implications of agency relationships.   
Empirical studies in the public sector have used agency theory to consider the accountability 
of organisations.   The use of economic reasoning and the related postulates of agency theory 
are increasing in the public sector as NPM initiatives gain in popularity.  Accounting 
becomes central to the task of holding resource users to account (Broadbent et al., 1996).  
However, there has been a focus on the description of agent behaviour rather than a more 
normative discussion on the best design of accounting control systems (Broadbent et al., 
1996).  Information asymmetry becomes problematic in enhancing control.  Ex ante controls 
require the principal to have an understanding of the agents’ actions prior to them being 
carried out.  Ex post controls such as monitoring activities have reduced effectiveness as 
actions have already been carried out (Broadbent et al., 1996). Indeed the very application of 
principal-agent theory may be problematic in the public sector.  The demands of principals 
may clash with the deep seated values of the agents, such as doctors, which undermine the 
professionalism of the agents (ibid.).   
As the parties to whom the organisation are accountable become more diverse, there are 
consequences in agency theory analysis (Benz, 2007).  Multiple agents mean that decision 
making becomes more problematic, as consensus and negotiation are required.  Stagnation 
can result.  Moreover, agents may selectively use the ‘blame game’ to allay responsibility for 
decisions made.  Finally, information asymmetry can result in decisions being presented as 
inevitable.  Principals are then deprived of an opportunity to  reject a decision (Benz, 2007).   
Problems also arise in the case of multiple principals (Benz, 2007).  The interests of 
principals are diverse.  Individual interests must be balanced with those of other principals’.    
Even then, these may not be compatible, increasing the difficulty of the agent in fulfilling 





to face punishment.  Control of agents must be collectively achieved which may require co-
ordinated efforts for them (ibid, p508).  Information must thus be shared among all 
principals and all agents to enable transparency.  Responsibilities must be decentralised as 
far as possible to avoid conflicting demands by principals (ibid.). 
It is well established empirically that agents engage in earnings management to demonstrate 
good operating performance in the private sector.  In a large scale survey, earnings 
smoothing is the main mechanism for management by private sector executives (Graham et 
al., 2005).  Nevertheless, positive business actions rather than accounting techniques were 
preferred to help with earnings management (Graham et al., 2005). It was clear that career 
advancement and personal reputation were significant part of agency costs in the survey 
(ibid, p27).  The incentives to do so are an increase in earnings, prestige and reputation.     
Public sector management may also engage in earnings management.  These have distinct 
incentives.   Earnings management may assist in demonstrating the meeting of objectives; 
justifying funding and to meet targets (Pina et al., 2012).  Management of earnings may 
employ different techniques to the private sector.  For example, balancing the books means 
that future generations of taxpayers are unencumbered with historic deficits.  On the other 
hand, large surpluses may be avoided to ensure that taxation rates do not appear excessive 
(Pina et al., 2012).  Empirical evidence for the UK executive agencies suggested that 
earnings management techniques were used to lower operating costs in service delivery 
(ibid.).  
In US hospitals, ownership structures provided an explanation for the response of hospitals 
to Government initiatives (Duggan, 2000). The study considered three types of hospitals: 
Government owned; private sector, for profit organisations and private sector, not for profit 
organisations.  In the USA, incentives were aligned for the private sector hospitals, whether 
they were for profit or not for profit organisations.   In fact, not for profit organisations 
sometimes had greater profits than their for profit counterparts.  Their actions to changes in 
Government policy were similar.  Government owned hospitals that did not benefit from 
changes in revenue funding, did not change activities in response to the new initiatives.  This 
suggested that the distinction in behaviour was based on ownership rather than profit 





In contrast, a search on earnings management which considered the relationship between 
unexpected depreciation levels and breakeven/near breakeven net earnings had no results.  
There was some evidence that management of depreciation was used to adjust financial 
performance to receive higher capital contribution (Pilcher and Van Der Zahn, 2010).   
The annual report may employ a different status in the public sector.  In Italy, however, the 
actual role of the annual report was limited.  It was used primarily to fulfil internal 
accountability requirements.  It had minimal voluntary disclosure (Steccolini, 2004).  The 
use of the annual reports was the only means of citizen- enabled accountability.  That the 
role of the annual report in normative terms is central: 
“The annual report might represent a fundamental medium to ‘close’ the 
accountability cycle, by allowing stakeholders to monitor and evaluate governmental 
activities and results and to involve them in the definition of governmental goals” 
(Steccolini, 2004) 
The lack of consideration in the annual report of these other stakeholders could be seen as 
worrying for democratic accountability.  This is particularly the case if pay is related to 
performance. 
Empirically, the relationship between pay and performance has been varied. In an early 
paper, the lack of sensitivity in the pay –performance relationship was noted and it was 
hypothesised that political incentives were dampening any attempts for high level pay 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990b).  Since this hypothesis was created, the pay performance link 
has been enhanced during the 1990s (Hall and Liebman, 1998).  Stock values and stock 
options were the mechanisms by which pay-performance linkages were expressed (Hall and 
Liebman, 1998).  Nonetheless, there could be improvements to the sensitivity of pay to 
performance (ibid).    In banks, compensation has been found to be similar to other 
industries, and did not encourage excessive risk taking (Houston and James, 1995).   
Deregulation of the banking industry helped to increase the relationship between pay and 
performance (Hubbard and Palia, 1995).  Whilst pay and performance of the banks has found 
to be significantly correlated in more recent years, the overall loan quality of the banks has 
declined.  This helps to identify that managers made huge bonuses on the back of risky loan 






5.3 Agency Theory and the Banking Sector 
There are particular concerns in the banking sector which may arise due to agency problems.  
One of these is related to the use of deposit insurance, a widespread Government policy 
designed to help stem bank runs and dampen banking crises.  Deposit insurance was 
regarded as a valuable public policy tool to avoid bank runs without impacting on the smooth 
running of the banks generally (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  The agency theory concern is 
that there is an increase in moral hazard.  Managers indulge in excessive risk taking as the 
cost of failure is decreased.  Moreover, capital market discipline weakens in the knowledge 
that losses will be socialised.   
Empirical studies have found that unlimited deposit protection insurance schemes help to 
dampen the effects of banking crisis (Angkinand, 2009; Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008; Hoggarth et 
al., 2005).  However, there is a cost to this guarantee, as it makes the banking system weaker 
and increases the chances of a banking crisis actually occurring (Hoggarth et al., 2005).  The 
increase in risk is pertinent as banking crises can be economically devastating, with countries 
losing 15 – 20% in GDP on average (Hoggarth et al., 2002).  They are particularly costly for 
developed countries as well (ibid.).  Nonetheless, the absence of any deposit insurance 
scheme at all actually increases moral hazard.  In a crisis, the Government is pushed towards 
full blown guarantees.  Thus the absence of insurance was not regarded as credible 
(Hoggarth et al., 2005).   
The relative efficiency of private and public banks has not been subject to much study 
(Altunbas et al., 2001).  In the German market, there appeared to be no decline in efficiency 
for publicly owned or mutual banks compared to their private sector counterparts (Altunbas 
et al., 2001).  In contrast, another study concluded that mutually owned banks were less 
efficient, as managers were able to pursue their own agendas without much monitoring from 
the principals (O'Hara, 1981).  In Belgium, a direct comparison between a private and public 
bank found the public bank to be the more efficient.  No reasons were given as to why this 
would be the case (Tulkens, 2006).   
Agency theory has also considered Government ownership of banks.  In this regard, it 
resonates with property rights, as the relative efficiency of the sectors is compared.   In a 





“We find that higher government ownership of banks is associated with slower 
subsequent development of the financial system, lower economic growth, and, in 
particular, lower growth of productivity. These results, and particularly the finding of 
low productivity growth in countries with high government ownership of banks, are 
broadly supportive of the political view on the effects of government interference in 
markets.” (La Porta et al., 2002) 
Further studies have confirmed less efficient State owned banking (Lin and Zhang, 2009; 
Berger et al., 2009; Sapienza, 2004) .  However, these all involved multi country analyses 
and primarily located within developing countries.  A study which directly separated out the 
performance of Government ownership in banks between developing and industrial countries 
found no significant correlation between ownership and performance (Micco et al., 2007).  
In  a more recent study, Government owned banks were associated with higher long run 
growth rates than privately owned banks (Andrianova et al., 2012).  Nonetheless, there may 
be implications for the UK on performance as a result of Government pressures.  A study in 
Italy found that State owned banks charged lower interest rates than their private 
counterparts and may also choose to fund non profitable loans.  This was attributed to 
political patronage, particularly in the south of Italy (Sapienza, 2004).   
Thus there are agency implications for the banking sector, as well as public sector analysis.  
These include the consideration of deposit insurance and moral hazard as well as the relative 
efficiency of Government owned banks.  Public sector analysis considers the implications of 
the relationship between public sector agents and principals.  There is extensive scope for 
considering the impact of Government ownership on the quasi-nationalised banks as a result. 
5.4 Stigma and Impression Management in Accounting Research 
The second research theme considers the banking crisis through the lens of financial 
reporting.  A means of considering attitudes to financial reporting can be found in impression 
management.  There have been three levels of analysis in this regard.  The first has looked at 
the impressions generated through features of the financial reporting process.  These could 
be pictures, graphs, narrative or numbers.  Goffman considers that these impressions are 
generally favourable of the performer (1968, p19).  Likewise, the annual report has been 
recognised as a self-promotion document for companies (McKinstry, 1996; Lee, 1994).  
Secondly, there has been research which considers the audience reaction to the impressions 
generated.  This echoes Goffman’s ideas of adaptability and flexibility of the impressions 





on the relationship managers have with the impressions generated, seeking to tease out the 
contingencies of producing the report for final consumption. 
5.4.1 Researching the Substance of Impressions: Features of 
Impression Management 
The design of annual reports has been shown to be increasing concern of management and 
has contributed from turning the annual report into a public relations document (McKinstry, 
1996).  Here the annual report is to present the company in the best possible light.  In its 
eagerness to do so, however, the promotional material may overshadow the original purpose 
of the annual report which is to present the audited financial statements of a company (ibid, 
p110).   
Research utilising positive methods and statistical techniques have shown the applicability of 
Goffman’s insights into many facets of financial reporting.   There have been a number of 
studies which demonstrate that there is an emphasis on good news, whilst downplaying the 
negative news in the accounting documents (Neu et al 1998, Merkl-Davies et al 2011).  This 
included the ability to predict good news in the future as well (Pava and Epstein, 1993).  
Football clubs provided remarkably upbeat reports on performance despite having 
substantial financial problems (Morrow, 2005).  This bias in positivity was not just restricted 
to finances but extended to the environmental reporting  as well (Deegan and Gordon, 1996).  
The emphasis wasn’t just on positive aspects of company performance.  Impression 
management has also been considered with regard to readability (Courtis, 1998; 2004; 
Linsely & Lawrence, 2007).  Technical language may help to distance management from 
poor performance, and thus made negative disclosures less easy to read.  Failed companies 
were significantly correlated with less readable documents (Smith & Taffler, 1992).  Poorly 
performing companies looked to focus on the future rather than past results (Clatworthy and 
Jones, 2006). Moreover, results were blamed on external factors, such as the economic 
environment (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003).   
Images have also been considered using computer assisted research techniques.  Graphs have 
been demonstrably adjusted so that they emphasise positive trends (Beattie & Jones, 1992, 
1999, 2002, Godfrey et al 2003).  This may include selectivity of what information is shown 





The legacy of this literature provides a strong evidence base that impression management by 
means of emphasising positive features of company performance and results and the 
minimising repercussions of negative features impacts in a plethora of ways on the overall 
presentation of results by companies. As a result of this, the readability of the annual report 
has been found to be very difficult (Courtis, 1998; 2004; Linsely & Lawrence, 2007).  
Consistent replacement of the performance measures produced by State bodies rendered it 
near impossible to establish trends or assess achievements against targets.  This in turn led to 
less, rather than more, effective accountability (Carlin, 2004). 
More recently, annual results press releases have been found to be improved by strong 
corporate governance mechanisms to reduce self-interested disclosures by managers, seeking 
to emphasise good performance and minimise the repercussions of bad news (García Osma, 
& Guillamón-Saorín, 2011).  This may be reinforced verbally in analyst meetings (Westphal 
and Graebner, 2010). 
Turning to photography, Preston et al (1996) introduce ways of seeing images in annual 
reports through a number of perspectives.  This introduces the plethora of techniques for 
giving messages in the annual report.  These include the projection of an intended corporate 
message, not only of the strengths of a company, but also in acknowledging poor 
performance and of responsible management in responding to it (ibid, p118).  It may also 
serve to refute or diminish negative perceptions of a company, such as one which causes 
environmental damage (ibid, p119).  Images nonetheless can be more critically perceived, 
particularly as they may overwhelm the more substantive depth of the reports by their 
accessibility.  Images may also produce multiple meanings depending on the viewer’s 
background (ibid, p122), including through items absent as well as present within them (ibid, 
p123).  Finally, they may constitute as well as replicate social and institutional structures 
(ibid, p130). 
Davison (2009) tracks the use of the Bowler Hat as part of Bradford & Bingley’s branding 
through the 60s right to the present time when it has failed and held in Government 
ownership.  The brand images are connected to and shaped by the changing business mix of 
the bank as well as reflecting greater societal changes within the UK.  The images also 
inform and analyze the lack of internal brands allowed to be captured through accounting 
regulations.  In so doing, the presence of the internal brand is emphasized yet not captured in 





Impression management has thus allowed great insight into the financial reporting process 
by providing a framework of analysis for annual reports.    This next subsection considers 
impression management in light of the audience receiving the information from the 
corporations thereby extending the impact of Goffman’s ideas.     
5.4.2 Managing Audiences 
In depth case study research reveals that corporations engage in a variety of impression 
management techniques which adapt to different audiences over time.  The ‘self’ is adapted 
to individual values and circumstances. In so doing, it is both ‘situational and multiple’; thus 
it is more practical to review corporate reputation in the multiple rather than in the singular 
(White and Hansen, 2002, p299).  By recognising multiple audiences and their concerns, the 
company expresses principal ideal aims which are flexible and rely on tacit background 
knowledge (ibid, p293).   The company also requires the audience to invoke their tact.  In the 
case analysed by White and Hanson, invoking tact allowed the company to be subdued in 
information about a European venture failure and so maintain poise (ibid, p297).  
Furthermore, stigmatising attributes are first of all met with silence, but when they are 
uncovered, the company responds by covering dirty work and couches the polluting effects 
of its businesses into a strength of the company (ibid p298).  
For Neu et al (1998), considering who are the relevant publics interested in these disclosures 
within the annual report and the differing communication strategies that may be used is an 
important aspect of analysis (ibid, p268).  In the environmental field, the relevant publics 
include not only financial stakeholders, but regulators and environmentalists, the latter of 
whom may be critical of firm activity.  These divergent interests result in ambiguity about 
the message that is sent in the annual report.  The strategy involves addressing supportive 
publics and dismissing claims made by critics.    This leads to an acknowledgement of the 
partiality of disclosures (ibid, p272) which can accurately portray aspects of performance but 
also serve to obfuscate.  As a result interpretation of disclosures can be difficult.    
Communication strategies help to address the relevant publics in 3 ways.  These include 
highlighting positive organisational activities; re-framing actions made visible by powerful 
constituents, so that attention is diverted elsewhere or to a particular aspect of these actions; 
and finally by ignoring actions made by less powerful parties (ibid, p274).  These strategies 





Longitudinal research has pointed to the changing discourses employed by companies in 
areas of public concern.   Management do appear to respond to an increase in societal 
concern with the environment with increased disclosure although critical publics shut this 
process down.  In reviewing environmental disclosures in a selection of Finnish companies, 
the discourse turned from polyphony of environmental ideals to one which is more integrated 
with the dominant ideologies as they develop over time (Laine, 2010, p269).     
5.4.3 The Relationship between Management and the Impressions 
Generated 
Impression management has also stimulated research into the relationship between 
management of companies and the reporting of corporate performance.  Impression 
management can be used to reinforce management priorities, such as board or structural 
changes.  It may also assist in understanding management responses to crisis.  Furthermore, 
financial reporting may help management understand corporate events.  Merkl-Davies et al 
(2011) focus on the more social aspects of impression management.  Managerial behaviour 
in corporate reporting can be analysed by an accountability framework where annual 
reporting can be a process to react to others.  With regard to the chairman’s report, there is 
empirical evidence in enhancing positive outcomes in the companies and some degree of 
retrospective sensemaking.  There is no evidence found for reporting which is at odds with 
management internal perceptions of the way the organisation is performing.  
 A change in CEO leadership was found to lead to impression management in the 
presentation of graphs, particularly within larger firms and in a positive manner in the year 
following the change.  (Godfrey et al, 2003).  In addition, CEOs will engage in verbal 
impression management.  CEOs align the corporation with societal norms regarding, for 
example, corporate governance best practice.  For the authors, the verbal reinforcement of 
financial market wisdom allows the legitimacy of the corporation to be increased without 
substantive change to corporate governance practices or procedures within the company 
(Westphal and Graebner, 2010).    
Hospitals have also utilised impression management techniques to assist in justifying and 
introducing structural innovations to other stakeholders (Arndt & Bigelow, 2000).   
Impression management helps the authors explain how such changes are communicated in a 





which is designed to better fit their needs.  This was done by emphasising the essential 
nature of the changes induced by external pressures, into a new, carefully thought out 
structure where the pioneering nature of the changes were downplayed to increase 
acceptance (ibid, p511).  Thus, the reforms become increasingly accepted by the audience 
through these techniques.   
Top management and their approach to impression management to reinforce the corporate 
image are critical when entities face a period of great change or the stigma of bankruptcy.  
Goffman’s stigma management was a useful framework to consider the actions of CEO’s in 
computer companies in the US after filing for bankruptcy.  The company suffered a loss of 
reputation which led to denigration and disengagement from customers, suppliers and 
competitors (Sutton & Callahan, 1987).  Moreover, the CEOs suffered considerable personal 
loss to their reputations, which was also experienced by their families in a form of courtesy 
stigma (ibid.)   Four means of managing the stigma of the bankruptcy filing are identified.  
The first and most common means was to conceal the news of the chapter 11 for as long as 
possible, to avoid jeopardising business relationships (ibid, p422).   If this was not possible, 
then companies chose to either define the filing as a thing happening to everyone or denying 
responsibility – by suggesting that the filing had been forced upon them through extraneous 
events (ibid, p427).    These all had the option of backfiring if the audience were not inclined 
to be sympathetic to the companies and if this involved misrepresentative behaviour could 
suggest that other events the company related could not be trusted.  Accepting responsibility, 
on the other hand, was a more functional approach as it allowed sympathy to be gathered 
from the audience.  Despite this, it was often not utilised by CEOs (ibid, p429).  Finally, 
some CEOs chose to withdraw from the situation either on a temporary basis or permanently, 
although this only had the effect of confirming the validity of the stigma.   
Neu & Wright (Neu and Wright, 1992) use Goffman’s stigma management to explain the 
response of the audit profession to the failure of Canadian Commercial Bank in the late 
1980s.  Despite the popular blame being aimed at the individual auditors responsible for the 
clean opinion prior to the bank’s collapse, the professional bodies chose to get involved and 
respond to the enquiry as well.  This was to help safeguard the reputation of the auditing 
profession.  However, the strategies of managing stigma such as scapegoating the chastised 





the auditors in the limelight and their consistent stories on professional standards which 
meant that the auditors retained professional membership.    
In the public sector, annual reports may take on a different nature.  They may be seen as an 
administrative communication between agencies, hidden away from the intended reader, the 
citizen (Christensen and Skærbæk, 2007). In this study, the financial reporting over time 
became increasingly distant from its intended purpose, which was to inform citizens. Instead, 
preparers anticipated that the reports would instead be used as part of the cost cutting agenda 
of central Government.  To prevent calls for investment in certain areas, results were 
published without interpretation or context.  Thus, assessing performance can be hindered 
not only by the hiding of information from the public eye but also by the nature of 
information produced.  Accounting is thus used to obfuscate as well as inform.  It can be 
used passively, fulfilling regulatory requirements and its status as a dispassionate neutral 
account, presenting as tedious reading to parties (Skaerbaek, 2005).   Transparency is not 
always positive in this regard.  The requirement to disclose the Northern Rock support from 
the Bank of England as Lender of Last Resort is one example of the ill effects of 
transparency (Roberts, 2009).   
Overall, impression management has cultivated many different perspectives on management 
actions and impressions created via the financial reporting process.  A particular issue for the 
thesis is the impact of an ownership change.  Previous literature has suggested that 
ownership may affect the company’s impression management in two distinct ways.   On the 
one hand, the ownership of the company is expected to exert a degree of control on the 
output and design of communications even if there is separation to control and management 
by agents (Garcia Osma and Guillamion-Saoron, 2011). Simultaneously, ownership may 
change the sphere of interested audiences in corporate communication and the approach 
taken to responding to this new pool of engaged readers (Preston et al, 1996; Neu et al, 
1998).      
By considering ownership change in reports, this thesis contributes to the impression 
management literature in explicitly acknowledging Government intervention and its effect 
on impressions fostered.   In contrast to business performance, the profound change in 
ownership means that impressions must be managed for an implicit agenda beyond 





In financial reporting terms, the mass communication is taken on by a different performer – 
that of the media.  The next section considers how the mass media may shape the financial 
reporting process.   
5.5 Research into Financial Reporting and the Media 
The use of critical discourse analysis is relatively new in accounting research.  Yet it offers 
the ability to analyse accounting documents in more depth and systematically (Merkl-Davies 
and Koller, 2012).  Thus obfuscation can be analysed in accounting texts not only in its 
presence but how it is achieved (ibid.).  This contributes to a wider discourse that linguistics 
offers worthy analytical frameworks in which to study accounting (Evans, 2010).  Using 
critical discourse analysis helped establish the media’s role in contributing to the glamour of 
hedge fund managers and their lives (Eshraghi and Taffler, 2012).  The media contributed to 
a feeling of excitement and glamour about hedge funds, thereby decreasing perceptions of 
risk (ibid). 
The media is a source which allows the idea of legitimacy to be operationalized in corporate 
reporting (Baum & Powell, 1995, p530).  In this vein, environmental disclosures in corporate 
reports have been assessed with a media-borne legitimacy measure.   The legitimacy 
measure contributed to a long term legitimacy score which was then reassessed at critical 
points (Aerts & Cormier, 2009).  The findings were that a broad family of communications 
in terms of press releases and annual reports were used strategically to promote the 
corporations’ legitimacy (Aerts & Cormier, 2009).  Annual report disclosures for the long 
term effects of the company and press releases were more useful in managing short term 
legitimacy threats (ibid, p27).  In the case of annual reports, the soft, subjective-based 
information did not affect media legitimacy whereas the hard, economic based information 
did (ibid, p17) 
Yet Fairclough (2010) contends that the media do much more than confer legitimacy, by 
constructing knowledge through representation of events.  There was an increase in positive 
environmental disclosures when there had been negative media coverage on that 
corporation’s environmental practices during the year (Brown & Deegan, 1998), suggesting 
that organisation will react to media coverage. There was not a general correlation between 
disclosure and media coverage generally (positive and negative) and part of this may be 





reports being published (ibid, p33).  The article did not discuss the prominence of the 
articles, associated photos or consider the impact of each article; each article was weighted 
equally (ibid, p34).   A further study confirmed the correlation between news coverage and 
social disclosure, which could be local, or global (Islam & Deegan, 2010).  
This can be demonstrated through the choice of journalists about which stories to run.  
Corporate press releases would need to ‘fit’ with the news stories that the particular media 
output is concerned with.  For instance, proactive, promotional press releases on corporate 
environmental disclosures did not gain much media coverage whereas the reactive press 
releases did (Islam & Deegan, 2010).  Self-promoting language and stories in earnings press 
releases were reviewed with apparent mistrust by professional journalists (Maat, 2007).  The 
press releases were certainly used in in the stories, but they routinely rectified or toned down 
the statements therein (ibid. p91).   
CDA and media study may be relatively new in accounting research, but in wider 
scholarship, there has been increasing attention on the role of the media in organisational 
life.  The media, it is argued, fulfils a corporate governance role for upholding norms of what 
is socially acceptable (Jansson, 2013).  They help to reduce information asymmetry but also 
shape information received based on social legitimacy (ibid.).  For Jansson (2013), in the 
case of Swedish scandals, the media helped to consider the importance of ownership.  The 
identity of the ‘real owner’ as opposed to mere investor was important.  Shareholders were 
not all equal for it was the ‘real’ or active owner who takes care of property and therefore 
would be attributed with responsibility.  In fact, being unable to identify the real owner was 
where the blame for the scandals landed (ibid).   
The media can have different effects on the corporate governance mechanisms depending on 
what system of governance is prevailing in countries.    In Russia, for example, the exposing 
of corporate governance failures had little effect on the Russian language papers whose 
readership was identified to be more relaxed about these.  However, the exposure in Russia’s 
English language press, whose readers were more concerned about stringent corporate 
governance, made a huge impact (Dyck et al., 2008).  This resonates with the media’s 
response to events and readership.   
As well as reducing information asymmetry, the media confer legitimacy on organisations.  





found to have an influence on CEO dismissal and remuneration, and the make up of board of 
directors.  However, the approval of the media was formulated through agency theory logics.  
Thus, there was an emphasis on the formal independence of the boards, but a lack of 
consideration of social familiarity of the independent non-executive directors (ibid.).  Media 
scrutiny and analysis was thus limited.  This in itself could have implications for the 
representation of corporate performance via mass dissemination.    
Media also conduct an important sense making function for organisations undergoing 
dramatic strategic change (Kjaergaard et al., 2011).  In one case, a Danish company invited 
the media into the organisation to discuss their new modus operandi.  Initially this met with 
tension by employees because these were aspirations rather than reality.  However, after 
some time, these aspirations became the organisational reality and the positive media 
coverage made employees feel good about their association with the company.  Later on 
when the organisation underwent management changes, the media story did not reflect these 
new organisational values, creating tension once again with members of the organisation: 
“…articles seemed to cling to past identity referents – unique and distinctive labels, 
personalities, structures, values, etc. – over which the celebrity of the organization 
had been built, regardless of their current veracity” (Kjaergaard et al., 2011) 
Thus, there could be a time lag between the organisation portrayed in the media and that 
which is the organisational reality of the corporation. 
Media reporting affects other stakeholders in an organisation apart from employees.  The 
media has a crucial role to play in the working of the financial markets.    The media can 
alleviate informational frictions and affect security pricing even without genuine news (Fang 
& Peress, 2009).  Yet this may come at a cost.  There is empirical evidence that stocks that 
have no media coverage earn higher returns than stocks with extensive media coverage, 
suggesting that the breadth of information dissemination can affect earnings (Fang & Peress, 
2009).  Investors are prone to buying attention grabbing stocks, including ones in the news 
(Barber & Odean, 2008) but the stocks which are bought in this way may underperform.   
Media could act as the identifiers of accounting fraud in the United States (Miller, 2006).  
Some press outlets relied upon accusations from other trusted sources.  The business press 
were also found to rely on in house journalistic analysis. However, there was a bias towards 
the more visible firms in the press and those with manager misappropriation.  This fulfilled 





There has been an increasing amount of content in earnings press releases and a greater 
market reaction to the information contained within (Francis et al, 2002).   Non-GAAP or 
‘Pro Forma’ numbers given in the earnings press releases are frequent and have been given 
higher pertinence in the earnings press releases where the GAAP results have been less 
attractive (Marques, 2010).  Firms with greater media coverage are also more likely to 
emphasise their unregulated pro forma earnings and less likely to emphasise GAAP earnings 
(Bowen et al, 2005).   
The studies discussed above demonstrate that the relationship between corporate 
communications and the media is intricately complex.  There is an established two way 
influence between financial reporting by the organisation reacting to media coverage and the 
media coverage a corporation receives.  This then influences market activity.  One important 
aspect of newspaper reporting particularly is the use of headlines.  Headlines themselves 
have unique linguistic constructions.  The following section considers the study of headlines 
and organisations.   
5.5.1 Representing Organisations through Headlines 
Headlines are an important part of the news story.  This is the part that attracts the reader’s 
attention and may well drive an idea as well as indicate the subject of the story.  Readers 
spend time scanning the headlines, but may not read the whole story (Dor, 2003).  Headlines 
are also a common feature across the news mediums, whether it is the printed press, the 
internet or TV broadcasts.  They act the reference point of choice about whether further 
attention is paid by the consumer to that particular news feature.  It is natural then that the 
headlines in an annual earnings announcement would emphasise the positives and eliminate 
the negative aspects of the corporate story (Guillamon-Saorin et al, 2012).  This study found 
that profitability drove the headlines if this was positive.  In contrast, if a loss had been 
incurred, sales figures were headlined to portray a positive ‘good news’ story (ibid, p162).   
Metaphor is also employed in headlines.  Metaphorical analyses have focused on established 
metaphors such as war.  It has been argued that these are predominantly masculine 
metaphors.  Women are excluded through the reification of male attributes and reflects the 
disposition of the (male) business press readers (Koller, 2004).  A change in metaphor has 
been advocated.  Moreover, fresh metaphors would increase the entertainment of the news, 





Metaphors were used by the CEOs during the Parliamentary Inquiry into the banking crisis 
to deflect responsibility for the failures themselves (Tourish and Hargie, 2012).   Using 
metaphors, the CEOs variously described themselves as victims of the wisdom of the crowds 
and at other times, observers in the unfolding events.  They also characterise themselves as 
victims of the crisis as well as willing to learn from their mistakes. The implications are that 
the bankers have lost an opportunity for deep learning following the crisis and what went 
wrong  
It is very hard to consider the impact of news media on the audiences concerned.  Readers 
are not ‘cultural dopes’ and may not accept the meanings and interpretations presented in the 
media products (Gamson et al, 1992).  Personal experiences and popular wisdom, as well as 
discussions with friends and family can alter and negotiate the construction of reality that 
readers of media formulate (ibid, p391).  The understanding of how this is formulated is not 
well understood.  However, it has been understood that the media do act as an ‘agenda-
setting’ function, drawing attention to certain issues which may be of concern to the public 
(McCoombs & Shaw, 1972).  This is particularly the case for unobtrusive issues, such as 
politics, where individuals do not participate daily in the activities (ibid, p182) but rely on 
the media for their information source about what is going in this arena.  The same could be 
said for the financial health of companies. 
Part of the narrative in newspaper articles (and thus picked up on in headlines) is the 
personal aspect of stories (Fairclough, 1995).  Journalists often attribute the success or 
failure of a company to the individual at the top (Hayward et al., 2004).  Personalising a 
story helps to achieve a story amid pressures to “process large amounts of information in short 
periods of time and present their reports in a manner that is credible, appealing and simple” (ibid, 
p650). Yet the personal aspect is an illusion (Fowler, 1991).  The world is presented as 
cultural categories rather than unique individuals.  These lead to stereotypes (ibid).   
The use of individual characteristics leading to a stereotype is not just restricted to articles.  
Journalistic accounts of corporate failure have opted to steer away from the technical 
vagaries of accounting and auditing.  Instead, they have focused on the characteristics of the 
accountant; honesty, integrity and professionalism (Carnegie and Napier, 2010).  
The impact of the media on markets and corporations is thus established by previous 





reporting process.  There is an increasing recognition that the financial reporting process is 
important in both press releases and analyst meetings.  Yet the actual follow through to the 
media remains underexplored.  This will be an important part of considering the 
accountability of the quasi-nationalised banks.   
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
Overall, the empirical works cited here help utilise a body of theories commonly associated 
with financial accountability and financial reporting.  The pedigree of the theories has been 
demonstrated with a discussion of a selection of literature which has employed these 
perspectives.   
Empirical research in property rights presents diverse evidence on the merits of private 
ownership compared to public ownership.  Agency theory research demonstrates that the 
particular circumstances of the public sector result in several incentives with regard to pay 
and earnings management.  In the banking sector, the complexity of organisations and the 
existence of deposit insurance schemes create specialist moral hazard implications.  
The use of impression management in the financial reporting literature has furthered 
understanding on how positive messages are foregrounded in the annual report to investors.  
These focus on language used, graphs and pictures.  Moreover, impression management and 
stigma have been used to explain management responses to change and crisis.  Critical 
discourse analysis and linguistic frameworks have been advocated as a means of analysing 
accounting phenomena.  The media has been cited as an important corporate governance 
mechanism of holding corporations to account, as well as influencing annual report content.   
What the empirical studies have also highlighted are the myriad possibilities for 
investigating the phenomena identified in the research themes.  This will affect the way that 
the research is conducted.  For this reason, the next chapter considers the research method 







Chapter 6: Research Methods 
This chapter outlines the research methods used in completing the thesis.  Common to all 
research themes was the use of a stakeholder approach and documents as source data.   This 
allowed an understanding of the unfolding events and helped to prioritise branches of 
inquiry.  After deep understanding was achieved on a more general level, the particular 
branches of inquiry were tailored for each research theme.  Subsequently, the methods used 
for each research theme had particular features which responded to the nature of the inquiry 
and the distinct theories being used to explain phenomena.  The specific methods are 
discussed in turn for each theme, reflecting on the main sources of data for each one and how 
these were analysed.  The chapter however, starts with explaining the approach to general 
understanding.   
6.1 Stakeholder Approach to the Research Design 
The PhD has been investigating contemporary events which have occurred simultaneously 
with the investigation of RBS and LBG.  As a result, a framework for general inquiry to 
assist understanding of the phenomena was required to provide robust analysis as research 
themes took shape over time.   This was achieved by employing a stakeholder approach to 
the research design, drawing from key ideas in stakeholder theory.  Stakeholder theory has 
been a controversial theory and has been described as a suite of approaches rather than a 
theory in itself (Freeman, 1994).  Nonetheless, stakeholder theory has seen increasing 
recognition in the literature.  This is due to increasing globalisation and the need to attract 
and retain customers and suppliers as well as investors.  Moreover, there is awareness that 
corporations have a massive impact on the community and there is a need to be ethically 
robust in business dealings (ibid). 
The basic idea of stakeholder theory is that it is normative, rather than instrumental or 
descriptive (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  It argues that the organisation should act in the 
interests of stakeholders to achieve social welfare and improved business performance 
(Friedman & Miles, 2006, p2). This includes financial reporting.   The public/private sector 
divide is muted as a Government interest is recognised alongside other stakeholders 





For this PhD, a stakeholder is any individual or group who can affect or is affected by the 
achievements of the organisation’s objectives (Freeman, 1984, p46).   Yet the relationship 
between the organisations and stakeholders can change.    Established stakeholder 
relationships with organisations fluctuate over time as management consider stakeholder 
salience (Mitchell et al, 1997) and stakeholder networks (Rowley, 1997). 
The prioritisation of stakeholders through 3 relationship attributes: power, legitimacy and 
urgency, was used for analysis (Mitchell et al, 1997).  ‘Definitive stakeholders’, who have 
the greatest portion of all of these attributes, occupy the central point in managements’ 
considerations. However, the stakeholders’ relative positions are fluid. Legitimacy and 
power therefore are two complementary factors in their identification of stakeholders.   The 
third attribute, urgency, ‘adds a catalytic component to a theory of stakeholder identification, 
for urgency demands attention’ (ibid, p864).  Management are central to stakeholder theory, 
as they control the ‘decision-making apparatus’ of the firm.  Therefore, the perception of 
managers regarding the stakeholders is crucial in determining whose needs are attended to 
(ibid, p871).   As a research approach here, then, it is the researcher who takes the place of 
the manager – determining what or who to delve analytic efforts into as time goes on.  This 
was very suitable for a context which was consistently changing direction as the crisis 
developed.   
A stakeholder approach also allows consideration of networks as a component of the 
research design.  This is particularly important in the context of the media analysis which 
makes up part of the investigation.  As the network relationships between stakeholders and 
the organisation influences behaviour (Rowley, 1997), the research approach responds by 
focusing on the pertinent groups.  A dense network of stakeholders facilitates information 
exchange, leading to easy communications and increased pressure on the organisation to 
respond to stakeholder influences (ibid, p898). With stakeholders providing a wider circle of 
interest groups for analysis the aim is to investigate and explain how financial accountability 
is shaped by the stakeholders involved. 
Stakeholder theory as a ‘middle ground’ research method between different research 
paradigms has been advocated previously (Simmons and Lovegrove, 2005).   Using a 
stakeholder approach allows dynamism and flexibility in the research design, as the most 
salient stakeholders are focused upon over time.  Whilst it may allow a subjective view of 





philosophies into case studies (ibid).    This is not, however, at the expense of the theories 
which inform and explain the issues arising here.   
A stakeholder approach gave an overarching structure to the data collection.  The 
contemporary, fast moving nature of the topic meant that decisions had to be made as to 
what line of enquiry to follow and when.  As it was, documents were the most important part 
of the research.  The next section therefore discusses the general role of documents in social 
research.  How documents were subsequently utilised in each of the three research themes is 
discussed afterwards.   
6.2 Documents 
Documents are an integral part of social, organisational and political life.  Documents can be 
used to both understand the context of the study but also ‘to illuminate deeper meanings 
which may be revealed by their style and coverage’ (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).  Nonetheless, 
the use of documentary analysis has often been as a supplement to other fieldwork, or a 
backup when access cannot be arranged (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).Yet their capacity for rich 
insight goes beyond these uses.  They do not act as surrogates for other forms of data but 
rather provide their own versions of contemporary life using literary conventions (Atkinson 
and Coffey, 2011).    There are a number of ways which they can be used in qualitative 
research, as shown in Figure 6. 1 below: 
Figure 6.1: Approaches to the Study of Documents 
 
 





When viewed under Prior’s analysis in Figure 6.1 above, documents are not just about what 
they contain but how they may be considered as actors in their own right (Prior, 2008).  For 
this study, documents are used both as a resource and as a topic.  As a resource, documents 
are receptacles of evidence.  As a topic, documents open up further avenues of research 
which may be concerned with the way that documents are active agents in “episodes of 
interaction and schemes of social organization” (Prior, 2008).  Archaeological approaches 
(2) have analysis which is concerned with how the document content comes into being.  This 
has resonance with the study of the annual reports and their focus on impression 
management.  With (3) It is important to consider the relationship of documents to other 
documents for most texts make reference to other documents, even implicitly (Atkinson and 
Coffey, 2011).  In (4) “the analysis concentrates on the relationship between the specific 
documents and their use or recruitment by identifiable human actors for purposeful ends” 
(Prior, 2008).  The document is an actor which can drive political or economic activities just 
as much as humans (ibid, p833): 
“The culturally competent reader knows how to use documentary sources to create 
the organisational reality they purport to describe…He or she reads into the text 
what might reasonably be assumed to be the case, given a shared stock of 
knowledge about how organisations typically function.”(Atkinson and Coffey, 2011) 
The study on the newspaper headlines is more oriented towards number four as it looks at 
the interaction between annual reports, conferences, press releases and the newspaper 
headlines.  The reader is also always imagined in their construction  and must be considered 
in the research of the document (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011). 
Documents have a number of advantages.  They are easily accessed over the internet.  They 
are naturally occurring and not ‘manufactured’ by the researcher ( Silverman, 2013).  They 
may also serve as a sense making function (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011; Weick, 1995) or as a 
concrete espousal of values.  Documents are not a neutral reflection of organisational life but 
help to produce a reality through textual conventions (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011).  
Reflecting on an empirical research project which utilised interview and documentary data, 
the authors reflected: 
“It was interesting to note the way in which the written word became enshrined in 
fact and history. The mission statements that were displayed in pride of place in 
many departments provided a good example of this. Few people questioned them, 
and with a few notable exceptions, there seemed little concern about developing 





Documents can be affirmative and influential in deeply meaningful ways.  Nonetheless, 
documents necessarily present a partial picture of what occurs in the ‘real world’.  They are 
not a transparent account of what has occurred and may leave out much of what was 
discussed in face to face interaction (Irvine and Gaffikin, 2006).   This has the potential of 
creating meanings or intentions which were not originally envisaged.   Yet for this project it 
is impressions that count as much as records of proceedings: 
“Documents can circulate and be exchanged partly because they are used to 
decontextualize events.  We transform things by writing them into texts…from the 
specific and the local, and make of them ‘facts’ and ‘records’ which take on 
independent existence” (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011) 
There is an inference on the researcher’s part in understanding the documents and 
interpreting what the actual events were. That inference must be justifiable and 
acknowledged (VK Dibble, 1965).  It is not just the doing but the giving of signs that 
confirms facts which could otherwise remain obscure (Goffman, 1956b). 
In the current study, the use of documents is critical in understanding the banking crisis but 
also in analysing the theoretical implications from it.  The following section discusses the 
main methods and documents used in the thesis, responding to the particular requirements of 
the theories utilised.  It aims to consider the wider role of these documents as part of social 
interaction.  
6.3 Methods used for Research Theme One 
The main sources of evidence for research theme one is Parliamentary transcripts and press 
releases from the RBS and LBG.  Other sources informed the content of the analysis.  The 
theoretical frameworks employed were property rights theory and agency theory.  The 
method of analysis is presented after the discussion on the documents.   
6.3.1 Press Releases 
Throughout the crisis, the two banks have released press notices to respond to circumstances 
or press commentary.  These are a significant source of documents for research.  The data 
collected from the press releases has been used to build up a diary of events from the 
organisational point of view.   Importantly, the press releases do more than act as a 
confirmatory instrument to newspaper articles.  They represent the organisation to the 





are (Garcia Osma and Guillamion-Saoron, 2011). The sole authors of the press releases are 
the corporations. The Press releases offer the opportunity for the companies to project the 
desired corporate image to the outside world. Likewise, they are not subject to the same 
financial reporting standards as the annual report.   As a result, the press releases require 
detailed reading and conscientious financial analysis.   
The actual collection of such information is straightforward, with a visit to the organisation’s 
website where a PDF version of the document can be downloaded.  The archive usually 
holds a numbers of years’ worth of documentation, which means that a complete set of 
documents can be retrieved for the research period.   
6.3.2 Parliament 
Parliamentary data has been collected through either electronic versions of Hansard when 
debates on the banking crisis have occurred or special reports by Select Committees. 
Although PDF files have been downloaded if possible, Hansard is also presented in HTML; 
thus summary notes are taken of the points of interest and recorded in a word document.  
These often include extensive quotes of the politicians concerned which are copied and 
pasted into the word document. Data has been used to the extent of identifying and 
understanding the events which have taken place to date. 
In these documents, it would be fair to say that the agenda of politicians is to hold the 
Government to account.  Furthermore, the politicians are seeking to obtain accountability 
direct from the banking industry itself.  A useful source of documentation for achieving the 
latter is the Treasury Select Committee’s collection of evidence. 
Both Hansard and the oral evidence of the Select Committee is a transcript of verbal 
interaction and can be further amended by the speakers themselves.  Information which has 
been spoken, rather than written first presents rather different data to other reports, which 
must be recognised during analysis. For instance, Molotch and Boden (1985) found that 
Watergate hearing transcripts replicated power differentials between respondent and 
questioner by undermining the credibility of the respondent’s evidence through 
conversational means.  For the authors, such discourse backed up the power structure in 
place during the testimonies.   The agendas of the parties involved is no less apparent by the 
form in which the document is created but it is possibly expressed in alternative ways to the 





6.3.3 Analytical Approach 
Agency and Property Rights theories both stem from a positivist tradition, which impacted 
on the analytical approach used for the first research theme.  The usefulness of positive 
theories lies in their predictive and explanatory powers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).    
Therefore, analysis was conducted in two streams.  Firstly, the research utilising property 
rights and agency theory comprised the building up of an analysis based on incentives.  To 
identify the predicted incentives, key pieces of literature were reviewed to tease out the 
important insights in agency theory (Jensen, 1994; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and property rights (Armen A.Alchian, 2008; Geddes, 1997; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Demsetz, 1967).  The data was then analysed using this 
framework for empirical fit and accuracy. This approach has been an illuminating research 
method in property rights analysis (Wineicki, 1996; Riker & Sened, 1996; Libecap, 1978).    
The phenomena identified during research which related to the theoretical predictions were 
coded as such and gathered together on an excel spread sheet. Positive approaches using 
agency theory are usually general, quantitative based studies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
But a qualitative approach allows rich data to analyse the characteristics of the contracts 
being produced (Jensen, 1983, p332).   It was with qualitative data that the analysis was built 
up. The political and economic implications were then assessed. 
Because of the distinct ownership structures of RBS and LBG, it was necessary to 
interrogate some of the standard incentives which may be identified in conventional public 
corporations with multiple disperse private investors.  It has been suggested that more 
consideration of the standard incentives is good practice when testing agency theory 
(Broadbent et al., 1996).   This particularly focused on the lack of market disciplinary effects 
currently being experienced e.g. takeovers stemming from subdued financial markets.  The 
incentives did not fundamentally change, but their relative importance was established by 
this further theoretical work.   Property rights, which looks to increase the specificity of 
rights (Libecap, 1978) did not seem to be so encumbered by the structures presumed under 
agency theory.   
Secondly, once the data had been compared to the predicted models, the explanatory powers 





rights do not provide for dynamism as events change quickly (North, 1990).  The stakeholder 
approach allowed a scheme for comparison. 
In contrast, the theories for research theme two, impression management and stigma, stem 
from a phenomenological position.  This meant that the research approach adopted was 
different to that utilised in research theme one.  A discussion of research theme two follows.   
6.4 Methods Used for Research Theme Two 
The second research theme utilised the annual reports of RBS and LBG.  The consideration 
of annual reports as documents is considered further below.  Afterwards, the analytical 
approach is discussed, which is informed by the theories of impression management and 
stigma. 
6.4.1 Annual Reports 
The processes involved in creating an annual report is mostly familiar to accounting 
researchers and will not be repeated here.  Yet the way that annual reports are accessed now, 
electronically, versus earlier paper versions either sent in the post or at libraries is worth 
considering: 
“The internet provides the means for creating, displaying and framing the objects of 
study and the boundaries for experience” (Markham, 2011) 
In corporate financial reporting terms, there are many reasons why accessing the annual 
report over the internet may be different to hard copy (Amernic, 1998).  These include the 
use of hyperlinks and the increased audience who may access the information content.  Yet it 
may also become just another part of the website.  Its role as a legal document may become 
blurred by other concurrent promotional material (Amernic, 1998).   
The Annual reports are freely accessible over the web.  To gain access, the investor relations 
website was sourced for LBG, HBOS and RBS.  These showed the annual reports in a 
library of general financial performance announcements.  There is a snapshot of the website 







Figure 6.2: Lloyds Banking Group Annual Report Access 
 
Source: Lloyds Banking Group Investor Relations Website (accessed 17 June 2013) 
In the Lloyds example above, the Annual Report is shown among the other reporting of 
finances to the markets, such as quarterly earnings statements or the half year results.   The 
reading of the annual report may be via different formats.  The options for Lloyds include the 
interactive html, the pdf and an interactive pdf.  It also includes the press release and the 
presentations for analysts as well as the webcasts and transcripts of such meetings.  The 
status of the annual report as a ‘pivotal presentation of the company’(O'Donovan, 2002) may 
have diminished somewhat.  Nonetheless, previous studies have suggested that the annual 






The pdf document has been used in this thesis.  Each annual report was sourced from the 
investor relations website.  The documents’ security properties were assessed on adobe.  
These confirm that the copyright conditions allow page extraction and commentary therein.  
The ‘snapshot’ tool was used to capture images of the annual reports used in analysis.   
Whilst the content of annual reports have been intensely scrutinised over the years, there has 
been less of a focus on studies into the other aspects of the annual report and the position it 
occupies as an actor in social interactions such as (4) in Figure 6.1 above.  Environmental 
accounting has provided some insight into the role of the annual report in its interaction with 
the press (Islam and Deegan, 2010) and other stakeholders (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006).  
In addition, there is evidence that management use content of annual reports to boost the 
legitimacy of the reporting corporation (O'Donovan, 2002).  A number of studies have 
highlighted the self-promoting nature of the annual report document (McKinstry, 1996; 
Dyball, 1993).   
6.4.2 Analytical Approach 
The second research theme uses impression management and stigma to consider the annual 
reports of RBS and LBG.  The technique employed here was slightly different, as no 
predictive model was built into the research process.  Once the theory was deeply 
understood, the major insights of the theory were considered whilst investigating the annual 
reports.  The first part of the process was the understanding of the numbers in the statutory 
accounts by performing standard analytical review on the published year on year numbers.  
This emulated the sort of analytical review that would be performed by auditors at the 
planning stage of an audit when trying to gather more knowledge about the entity (Auditing 
Practices Board, 2009).     This helped to build up an accounting story of the banks’ failure. 
The task was difficult due to corporate restructuring and shifts in accounting regulation.  To 
ensure as much consistency as possible, the most recent published figures for each year were 
utilised.  For 2010, then, the comparatives in the 2011 annual report were used.   The 
implications for impression management were considered in light of these difficulties. 
The second part of the analysis drew upon the key theoretical insights from Goffman 
(Goffman, 1968; Goffman, 1956b).  Key themes were used to draw upon significant parts of 
the annual report, including images and text.  These were then interpreted using ‘Stigma’ or 





and banks to compare and contrast the impression management encountered.  The wider 
context of the banks’ activities was also considered in light of the annual reports. 
Interpretive analysis of accounting reports has been less popular as a research method, but 
has provided insights into new and developing conceptualisations, such as sustainability 
(Laine, 2010).   It has also provided insight into the process of institutional change within 
industry (Arndt et al, 2000). A strength of thematic analysis has been the ability to 
understand how core themes may interrelate with one another (Prior, 2003).  As the research 
demonstrates, results are repackaged in increasingly complex ways to help manage 
impressions.   
Impression Management has been well researched in the accounting literature using content 
analysis and word counts.  This approach was not taken in the paper.  By looking at aspects 
of the reports, findings are based on phenomena in isolation to the rest of the annual report, 
which may serve to provide a different context to the research (Davison, 2009).   Content 
analysis techniques serve to consider large swathes of data but analyse words regardless of 
their context (Merkl-Davies et al, p337) and in so doing, cannot capture the more subtle 
impression management techniques that organisations can use (Neu et al, 1998, p275).  
Specifically, the non-reporting or omission of items may be disregarded through this 
research (Neu et al, 1998, p280).  This is particularly the case when impressions are 
cultivated for various different audiences, whose own agendas serve to alter the impressions 
that organisations seek to project to them (Neu et al 1998; Preston et al 1996).   Looking at 
the whole of the report for the two banks, as is being done here, helped to overcome some of 
these issues. 
Moreover, characteristics used to proxy certain impression management techniques may 
occasionally be rather absolute. Bankruptcy survival measures have been used (Smith & 
Taffler, 1992).  Commonly, positive or negative outcomes are based on accounting measures 
such as profitability or change in net income (Merkl-Davies et al, 2011).   Whilst the good 
news/bad news dichotomy will follow the accounting measurements in the majority of cases 
there are a minority of organisations who buck this trend.  The banking industry in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, seeking to derisk and shore up capital and liquidity may be 
one example.  Such priorities may negatively impact on the change in net income.  As such 
the banks could be considered outliers in established statistical analyses and lend themselves 





6.5 Methods used for Research Theme Three 
The main sources of documents used in research theme three were the headlines generated in 
the printed press.  The purity of the corporate message in the Press for accounting research is 
limited, as so many different sources and authors make up the final newspaper articles.  As a 
result, there is an extended discussion on the Press and how it may be used in accounting 
research.  Following on from that, the analytical approach under critical discourse analysis is 
discussed.   
6.5.1 The UK Printed Press Industry 
The printed press in the UK offers a variety of titles for a range of audiences.  At the popular 
end, red top tabloids offer entertaining stories of celebrities and scandals.  The news content 
of the papers is light and the factual basis of the stories is regarded as light.  Nonetheless, 
they enjoy a large readership and retain significant influence over news making.  The mid 
market papers consist of the Daily Express and Daily Mail.  They also provide some 
entertaining stories on celebrities and gossip but provide comment and opinion on more 
serious news stories. There are a range of titles for the quality end of the market, traditionally 
called ‘broadsheets’.  These concentrate on news stories for the day and have very little 
gossip or scandals in them.  The reliability of the stories is high with a number of sources 
consulted prior to running the news. 







Table 6.1: National Titles and their Circulation Figures 




(NRS Social Grades) 
   % ABC1 %C2DE 
Daily  Mirror  1,174,924 Tabloid 40 59 
Daily Record  307,794 Tabloid 38 61 
Daily Star  703,218 Tabloid 26 74 
The Sun  2,795,601 Tabloid 32 67 
Daily Express  629,764 Mid Market 57 43 
Daily Mail  2,063,738 Mid Market 65 35 
The Daily Telegraph  632,070 Broadsheet 89 11 
Financial Times  331,883 Broadsheet 86 14 
The Herald  48,629 Broadsheet 87 13 
The Guardian  241,287 Broadsheet 86 14 
i  191,077 Broadsheet 78 22 
The Independent  180,470 Broadsheet 80 20 
The Scotsman  42,581 Broadsheet 81 19 
The Times  449,938 Broadsheet 85 15 
Sources: Press Gazette (2011);(MediaUK, 2013; Daily Star, 2011) 
The markets for newspapers are generally declining.   Readership figures above are 
significantly below prior years.  Tables 6.2 and 6.3 demonstrate this in income terms for a 
variety of titles. 
The type of income for newspaper titles is very important for the market segments.  On the 
one hand, the tabloid titles depend on mass consumption and newspaper sales to boost their 
income.  In contrast, the quality end of the newspaper industry relies less on the revenue that 
is generated through sales.  Instead, the advertising space that is sold within the broadsheets 
remains the main income generator.   A comparison of the Trinity Mirror Group which 







Table 6.2: Revenue by Type, Trinity Mirror Group 
Trinity Mirror Group (Daily Mirror, Sunday Mirror, The People, Daily Record) 
Trinity Mirror Group plc: 
National Titles Divisional 
Performance 
2010 % of 
total 
income 
2009 % of 
total 
income 
 £m  £m  
Advertising  128.8 30% 132.9 29% 
Circulation 244.2 57% 266.8 58% 
Other 57.3 13% 60.7 13% 
 430.3  460.4  
   Source: (Trinity Mirror Group, 2011) p 17   
For each year the circulation revenue makes up 57% and 58% of total revenues respectively.  
Advertising is still a significant income generator, although not its main source.  This can be 
contrasted with the quality end of the market, which relies more on advertising to generate 
income: 
Table 6.3: Revenue by Type, Guardian Media Group 
The Guardian and Observer 
Titles: Divisional Performance 
2010 % of 
total 
income 
2009 % of 
total 
income 
 £m  £m  
Advertising  134.2 53% 156 56% 
Circulation 90.9 36% 94.7 34% 
Other 30 12% 29.3 10% 
 255.1  280  
Source: (Guardian Media Group, 2010)   
As table 6.3 shows, revenue from circulation in the quality end of the market makes up just 
over a third of total income, with advertising revenue making up over half.  The tables above 
also show that the printed press market is declining.  Nonetheless, the circulation figures 
provided in Table 6.1 show that over 9m copies of titles are consumed daily.  This continues 





6.5.2 Making the News: Implications for Accounting Research 
Media information is good quality, easily accessible and is not modified by observers (Bell, 
1991).  However, its production needs considering, as this may impact on the way that 
accounting is portrayed within publications.  Thus, this section considers how news is 
produced for mass consumption. 
News is divided into ‘hard news’ and ‘soft news’.  Hard news is the staple product.  Hard 
news includes reports of accidents, announcements, discoveries and other events which have 
come to light since the last publication occurred (Bell, 1991).  Hard news will have the most 
distinctive news style of the publication.   One off events, such as natural disasters, may be 
called ‘spot news’ due to their unscheduled nature.  ‘Soft news’ does not have the same sort 
of immediacy and will often feature longer articles.  Journalists may direct effort towards 
presenting ‘soft news’ items in a hard news way (ibid.).  There are also special sections to a 
newspaper such as sport or business.  These usually have their own mini-newsroom working 
on these articles.   
The language of newspapers is ‘frequently recycled’ (Bell, 1991) with all previous iterations 
of articles embedded within the final product. Fairclough (2010) terms this as mediation in a 
true sense, as text and meaning making is taken from one source to another through press 
articles (ibid, p72).  This is often in the form of a public discourse entering the private 
domain (ibid).  Although the work is usually attributed to one journalist, its smooth and 
unified style can hide a number of different pens put to work (Fairclough, 1995; Bell, 1991)).  
Journalists are responsible for authoring the main article, with editors and subeditors refining 
and cutting down the work as required (Bell, 1991).  In fact, the articles can be much less 
original than expected.   
In all news communications, there are acute time pressures.  This leads to the quickest 
production route to an article being used.  News that comes pre-packaged for publication can 
therefore have an advantage over equally newsworthy items (Bell, 1991; Gans, 1980).  
Journalists’ main sources for news stories come mainly from official sources, documents and 
channels.  Many of these can often be anticipated ahead of time, such as crime statistics 
announcements (Leach, 2006).  Panics can be created as the most worrisome or 





audience’s attention (ibid, p607).  This focus on the worrisome aspects of the news item 
could be beneficial, as deviance is defined and rooted out by public power (p608).   
The preferred way to gather material is by interviews and speech, with the belief that verbal 
content is usually much more simple and concise than documentary evidence (Bell, 1991). 
The content of an article will be made up of extensive quotes or paraphrases of what 
someone has said (ibid, p41).  Documentary inputs are nonetheless another important source, 
particularly if they have been prefabricated in a journalistic style.  Three primary sources of 
documents are news agency copies (e.g. International Press Association), press releases and 
prior stories on the same topic (Fairclough, 1995; Bell, 1991). 
Press releases are used frequently by journalists and may receive almost verbatim 
publication in a newspaper (Sissons, 2012; Bell, 1991).  This is due to their convenience and 
reliability, particularly on dailies where journalists may be under considerable time pressure.  
Yet they are also ‘despised’ by journalists due to the agenda setting function they can fulfil 
for the interested parties (ibid, p59). At the same time as creating positive publicity for the 
organisation, they also relinquish the journalists from their agenda setting role (Sissons, 
2012).   Prior stories on the same topic offer a similar level of convenience for the journalist 
and can result in a herd mentality (Bell, 1991).   
The editors’ role is to ensure accuracy and coherence in an article.  The language will often 
be changed, mostly by cutting down the words.  The journalist may resent such intervention 
(ibid, p43).  Editors also act as interpreters, deciding on the prominence of a story and how it 
is displayed.  Deciding on the presentation and the headlines of a story can significantly 
affect how the story is understood (Bell, 1991). 
6.5.2.1 Headlines 
Headlines are written by the editor rather than the journalist who has written the article.  The 
headline is often a summary of the lead paragraph, and provides a digested account of the 
article itself.  The construction of the headline is influenced by page space as well as by the 
article ((Bell, 1991).   Headlines have distinct syntactic and grammatical styles (ibid.).  They 
are a standalone unit and can be an opportunity to present the news in an individual way. 
Headlines thus have many functions.  They are the product which competes for limited 
attention resources from readers (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013).  Headlines can viewed as 





sensationalised (ibid.).  Language is an important resource for constructing this 
newsworthiness. However, the headlines may not be any substitute for reading the full 
article.  There can be a disjuncture between the headlines and the main subject of the story 
which follows (Andrew, 2007).  Readers who scan the headlines then are going to have 
different conceptions of events than those who spend a little more time reading the full 
article (ibid.).  In a recent study based at a national quality newspaper, the function of the 
headline was considered to serve as a relevance optimiser.  Here the relevance referred to the 
new information or assumptions being placed in front of the reader whilst simultaneously 
referring to an internal reader’s presumptions about the wider world (Dor, 2003).  In this 
way, the readers could get the most of the context of the story from a very small amount of 
effort in reading the headline (ibid. p718) and by scanning the newspaper headlines, could 
choose which stories to read by prioritising those which had most relevance to their 
individual lives (ibid, p718).  Readers thus did not have to invest in the full effort of reading 
the entire piece but could glean enough information from the headline.  
The use of newspaper headlines in the age of the Web 2.0 and social media may appear old 
fashioned.  Yet the headlines and the leader in a paper article is a feature of all different 
types of media.  Broadcasts over the TV and the radio have ‘headlines’ in their news 
bulletins before turning to the detail of each news item.  ‘Headlines’ in the broadcast sense 
are more similar to headlines + leader in a newspaper article than just the stand alone 
headline.  Headlines and leaders are also used in internet news sites, imitating a traditional 
newspaper headline.  Printed newspapers still account for the vast majority of reading news   
time as opposed to audience (Press Gazette, 2013). 
Newspapers also need to offer something new in their analysis of events.  With the advent of 
24 hour news, all ‘hard news’ events become old news by the time is a newspaper is printed.  
Thus there is pressure for the newspapers to carry an alternative angle or more opinion on 
items than previously.   There is an opportunity for reflection and critical analysis before the 
article is published, in a way that is not possible for the 24 hour news channels or websites.  
The transformational process from the original source and newsmakers to the final finished 
article is connected and embedded within the text.  There are great ‘genre chasms’ present as 
the newspaper is challenged to present the standard news in a digestible format for its 





Overall, there is considerable churn in the production of a newspaper article and the creation 
of its headline.  The headline itself has many functions.  The analysis of headlines therefore 
must be aware of these factors when conducting research.  The analytical approach taken in 
this thesis is presented next.   
 6.5.3 Analytical approach 
The Headlines for RBS and LBG were selected using Factiva.com to locate the data 
required.  Here, the headlines for the day following the year-end earnings announcements- 
the first possible day for coverage- were downloaded.  The national newspapers, including 
Scotland’s own national newspapers, the Herald and the Scotsman, were included within the 
search
9
.   With the exception of these two titles, the papers used were all based and printed 
out from a London base.  Content available on the Factiva website were closely analysed 
before searching for completeness
10
.  Searches were conducted using the official company 
tag in the database.  This ensured that the focus remained at the group level. Not all stories 
related to the earnings results of these groups on the days for review.  Where the stories 
related to a different topic, these were not included within the research for further review.   
A simple count helped to establish which papers were publishing news stories on the banks 
in the first place. This was tabulated and is presented in results.  This was partly to consider 
the silences or empty spaces (Parker, 2007) which may accompany the financial reporting 
process. 
Finally, the linguistic analysis was then conducted on the newspaper headlines.  This was 
done first by coding the headlines into themes which would reflect the main subject of the 
headline.  Once in these categories, each headline was closely read and analysed.  The 
theoretical framework chapter discusses the linguistic characteristics in detail. 
                                                     
9
 Both RBS and major subsidiaries of LBG – HBOS and Scottish Widows – are based in Edinburgh.  
Thus, the banks’ results generate a lot of local interest.  They remain national newspapers for the 
country of Scotland, whilst the London based titles are national for Great Britain. 
10
 The entire print editions of the newspapers were available.  Some supplements were not covered for 
some of the newspapers.  However, the stories were more of a hard news item so this was deemed not 





The methodology of CDA is theoretically driven (Fairclough, 2010, p75). Analysis of texts 
includes intertextual (Fairclough, 2010) analysis of what genres, discourses and styles are 
drawn upon in the relevant text. Intertextuality moves beyond the written components of a 
document and consider how it relates to societal discourses on certain topics (Fairclough, 
1995). It then makes use of linguistic devices to consider representations in the language of 
the particular discourse (ibid).  For the thesis, the newspaper headlines were considered 
alongside a context in a number of ways.  The first was alongside the annual reports studied 
in chapter 9 and the press announcements of the yearly earnings.  Wires and analyst 
transcript proceedings, where available, were also analysed.  Wires transcripts were only 
partially available for RBS on the web.  LBG did not publish them alongside their other 
information.  Nonetheless, the RBS ones give some indication of the nature of such 
proceedings.   Finally, the wider world news of the day were considered, in case there was 
another story of an unscheduled nature which would have impacted on the coverage of RBS 
and LBG (Bell, 1991).  These are all discussed alongside the empirical results.   
The chapter thus far has considered the overall research design for the thesis.  The first task 
of the research design was to provide a deep understanding and direction for enquiries.  For 
this purpose, a stakeholder approach framed the research.  Secondly, there are three research 
themes which have specific documentary evidence being used alongside analytical 
approaches which are coherent with the theories being utilised. 
Figure 6.3 is a diagrammatic representation of the overall research design for the thesis based 
on research themes and the nature of data collected.  The main sources of data are discussed 
above but a number of periphery sources were used to help enrich the contextual analysis of 
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The thesis was collated under a common umbrella of understanding using a stakeholder 
approach and documents.  This understanding and documentary evidence was then analysed 
using theoretically informed approaches subsequently.   
The remainder of the chapter now turns to the timing of data collection and the ethics of the 
research process. 
6.6 Timing of Data Collection and Analysis 
The PhD has been completed concurrently with the events it is studying.  Part of the 
challenge has been to keep abreast of rapidly changing developments and place these in the 
wider historical context.   The use of contemporary events, however, allows researchers to 
generate their own data based on design rather than on relics which have survived by virtue 
of historical accident (Goldthorpe, 1991).  Thus the topicality of the banking crisis can be 
seen as an asset. 
The timing of the study begins with the day that credit markets contracted, resulting in an 
abrupt decline in liquidity.  This is commonly agreed to be 10 August 2007 (HM Treasury, 
2008).    A point for stopping data collection also had to be chosen.  This would ideally 
reflect either: a natural break driven by events (the publication of accounts may be a good 
place to stop); a theoretically informed goal post (for example, property rights would suggest 
this would stop when ownership change) or one which reflects a practical point for the PhD.   
A transfer in property rights back from the Government to the private sector did not occur 
before writing up. Historical experience suggests that nationalised banks are held for many 
years before returning to the private sector (Laeven & Valencia, 2008).  A practical point for 
the PhD would be the end of 2012, as this allows a suitable horizon for the completion of a 
PhD part time.  Due to year end procedures, closing the books can take some time after the 
end of the financial year.  The release of annual reports therefore happens before the end of 
March. Thus, the date past which no new data will be collected is March 2013.   
The analysis of certain phenomena located within a particular time period allows the 
recognition of the past in the present.  Any study of society has a deep and often implicit, 
sense of history, which is usually referred to in more recent events (Mills, 2000).   The 
importance of market shocks for accounting today is frequently recognised.  Enron left a 





al, 2007), which is still in force today; the flow and regulation of money is both cause and 
effect of financial crisis (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2006) and the accounting profession reacts 
to scandal to continue its own interests of existence (Wright, 1994).  The decision to stop at 
March 2013 allowed the fullest extent of Government ownership to be considered prior to 
the two tranches of sales occurring in September 2013 and March 2014.  The consideration 
of the privatisation process is an excellent opportunity for further research.   
6.7 Ethics 
No major ethical issues have been encountered completing the PhD.  The information 
utilised is publicly available information which can be collected quite easily over the 
internet.   The documentary analysis has been conducted in a secure office on University 
grounds.  All documents are backed up daily by University servers.     Freedom of 
Information applies as a staff member (Scottish Parliament, 2002).  No requests were made 
during the research process. 
The author is a chartered accountant.  Affiliation with the accounting profession inevitably 
suggests a tendency to bias, as loyalty to the profession is required for membership (IFAC, 
2005).  Nonetheless, this is resolved professionally by the duty of members to act in the 
public interest (International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 2013) and researching the 
practises of accountants helps to fulfil this mission.   
Copyright restrictions and licenses were thoroughly checked before any extraction of data 
from them occurred.  These are discussed under the relevant sources above.   
6.8 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter outlined the research methods employed in the thesis.  Understanding of the 
cases was assisted by an approach influenced by stakeholder theory.  This helped to direct 
the preliminary investigation into the cases.   The chapter then discussed the role of 
documents in the thesis. The methodology for each research theme was discussed by 
considering the principal documentary sources used for analysis.  Thereafter, the analytical 
approach used for each research theme was explained.  Finally the timing of the data 





Chapter 7: The Cases of RBS and 
LBG: The Historical Context 
The thesis now turns to the empirical investigation into RBS and LBG.  There are three 
overarching themes: 
1. The Impact of Government Intervention on the accountability of the UK Quasi-
nationalised banks 
2. The banking crisis through the lens of financial reporting for RBS and LBG 
3. Media reporting of the banking crisis for RBS and LBG 
This chapter provides a short introduction to the company histories of LBG and RBS.  This 
considers the institutions from their origins up to their contemporary positions as quasi-
nationalised banks.  The rationale is to provide a deeper understanding of these banking 
institutions and the context of their role in the economy of the UK.  For Scotland in 
particular, there is a long and proud tradition of banking.  The Bank of Scotland, now part of 
Lloyds Banking Group, provides the original history for LBG below.   Both banking groups 
have had recent high profile takeovers.  RBS won a hostile takeover bid of ABN Amro, a 
Dutch bank.  The takeover left RBS particularly vulnerable when the financial crisis came.  
Lloyds TSB took over HBOS (Halifax Bank of Scotland) during the crux of the crisis in 
2008.  These significant takeovers are discussed in more detail.     
A second aim of the chapter is to consider the current position of the banks as quasi-
nationalised entities.  Defining RBS and LBG as ‘quasi-nationalised’ is justified in this 
chapter.  Moreover, the stakeholders related to RBS and LBG are identified.  This helped 
informed the initial data collection as discussed in chapter 6.    With this understanding, it is 
hoped that a more penetrating analysis can be conducted in the following empirical chapters. 
7.1 The Bank of Scotland and The Royal Bank of Scotland: The 
First 300 years 
The Bank of Scotland, taken over by LBG in September 2008, is Scotland’s oldest bank.  
Since the 17
th
 century, it has had an important role in the economy of Scotland, and latterly, 





RBS.  This first section therefore considers the history of these two banks.  This helps to 
illuminate the understanding of rivalry up into the 2000s.   
The Bank of Scotland was created by Royal Charter in 1695 (Checkland, 1975).  It was 
funded with private monies and was always intended to be completely separate from the 
State (Checkland, 1975).  Allocated share capital was £1.2m Scots, the equivalent of 
£100,000 sterling.   Only 10% was called up in the initial creation of the company.  It was to 
have a national focus, although its activities were mainly on Edinburgh.  At the time of 
creation, it was granted a 21 year monopoly on banking activities.   
Banking in the early years was about lending rather than deposits.  Loans were funded out of 
the called up share capital.  Loans were generally to mercantile or land owners, for between 
£100 - £500 sterling.  Interest was 6% and the loans were to be repaid within a year.  The 
loan value could not represent more than a third of the value of the unencumbered security 
(Checkland, 1975).   
The monopoly and standard loan terms provided the Bank of Scotland with a stable business 
model until the creation of the Royal Bank of Scotland in 1727.  The Royal Bank of Scotland 
started life with a larger capital than the Bank of Scotland.  It also had greater monetary and 
political connections to the City of London, being “part of Walpole’s political control in 
Scotland” (Checkland, 1975).   
From their earliest days, the ‘Bank’ and ‘Royal Bank’
11
 were intensely competitive.  Each 
bank held strategic reserves of the other’s notes.  Rival staff were used to create runs on the 
banks by calling in the notes en masse at certain times (Checkland, 1975).  To curtail these 
runs between rivals, a unique option clause was added to the issued notes (Checkland, 1975).  
The option clause allowed the banks times to a longer time period to issue the coin to the 
note bearer, with interest.  This helped to stem strategic bank runs by rival banks (Cowen 
and Kroszner, 1989).   Whilst the option clause may have caused stability, it has also been 
argued to have caused an over issuance of banking notes in Scotland.  This caused 
depreciation on their value (Gherity, 1995).   
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The banks were both innovators.  At the Royal Bank, the first form of overdraft was created 
in 1728.   Interest was only charged on any amounts drawn down (Checkland, 1975).  In 
1810, RBS opened the Commercial Bank of Scotland.  This was the first bank that was open 
for a new class of client – traders, farmers and ordinary merchants (Royal Bank of Scotland, 
2013e).  Bank of Scotland also opened many branches, with 265 in operation throughout 
Scotland by 1939.  The banks buildings were imposing and solid, meant to indicate 
permanence and prosperity (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2013e).  One social observer noted: 
“In the Middle Ages, the village was an accretion on the feudal castle.  In modern 
Scotland, the village seems to have grown upon the bank…”  anonymous quote in 
Rosenblum (  1933) 
Overall, the banks were ubiquitous throughout Scotland into the nineteenth century and 
provided counter services to many remote and rural areas throughout the twentieth century 
(BBC News, 2012).  Nonetheless, throughout the lives of the banks, there has been an 
implicit reliance on the Bank of England as a lender of last resort (Cowen and Kroszner, 
1989).  London was needed regularly for specie, and particularly during periods of tumult, 
such as during the Jacobite uprising of ’45 (Checkland, 1975).  In fact, crises in the Scottish 
banks were often caused by the collapse of their London based correspondents (Cowen and 
Kroszner, 1989).  RBS and Bank of Scotland, being the two largest public banks in Scotland 
did not fulfil a similar role to the Bank of England.  The two banks did provide some limited 
stability measures when there was a collapse of a smaller rival.  The City of Glasgow Bank, 
the last bank run on a British bank before Northern Rock, collapsed in 1878.  The banks in 
Scotland joined forces and immediately agreed to accept the notes of the failed bank.  In 
some instances, there were arrangements to transfer deposits away from the bank to the 
respective public banks (Acheson and Turner, 2011; Acheson and Turner, 2008).   
Nonetheless, the banks’ involvement in the stability of the banking system was limited to co-
ordinate efforts amongst the entire industry.   
In the earliest days, the banks were funded and managed by the very wealthiest parts of 
society (Checkland, 1975).  By the nineteenth century, the shareholder base of the Scottish 
banks was diverse and passive.  The shareholders saw ownership as a means of accessing 
capital in the 1840s.   However, shares gradually became less important in accessing capital.  
The practice of holding shares for capital access had died out by the 1870s and the 





The Scottish people developed a reputation for being good bankers, and RBS purposefully 
trained more bankers than they had employment for in the expectation that the employees 
would be recruited worldwide (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2013e).    The Bank of Scotland 
offered a modern career as processes were replicated from branch to branch (McKinlay, 
2002).  Recruitment occurred through personal recommendation and individual social status 
was important for promotion opportunities.  ‘The man was the bank’ and punishments were 
inflicted when personal conduct was unsatisfactory (McKinlay, 2002).   
By the beginning of the first world war, the Royal Bank of Scotland was operating 
internationally (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2013e).  The banks were both involved in 
supporting Government war loans and trading controls.  The first women were employed in 
banking duties whilst men were fighting (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2013e).  In the 1920s, 
competition for banking customers was intense.  RBS started up the ‘homesafe’ accounts 
designed for customers who could only save a few coins at the time, as well as the very 
wealthy customers.  In the 1970s, RBS was the first British clearing bank to offer a home 
purchase loan scheme to customers as well (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2013e).     
Thus, Scottish banks and their bankers became internationally recognised for innovation and 
prudence through the centuries.    Towards the end of the twentieth century, a change in 
banking culture can be identified as they looked toward international corporate expansion 
from mature domestic markets.  This overall change in approach is discussed next. 
7.2 The Banks into the Millennium 
Previously, the Bank and Royal bank were Scottish businesses.  There were international 
connections but generally these were utilised to service their domestic customers.  By the 
end of the twentieth century, the banks had become more ambitious.  Both sought to expand 
geographically and by service line.    This represented a new era for the banks, stepping 
away from their traditional markets and headed up by a new form of banking elite (Kerr and 
Robinson, 2011). 
RBS was intent on diversification through acquisition. It purchased a number of companies 
in the 1990s, such as Green Flag,  and created the successful Direct Line insurance brand 
(Royal Bank of Scotland, 2013e).  Its famous success, however, was the acquisition of 





English bank.  Advances were rejected fulsomely by the directors of NatWest at the time.  
The directors’ claim was based on neither offers having ‘the right management 
experience…claiming inflated merger benefits…and leading to unacceptable risks and 
potential value destruction”(NatWest, 2000).   The takeover battle was portrayed in the media 
as a battle between the two bank chief executives who were looking to expand out of 
Scotland (Kerr and Robinson, 2011) and represented a new aggressive style in Scottish 
Banking (Kerr and Robinson, 2012; Kerr and Robinson, 2011).  RBS succeeded.    
RBS hailed the takeover of NatWest an enormous success, with savings in excess of the 
estimated £1billion and completed within 3 years (Kennedy et al., 2006).  The integration 
successes were then replicated with the acquisitions of further companies later on, such as 
Ulster bank (Kennedy et al., 2006) and Churchill Insurance.  RBS had moved from a 
national bank of 32,670 in 1999 (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2000) to a global corporation with 
226,400 employees working in 53 companies (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2007b).     
Bank of Scotland had been disappointed with failing to take over NatWest.  A further bid to 
merge with Abbey National also did not proceed (Office of Fair Trading, 2001).  In April 
2001, the Bank of Scotland announced a merger with Halifax plc, an English based bank.  
The merger was a nil premium one for one share offer with targeted synergies of £620 
million per annum (Halifax, 2001). The merger was promoted as favourable for competition:  
“The combination of Bank of Scotland and Halifax to form HBOS will create a major 
and distinctive competitor in the UK financial services market, having the scale and 
expertise to challenge the 'Big 4' clearing banks” (Halifax, 2001) 
For the Bank of Scotland, the deal with Halifax was seen as acceding power to England 
(Kerr and Robinson, 2011).  Nonetheless, the newly merged group focused on a high growth 
strategy within the UK (HBOS, 2002) and did not acquire further businesses, even though 
opportunity arose  (HBOS, 2004).  In 2005, the old Chairman stepped down, with Andy 
Hornby becoming chief executive of HBOS (HBOS, 2005). 
After the success of the NatWest takeover, the RBS strategy continued to be acquisitive.  
Much of RBS’ funding problems originated from the large acquisition of ABN Amro in 
October 2007.  This left it with a large amount of toxic assets and low levels of cash on the 
cusp of the global financial crisis.  The bank, in consortium with Fortis and Banco 
Santander, had paid a premium for ABN which was then broken up between the three 





Netherlands.  Its takeover by the consortium is one of the largest hostile takeovers ever 
completed.  The nature of the bid and the corresponding impact on RBS is worth 
documenting.  It demonstrates the nature of RBS’ acquisitive strategy, its desire to decrease 
risk through diversification, and its steadfast ambition to continue its purchase of ABN 
Amro, despite poison pills and severe uncertainty in the financial markets at the time of the 
takeover.   
 ABN Amro had been a successful bank and had a large international presence.  It had 
acquired many banks in different countries and had achieved good growth through this 
strategy.  However, the banks had also had a number of restructures during its acquisitive 
phase and the markets had not responded well to this (ABN Amro, 2010a).  Moreover, its 
costs were very high compared to other banks and its share price remained low as a result.  It 
was an attractive takeover target. 
In February 2007, ABN Amro posted modest results, which showed that profits had risen but 
cost rises had outstripped earnings growth (Euroweek, 2007a).  Before the shareholders 
meeting that April, there were proposed motions for the break up or sale of the bank and a 
demand to stop its acquisitions (Degorce P, 2007; Euroweek, 2007b).   
Some weeks later, Barclays plc, a British based international bank announced to the market 
that it was in exclusive talks with ABN Amro about a proposed merger (Barclays, 2007a), 
putting ABN’s bid share price at approximately €32.70/share (Dutch News Digest, 2007).  
These were exclusive discussions between the banks and lasted until the 20 April that year 
(Barclays, 2007b).  A few days prior to the end of the talks, RBS, in consortium with Fortis 
and Banco Santander announced interest in the bank too.  The consortium (hereafter known 
as RFS) agreed to meet with ABN Amro on 23 April to discuss their own proposal so that 
they may be considered alongside the Barclays offer (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2007f). 
RBS would lead the break-up of the bank and asserted there was less transaction risk since 
all of the banks had presence in the markets in which ABN operated (Royal Bank of 
Scotland, 2007c).  The banks requested the co-operation of the ABN board.  They completed 
limited due diligence and had little further information over what had already been received 
by Barclays and by Bank of America (ibid, p1).  ABN had reluctantly offered access to RFS 
for conducting due diligence, with the condition that an offer not proceed for 12 months 





to bid for 100% of the bank’s shares.  However, there were questions over the ability of RBS 
to come up with the cash for the deal and that the other banks would have to initiate large 
public rights issues (Economist, 2007). 
The transaction would involve some complexity given that it was a break up bid.  First of all 
the assets would transfer to a subsidiary of RBS, named RFS Holdings Ltd.  This subsidiary 
was represented in the 2008 accounts of RBS.   ABN Amro would then be reorganised into 
three divisions to help with the relevant parts of the bank ending up with the correct 
consortium partner (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2007a).   RBS was seeking annual cost savings 
of €2.01bn and expected integration costs of €3.84bn (ibid, p13).  RFS believed the 
consortium provided the breadth of expertise to enable the ABN businesses to be most 
successfully built upon and integrated, over a single buyer like Barclays.  Likewise, they all 
had a good track record of previous acquisitions.  RBS remarked upon the success of the 
NatWest bid, achieving over £2bn in cost synergies (ibid, p14).   
The consortium had further issues with persuading the regulators of the deal, as the 
consideration for ABN would stretch the capital ratios of each of the banks to a ‘degree that 
should make the rating agencies uncomfortable.’  RBS, as the main partner, was effectively 
underwriting the deal by taking on the full bank through the subsidiary RFS Holdings Ltd.  
The banks also acknowledged that they didn’t have a lot of facts about the bank, given that 
the consortium has based its offer on limited due diligence  (FT.com, 2007).   
On 16 July, the consortium revised its offer for ABN Amro. The acquisition vehicle 
remained RFS Holdings Ltd, an RBS subsidiary which would distribute the assets of ABN to 
the other banks as agreed(Royal Bank of Scotland, 2007d).  For each ordinary share of ABN 
Amro, RFS was offering: 
 €35.60 cash and 
 0.296 newly issued shares in RBS with a nominal value of £0.25 (ibid, p2). 
This gave a total consideration for ABN Amro of €71.1bn which was declared binding in 
October 2007.  Yet the preceding month had been one of considerable uncertainty for the 
financial markets as the pending US subprime crisis caused considerable mistrust in the 
wholesale money markets.  However, the Dutch financial regulator, the DNB, did recognise 
the potential regulatory impact of these times and had made enquiries to this effect before 





“In this context it should be noted that this recommendation is issued under special 
circumstances. Not only is the issue at hand an unprecedented case where a 
consortium of three banks desires to take over and break up a system-relevant bank, 
but, since several weeks [sic], also with great uncertainties in the financial markets. 
These special circumstances impose special responsibilities on all parties 
concerned...” ((DNB, 2007) 
Nonetheless, the banks were certain that there would not be an issue for them as they 
continued to have good credit ratings.  The DNB urged caution and recommended that the 
financing be further secured before declaration of no objection would be in place: 
“Despite the uncertainties on the financial markets…, the Applicant does not foresee 
problems for the success of the issues, given the financial status of the parties 
concerned.  The above does not alter the fact that the consideration (largely in cash) 
involved by the public offer issued will still need to be produced. The present 
uncertainties on the financial markets, i.e. those created by liquidity drying up – 
which make banks increasingly dependent on call money and various segments of 
the capital market, such as securitisations, hybrids and bank debt certificates, have 
led to special attention being paid to the solvency and liquidity positions of both the 
Applicant and ABN AMRO Group…DNB therefore deems it imperative that the 
financing be adequately safeguarded” (ibid, pp9 – 10). 
Despite the warnings of the DNB, the takeover of ABN Amro was completed. Shortly 
afterwards, the financial crisis occurred, with a sharp contraction in liquidity in the money 
markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  There were also the large 
potential losses from the revaluation of financial instruments, such as the ABSs and CDOs.   
RBS suffered greater exposure to the financial instruments following the takeover.  
Moreover, RBS had limited capital and cash to absorb losses on assets, having invested in 
ABN Amro.  6 months after takeover, RBS announced a £12billion rights issue to increase 
capital ratios in the face of the turbulent financial sector and its capital write downs in the 
year (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2008a).  The rights issue was 95% subscribed (Royal Bank of 
Scotland, 2008f).  It was nonetheless met with a lot of criticism as the ABN Amro purchase 
was questioned.  Moreover, there was concern at the dramatic change in RBS’ outlook in a 
very short time (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2008c). By October 2008, the bank was two hours 
away from having no funding or liquidity and required over £45bn in Government money to 
stay afloat(National Audit Office., 2010). The Chief Executive of RBS, Fred Goodwin, was 
succeeded by Stephen Hester shortly after Government intervention on 21 November 2008 
(Royal Bank of Scotland, 2008b).  The Chairman, Tom McKillop, was replaced by Phillip 





Overall, the demise of RBS can be attributed to an extent on the ill-judged acquisition 
(Hamilton and Micklethwait, 2006) of ABN Amro.  Overconfidence had been generated by a 
successful acquisitive history previously.  ABN Amro, however, was a much larger 
acquisition and had not received extensive due diligence.  Lloyds Banking Group, on the 
other hand, had become deeply entrenched in the crisis by acquiring HBOS.  HBOS was 
bought at the peak of the crisis and with extensive exposure to the depressed property 
markets.  The next part of the chapter therefore focuses on the story of LBG and HBOS.   
7.3 Lloyds Banking Group 
Lloyds Banking Group was formed when it formally merged with the failed HBOS bank in 
January 2009.  When the two companies merged, Lloyds Banking Group became the UK’s 
largest banking provider.  Currently, LBG has over 30 million customers in retail and 
commercial sectors.  The bank Chief Executive is António Horta-Osório, who joined in 
2011.  Key to the appointment of  Horta-Osório was his experience in integrating banking 
franchises in the UK (Lloyds Banking Group, 2010b).  The chairman of the bank is Sir Win 
Bischoff.  He joined the bank in 2009.  Sir Win had previously been Chairman of Citigroup 
(Lloyds Banking Group and Llo, 2009).   
Lloyds TSB was itself a product of a merger between Lloyds Bank and ‘The Savings Bank’ 
(TSB) in 1995 (Lloyds Banking Group, 2014).  The TSB was set up in Dumfriesshire in 
1810 by the Reverend Henry Duncan to encourage the poor to save. Lloyds bank originated 
in 1765 in Birmingham and operated out of a single office for nearly 100 years, before 
expanding into London (Lloyds Banking Group, 2014).  
LBG sought a competitive advantage to buying HBOS at the height of the banking crisis.  
Competition concerns about the size of the merged bank were dismissed in favour of a 
private sector solution to the failure of HBOS (Darling, 2011).   HBOS had been heavily 
exposed to downturn in the property market and overall market dislocation (HBOS, 2009).  
Interestingly, HBOS’ exposure to the liquidity markets was less than Northern Rock.  At the 
end of 2007, HBOS relied on wholesale markets for 56% of its group funding,  £280bn 
(HBOS, 2009).  As market conditions deteriorated, its ability to fund from the wholesale 
markets became increasingly difficult.  The banks did not trust each other generally.  
However, HBOS was particularly vulnerable in the perilous conditions.  It had embarked on 





Committee, 2009a; HBOS, 2008e).  It was offering more loans to customers using wholesale 
funding rather than customer deposits to drive the growth.  Much of this growth was 
concentrated in the property sector.  By June 2008, 38% of its total corporate treasury book 
was concentrated in the commercial property area (HBOS, 2008d).  Added to that, the retail 
sector wrote a great deal of new mortgages, with ‘1 in 5 approved mortgages’ originating 
with HBOS (ibid).   It was exposed to any downturn in the property markets.  
HBOS tried to raise £4bn in a rights issue in July 2008 to strengthen its capital base.  This 
would act as a buffer on assets at fair value and help to absorb property market impairments.  
The rights issue was fully underwritten and was offered at a 45% discount to the market 
value of the shares at the time.  However, the rights issue failed, with only 8.29% of 
shareholders subscribing for the shares (HBOS, 2008b).   The markets were concerned about 
HBOS’ ability to come through the crisis (Seib, 2008; Flanagan, 2008; Guardian, 2008; 
Croft J, 2008a; Croft J, 2008b). 
The collapse of Lehman brothers on 15
th
 September created widespread panic in the markets.  
The prospects for HBOS were particularly dim.  Customers withdrew deposits, increasing 
pressure to obtain wholesale funding.  From June to December 2008, HBOS lost over £36bn 
in customer deposits
12
 attributed to withdrawal of deposits primarily from corporate 
customers (HBOS, 2009).  Despite announcements from both HBOS (HBOS, 2008c) and the 
FSA (HBOS, 2008c) to the markets that the bank was satisfactorily funded, HBOS’s share 






.  On 17
th
 September, HBOS 
announced it was in talks with Lloyds about a possible merger (HBOS, 2008a).    On 18 
September 2008, the merger was formally announced (Lloyds TSB, 2008c).  For the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the economic situation overrode any concerns about 
competition: 
“Lloyds had considered a takeover before but knew that it would fall foul of the 
competition rules in the UK, because the two banks’ combined share of the 
mortgage market would be too great.  Nevertheless, it looks as if they would now be 
ready to take over HBOS, thereby providing the banks with the much-needed capital 
to stay afloat.  I discussed the takeover with Eric Daniels on 17 September.  I told 
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him that Lloyds would have to be satisfied that it knew what it was taking on.  For our 
part, we would be prepared to consider amending the competition rules in these very 
exceptional circumstances.  Until very late in the day, we had two draft 
announcements ready: one dealing with a Lloyd’s takeover, the other with 
nationalization.  I talked about this with Gordon, who was as keen as I was to 
achieve a private sector solution, if it would work.  After all, if we were stuck with 
HBOS, we would have to wind it down, and competition in the mortgage market 
would be reduced anyway.  The announcement of the takeover was made the 
following morning, 18 September.” (Darling, 2011) 
The merger announcement help to sustain the HBOS share price for only a few days.  By 30 
September 2008, the share price of HBOS had slid to 120p, well below the pre-merger 
announcement price of 147p (Lloyds Banking Group, 2013c).  The deteriorating market 
conditions meant that both Lloyds TSB and HBOS would have to raise capital under 
Government recommendations (ibid.)  The terms of the merger were duly revised to reflect 
the deteriorating circumstances (Lloyds TSB, 2008a).  Nonetheless, the Lloyds TSB board 
were strongly minded that the deal was an excellent opportunity for Lloyds TSB: 
“This will be a unique opportunity to accelerate and extend our strategy and create 
the UK’s leading financial services group.  Lloyds TSB/HBOS’s [sic] outstanding 
franchise will enable it to service more of its customer needs with the balance sheet 
strength to prosper in challenging markets.  This is a good deal for customers and 
shareholders.” (Lloyds TSB, 2008c) 
The official merger for Lloyds TSB and HBOS occurred on 19 January 2009 (Lloyds 
Banking Group, 2008).   In June 2010, LBG announced a plan to streamline their 
international activities, cut jobs in the middle management of the banks and invest in their 
relationship brands of Lloyds and Halifax and Bank of Scotland.   
For both RBS and LBG, Government intervention coincided with major corporate 
restructuring.  The acquisitions and history described above gives context to the state of the 
banks at the time of the initial Government investment.  The next part of the chapter moves 
on to discuss the conditions of the Government intervention in 2008 and as updated in 2009.  
This is useful in assessing the nature of ownership that the banks are subject to during the 







7.4 Conditions of the Government Intervention of October 2008 
and the Asset Protection Scheme of January 2009 
In return for the large scale funding of both LBG and RBS, the State imposed additional 
conditions on the banks.  These were made during the crisis in October 2008 and then 
updated in November 2009.  The conditions centred on executive pay for bankers, small and 
medium sized enterprise (SME) lending, and the Government’s right to appoint directors to 
the board. 
7.4.1 Restraint on Pay and Bonuses 
The banks were criticised publicly for excessive remuneration in the banking industry.  The 
Government sought to influence incentives and policy within the industry and particularly 
towards cash bonuses.  With regard to bonuses, it was agreed that RBS would not award any 
bonuses to directors in 2008.  For LBG, bonuses would only be awarded via shares.  In 2009, 
in both banks there would be limit on discretionary bonuses for staff earning over £39,000.  
Directors bonuses would be deferred from 2009 – 2012.  The banks were also obliged to 
follow best practice guidelines as set out by the G20, the FSA and the Walker Review 
(Lloyds TSB, 2008a; Royal Bank of Scotland, 2008e).  The Government commented on the 
rationale for the bonus restrictions: 
“…we are trying to stop irresponsible remuneration, whereby people are encouraged 
to do something that damages the banks and, therefore, the rest of the financial 
system. What we are suggesting means that in future the rewards will be tied to the 
long-term interests of the bank.” (Hansard HC, 2008)  
The banks accepted the conditions but have found the need to attract talented staff with 
restricted remuneration policies a difficult balance.  Further details of this are explored in 
chapter 8. 
7.4.2 Board Appointments 
The investment in the banks granted the State the right to appoint directors to the board.  For 
RBS, which had received a greater proportion of Government support, the State could 
appoint three non-executive directors.  In LBG, there would be two appointments (Lloyds 
TSB, 2008a; Royal Bank of Scotland, 2008e).  The reasoning behind the board appointments 





“It is important that we nominate people who have the relevant experience and can 
bring their influence to bear. I have made this point before: the boards are the first 
line of defence, not just in preventing banks from getting into difficulties, but in the 
wider system.” (Hansard HC 2008, Col 550) 
The State had thus direct influence on both board membership and incentives to executives.  
State investment was granted subject to the banks agreeing to conditions on lending policies 
as well.  These are described next.   
7.4.3 Lending to SMEs and Individuals 
As well as the changes at executive level, the Government negotiated involvement in lending 
policies for economic reasons.  The banks were committed to maintaining lending at 2007 
levels and to increase lending by £25bn (RBS) and £14bn (LBG) in 2010 and 2011(HM 
Treasury, 2009a; Royal Bank of Scotland, 2009b; Lloyds Banking Group, 2009d).  
Moreover, both would create a customer charter which would lay out these commitments for 
mortgage lending.  The banks would publish an annual report which detailed how they 
fulfilled these commitments (ibid).    Customers would benefit further through increased 
shared equity projects and assistance for those who risked having homes repossessed (ibid).  
For LBG, the Mound in Edinburgh would be the Headquarters for the enlarged group (HM 
Treasury, 2009a; Lloyds TSB, 2008c).   
The continuation of private sector investment in the banks was a critical component of the 
Government rescue package.  The banks were to maintain the commercial orientation to their 
activities, allowing recovery and return to profit.  This in turn would allow the Government 
to exit from the investment. 
7.4.4 The Asset Protect Scheme 
By January 2009, the UK economy was deep in recession with falling asset values and 
increasing credit default rates (Bank of England, 2009: 9 – 12).  Once again, the UK 
Government offered additional financing to the banking industry.  This time funding came 
through an instrument named the Asset Protection Scheme (APS).  The APS was a form of 
insurance policy designed to buffer the banks from losses against financial assets whose 
values had declined dramatically (HM Treasury, 2009b).  The banks would incur a level of 
the losses on asset values, and anything above an excess would be incurred by the 
Government.  In the interests of stability, both RBS and LBG agreed in principle to the APS 





medium term.    By November 2009, LBG considered the economy was buoyant enough to 
allow them to fund the losses by going directly to market for further capital instead of 
receiving further Government assistance.  LBG subsequently left the APS scheme (Lloyds 
Banking Group, 2009d).  Nonetheless, LBG paid an interim fee of £2.5bn for the 
Government assurance provided before opting to fund through markets (Lloyds Banking 
Group, 2009d).  RBS remained committed to utilising the Asset Protection Scheme (RBS, 27 
Nov 2009).  RBS exited from the APS scheme in October 2012, without drawing down on 
Government funds (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2012b).  
There was an inherent conflict in objectives given to the banks.  On the one hand, there was 
been a requirement to preserve capital to meet BASEL regulations.  On the other, lending 
commitments required capital to be invested in individuals and small firms in a challenging 
economic environment.  The former can be seen as trying to protect the stability of the bank, 
whilst the latter was concentrated on protecting consumers as stakeholders and in assisting 
the wider economy recover from the crisis (House of Commons - Treasury Committee, 
2009a). Moreover, executive remuneration created a popular backlash against the bankers’ 
bonuses.  Responding to public feeling, the entire banking industry in addition to RBS and 
LBG took responsibility for the lending to the UK economy in 2011 (Project Merlin, 2011).  
Executive pay would be linked to the performance of the banks against the agreed to lending 
targets.  Later on in the same year, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) published a report 
into the failure of RBS, citing poor management and strategic decisions, as well as 
implicating their own loose rein of regulation as a cause for the failure of RBS (Financial 
Services Authority, 2011). 
Figure 7.1 summarises the key events pertaining to RBS and LBG during the research 
period.  There continues to be considerable regulatory activity surrounding the banks to the 
present day.  These are discussed in more detail as appropriate throughout the thesis. 
The UK banking crisis resulted in fast moving and complicated events.  As a result, the 
conditions of ownership of the RBS and LBG were complex.  The next section considers this 
Government ownership in RBS and LBG more fully.  The shareholdings are analysed next.  
This helps inform the discussion on the banks’ status as quasi-nationalised entities.  Finally, 







US Subprime Collapse 
•17th February 2008 
Northern Rock Nationalised 
•15 September 2008 
Failure of Lehman Brothers in the US 
•September 2008 
Bradford and Bingley, Icesave Collapse; HBOS is failing 
•30 September 2008 
Lloyds TSB agrees to buy HBOS 
•8 October 2008 
Government offers Banking Rescue Package 
•13 October 2008 
RBS and LBG confirm participation in Government Scheme 
•19 January 2009 
Government Asset Protection Scheme; HBOS and LLoyds TSB officially merge 
•3 November 2009 
LBG withdraws from Asset Protection Scheme, raises money via Rights Issue 
•6 May 2010 
UK General Election 
•February 2011 
Project Merlin Targets Agreed with all Major Banks in UK 
•September 2011 
Independent Commission on Banking Reports 
•September 2012 
RBS withdraws from APS without drawing on Government funds 
•January 2013 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards Begins 
•18 September 2013 
HM Treasury sells 6% shareholding in LBG 





7.5 The Shareholdings in RBS and LBG 2008 - 2013 
This section analyses in depth the nature of the Government ownership in RBS and LBG.  
The total Government shareholding in the two banks is shown below.  In Figure 7.2, the RBS 
shareholding is presented.  The ordinary share capital stage can be clearly seen.    As well as 
the ordinary share capital, The Government also holds 51 billion convertible B shares, which 
translate into ordinary shares at a ratio of 10:1.  These were part of the original APS scheme.    
Finally, the Government holds an enhanced Dividend Access Share.  This gives the 
Government the right to receive the greater of 7% of the B share nominal amount or 250% of 
the ordinary share dividend (UKFI, 2013b; Royal Bank of Scotland, 2008d).  The Dividend 
Access Share expires when the RBS share price is in excess of 650p in 20 out of 30 days 
(ibid.).    Overall, the economic interest in RBS for the Government is 81%(UKFI, 2013b). 












Figure 7.3: UKFI Analysis of LBG Shareholding 
 
(UKFI, 2013b) 
In Lloyds Banking Group, the share ownership fluctuated in the first year or so of 
Government intervention.   This can be seen in Figure 7.3. The initial capitalisation of the 
banks took place in the separate HBOS and Lloyds TSB.  HBOS received £11.5bn in return 
for equity capital and Lloyds TSB took £5.5bn.  Without the merger with HBOS, Lloyds 
TSB would have had to have taken £7bn itself (Lloyds TSB, 2008a).  The HBOS 
shareholders were given Lloyds Banking Group shares as consideration for their HBOS 
shareholding (Lloyds TSB, 2008b). 
In June 2009, Lloyds Banking Group redeemed the HM Treasury preference shares in place.  
This was executed via the proceeds of an open offer of shares, which HM Treasury 
subscribed to pro rata (Lloyds Banking Group, 2009c).  This relieved LBG of paying £480m 
in preference share dividends and allowed the group to work on paying ordinary dividends in 
the future, as well as retaining cash during the tumultuous market conditions (ibid.). 
The Asset Protection Scheme exit was an opportunity for the bank to demonstrate its 
improved perception in the market.  The Board launched a £13.5bn rights issue in its place, 
for which the Government took up its pro rata share and 95% took up the offer for the shares 
(Lloyds Banking Group, 2009b).  In return for the implicit guarantee which the proposed 
involvement in APS had given LBG during its particularly difficult period in early 2009, the 





Government’s share in Lloyds Banking Group represented 39% of the issued share capital, 
down 4% from its initial 43% share (UKFI, 2013b). 
Overall, the Government’s shareholding in the two banks has remained substantially stable 
since 2009.  RBS did complete a share consolidation exercise in September 2012 which was 
designed to reduce the number of shares in issue and to potentially help with excess volatility 
(Royal Bank of Scotland, 2012a).   Various modest share sales have lowered the 
Government’s voting stake from 70.3% (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2009e) to 65% (UKFI, 
2013b).  In September 2013, outside the research period, HM Treasury successfully sold a 
6% shareholding in LBG (UKFI, 2013c) and a further 7.8% stake in March 2014 (UKFI, 
2014). 
The National Audit Office provide figures on the extent of Government support for the entire 
banking industry (National Audit Office., 2010).  The National Audit Office estimate the 
value of support at its peak reached £1,161.88bn, of which £132.85bn was outlaid in cash 
(NAO, 2011, p6).  In fact, this number is an accounting construct.  The support schemes and 
facilities were all available at different times, so this does not represent just one point in time 
but rather the maximum amount of monies pledged up to 2011 (NAO, 2011, p7).  The 
exposure of the State did not reach this level.    
The shareholding analysis above demonstrates that the Government has been the largest 
single investor in both RBS and LBG since the UK banking crisis.  For RBS, the 
Government owns a majority of the shares.  For LBG, the share ownership sits at a 
significant minority.  Now that the shareholdings have been analysed in further detail, the 
next section discusses the rationale for calling the banks ‘quasi-nationalised’.   
7.6 RBS and LBG: Quasi-Nationalised 
This section considers on what basis the banks could be termed as quasi-nationalised.  
Ambiguity arises as to the nature of ownership in RBS and LBG because of the distinct 
features of Government intervention.   Importantly, the banks still have significant private 
ownership.  The banks’ shares continue to be traded on the London Stock Exchange.  The 





exchange listing (Financial Services Authority, 2003)
14
.  Yet by far the largest shareholder in 
both LBG and RBS is the Government.   
The UKFI, responsible for managing the day to day shareholding of the two banks, reflects 
the distinct status of the banks in its reporting structure.  There is an explicit commitment to 
managing a privatisation process for RBS and LBG (UKFI, 2013b).  These banks have 
retained a separate management structure and have been designed to trade out of difficulties.  
They have not been carved into separate businesses upon Government intervention, which 
was the experience of both Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley plc (UK Asset 
Resolution Ltd, 2013a)  In this sense, the reporting of RBS and LBG is distinct, and 
resonates with  a particular desire for the recovery of these banks.   
In contrast, the banks who were taken into 100% public ownership
15
 and are being run down 
are dealt with by the UK Asset Resolution Team (UKFI, 2013b; UK Asset Resolution Ltd, 
2013b).  These banks have had tranches of their businesses sold off.  What remains are the 
mortgage books of these banks which are being serviced by UK Asset Resolution.  There is 
no overarching view to onward sale beyond the Government, although opportunities are 
being taken to do so (UK Asset Resolution Ltd, 2013b).  
Public ownership is a complicated matter.  It reflects not only on the shareholdings of the 
companies but also on aspects of control.  As a precedent, a 50% Government share of 
British Petroleum was considered nationalised; the sale of its shares encompassed 
privatisation (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Control goes beyond proportionate shareholdings 
held by interested parties (Nyman and Silberston, 1977).  Under Stakeholder theory, 
ownership shares are also a basis for classifying SOEs as such (Heath and Norman, 2004) 
but further characteristics of management style may help in drawing this conclusion (ibid).  
An accounting perspective resonates with stakeholder theory by classifying publicly owned 
entities based on the assessment of control.  IFRS 10 outlines the basis for consolidation 
based on the concept of control (IASB, 2011).  Control is further defined by: 
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 The RBS rescue  included non-voting preference shares to ensure that the public listing could be 
retained (UKFI, 2013b).   
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1. power over the investee; 
2. exposure, or rights, to variable returns from its involvement with the investee (see 
and 
3. the ability to use its power over the investee to affect the amount of the investor’s 
returns  (IASB, 2011) 
Power may issue primarily from the existence of voting shares, but can also arise through the 
ability to appoint or remove members of the key management personnel of the investees, 
direct activities of the investee or direct the investee into transactions for the benefit of the 
investor (IASB, 2011). 
Under the accounting basis of IFRS and its predecessor IAS 27 (IASB, 2009a) both banks 
have been deemed to be public sector by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), a 
Government body producing information on State finances (Office for National Statistics, 
2013).  
In addition, the Auditor General qualified the Whole of Government Accounts (WGA) 
produced by the UK Treasury due to the decision to exclude RBS and Lloyds from 
consolidation, saying it did not consistently apply its own policies and did not meet IFRS 
standards (HM Treasury, 2012).  This is particularly significant since the NAO's analysis on 
the WGA SFP includes specific mention on a drop in market value of these assets.  Thus, the 
investments are material from a WGA point of view (HM Treasury, 2012).  The 
Government's viewpoint is that these investments would  
'dwarf other aspects of the WGA, distorting the accounts and making it difficult to 
determine trends...it would also be extremely costly to carry out the consolidation 
(mainly because of differing year ends) which would not represent good value for the 
taxpayer, given the temporary expected nature of their ownership' (HM Treasury, 
2012) 
It is surprising that the Government opted to exclude the investment in the banks from the 
WGA.  Audit and accounting techniques are sophisticated enough to allow analysis to 
continue on other aspects of WGA despite the huge numbers involved in the banks.  
Materiality, after all, has qualitative aspects as well as quantitative considerations (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2009).  Furthermore, since both banks provide quarterly earnings updates 
to 31 March like the WGA, consolidation would unlikely be an extremely costly process.  





taxpayer.  It can be speculated that the decision to exclude the banks is therefore politically 
motivated. 
There is a strong case for considering the banks to be classed as public sector bodies.  
Moreover, the common parlance is of privatisation when discussing the exit of Government 
from owning the banks (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2013a; Royal Bank of Scotland, 2013b; 
UKFI, 2013d) .  The UKFI has recruited a “Privatisation Strategy Advisor” (UKFI, 2013a). 
The above discussions demonstrate the controversy caused by the ownership structures of 
the banks.  Whilst the banks are dominated by the Government investment, the continuation 
of market involvement implies it would be rather partial to attribute these banks as SOEs.  
Therefore, alternative descriptions of the banks were considered.  Quasi-nationalised was 
deemed the preferred term. 
Hybrid organisations may be another means to describe the banks’ current set up 
(Thomasson, 2009; Miller et al., 2008; Kurunmäki and Miller, 2006; Mitronen and Moller, 
2003) but hybrid forms can refer to both processes and organisational forms (Miller et al., 
2008). It is the context of ownership which is of interest here, and how this may impact upon 
processes, such as financial accountability exercises.   
A further alternative would be to talk of the banks being under ‘temporary public 
ownership’, a term favoured by the Government keen to avoid the political history associated 
with ‘nationalisation’ (Darling, 2011; Darling, 2008; HM Treasury, 2008a).  Yet this term is 
most closely associated with Northern Rock, whose particular circumstances were quite 
different to RBS and LBG (UK Asset Resolution Ltd, 2013a). 
In preference, ‘quasi-nationalisation’ helps to delineate an important political history to the 
terms of banks ownership whilst representing the fact that private investment is still a critical 
factor in shaping the banks’ own operating strategy now and in the future.  Other sources 
have described the Government intervention as quasi-nationalised as well (Myners and 
Costello, 2012; Kerr and Robinson, 2012) but it does not suffer from ubiquity as hybrids 
may do.  
The implications of quasi-nationalisation are investigated further next.  Here, the focus turns 





oversight bodies.  The section demonstrates that accountability of the banks is extensive with 
State investment. 
7.6 Accountability of the Quasi-Nationalised Banks 
Using a stakeholder approach, the diagram below shows the important stakeholders of RBS 
and LBG. The purple half of the diagram represents the new bodies which have had 
increased involvement since the Government intervention.  The blue circles represent the 
more classical view of stakeholders involved in private corporations (Freeman R, 1984).   
It is notable that there has been a large amount of activity related to the banks and banking 
industry since the quasi-nationalisation.  The following discussion considers the additional 
stakeholders identified in the diagram below and gives a brief background on them.  It 
considers stakeholders identified in Parliament, the regulators of the banks and then the 















































Figure 7.4: Stakeholder Analysis of RBS and LBG 
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7.6.1 Parliamentary Stakeholders 
Within Parliament, the most influential members are the Government.  From the outset of the 
banking crisis until May 2010, Labour was in Government.  Alistair Darling, as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer and Gordon Brown, as Prime Minister, were most influential in negotiating 
the intervention into RBS and LBG.  The opposition, comprising of Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats were elected to Government in May 2010.  George Osborne, now 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and David Cameron, Prime Minister, continue to lead reform of 
the financial services industry (UK Parliament, 2012).   Vince Cable, a Liberal Democrat, 
now part of the Coalition Government as Business Secretary, has also been an influential 
speaker and analyst on the banking crisis. 
The Parliamentary select committees have been involved in analysing the events of the 
banking crisis.  The Treasury Select Committee held an inquiry into the UK banking crisis in 
2009 (House of Commons - Treasury Committee, 2009a).  This encompassed a number of 
reports which focused on different aspects of the banking crisis.  They took evidence from a 
number of prominent individuals at the centre of the crisis, including Fred Goodwin, Andy 
Hornby, Stephen Hester and Eric Daniels, all executive management at HBOS, RBS and 
LBG. 
Other select committees considered the failure of RBS and LBG.  The Scottish Affairs 
Committee considered the impact on Scotland by the failure of two very Scottish banks 
(Scottish Affairs Committee, 2010).  The Economic Affairs committee look at the structure 
of banking in the UK (Economic Affairs Committee, 2009).  Overall, Parliament has been 
very involved in investigating the banking crisis. 
More recently, the Banking Standards Joint Select Committee has considered the culture and 
professional standards of the UK banking industry (Banking Standards Inquiry, 2013b).  It 
included Justin Welby, the Archbishop of Canterbury and former business executive.  It also 
published a report into the failure of HBOS (Banking Standards Inquiry, 2013a).  The reports 





The banking industry has been subject to regulatory oversight during the research period of 
the Tripartite Authorities, comprising the Financial Services Authority, the Bank of England 
and HM Treasury
16
.   
The Financial Services Authority had day to day oversight of the banks.  They had ultimate 
authority to deem banks able to be ‘deposit taking institutions’ (Financial Services Authority, 
2002).  The authority was also author of the ‘Failure of RBS’ report after receiving extensive 
criticism on the way that it supervised this bank (Financial Services Authority, 2011).  The 
UK Listing Authority, a branch of the FSA, regulates the securities traded on UK stock 
exchanges.   
The Bank of England had responsibility for overall financial stability in the economy.  It 
implemented a number of initiatives designed to assist the economy during the crisis.  These 
included quantitative easing (Bank of England, 2013a); loose monetary policy with 
historically low interest rates (Bank of England, 2013b) and the funding for lending scheme.  
Funding for lending was an incentive scheme for banks to encourage further lending in the 
economy (Bank of England, 2012b). 
Other regulators played important roles during the banking crisis.  HMRC were responsible 
for assessing the corporations’ tax charges.  This was politically charged as RBS temporarily 
forfeited the right to claim back tax losses as part of the APS Scheme (Royal Bank of 
Scotland, 2009c).    The Office of Fair Trading was involved after the Independent 
Commission on Banking recommended that they investigate UK banking.  RBS and LBG 
hold large portions of the UK retail banking market.  The Office of Fair Trading conducted 
an industry review which is still on-going (Office of Fair Trading, 2013). 
Finally, the external auditors of the banks play a quasi-regulatory role.  By virtue of the 
Companies Act (2006) and its predecessors, auditors are required by the State to examine the 
financial statements of the largest UK companies. 
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 There has been a substantial reform of banking regulation implemented in April 2013, after the cut-
off date for the thesis (UK Parliament, 2012).    
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7.6.3 Government Agencies and Inquiries 
Government agencies have been responsible for the day to day running of the UK 
Government’s investment in RBS and LBG.  HM Treasury is the ultimate investor in the 
failed banks.   UK Financial Investments Ltd (UKFI) was set up as an independent company, 
at arm’s length from the Government, to manage the State’s shareholdings in the banks.  The 
Asset Protection Agency (APA) had responsibility for managing the Asset Protection 
Scheme.  The agencies were independent to be buffered from political interference and to 
utilise specialist banking expertise (UKFI, 2009, para 7.1; APA, 2009). The commercial 
attitude to the shareholding has been captured by equating the UKFI to an institutional 
investor: 
“I suppose the philosophy that runs through the Framework Agreement and through 
the Chancellor's announcement last autumn about setting us up was a belief that the 
best way of getting these banks back on their feet and back into the private sector 
properly was for them to be run commercially by proper independent boards and for 
those boards to be running the banks and not for the Government to be running the 
banks or indeed for UKFI to be running the banks. I see our role as managing the 
shareholdings, and I do see a very important part of that as having all the dialogue 
you would expect a serious shareholder to have around management, strategy, 
performance, capital, risk management, all of those issues, but we are not running 
the banks and I do not believe that, were we running the banks, we would get the 
quick exit that the Government wants to see and we want to see.” (House of 
Commons - Treasury Committee, 2009c) 
Nonetheless, the recruitment of senior staff for UKFI and APA are ratified by the State and 
give the Government the right of veto over strategic decisions of the agencies  (UKFI, 2009; 
Asset Protection Agency, 2009).  The monitoring of these agencies is HM Treasury and 
through their representatives the Treasury Select Committee and the UK Parliament (UKFI, 
2009: 9.18 – 9.20; APA, 2010 part 7 & part 12).  The APA was closed in October 2012, after 
RBS withdrew from the asset protection scheme.  RBS did not draw down on the Asset 
Protection facility whilst it was in place(Asset Protection Agency, 2013).  
The national audit office provide special reports considering the value of UK support to the 
banks (National Audit Office., 2012; National Audit Office., 2010).  Thus there has been 
considerable scrutiny of the Government investment into RBS and LBG. 
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this chapter was to give an introduction to the research context of the study.  The 
chapter started with a discussion on the long term history of the banks and discussed their 




 centuries.  The banks were also pioneers.  The 
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chapter then discussed some key corporate transactions for both RBS and LBG around the 
millennium.  Government intervention at the height of the crisis was then discussed.  The 
events of the UK banking crisis unfolded very quickly.  Moreover, there was some 
complexity initially in resolving the positions of RBS and LBG.  As a result of Government 
action, RBS and LBG have been given the chance to trade out of their troubles. The solution, 
it is arguable, was practical in a time of deeply distressed markets.  It helped to shore up the 
economy by keeping trust in the UK banking system.  Yet it also left the responsibility to 
sort out the banking losses within the private sector.  The risk to the taxpayer was 
considerable but there is a possibility that this money will be recuperated in future years 
through privatisation.   
The second part of the chapter considered the nature of the ownership of RBS and LBG.  To 
do this, the Government shareholding was considered in detail.  The rationale for terming the 
banks quasi-nationalised was discussed.  Finally, the stakeholders now involved in the banks 
were analysed.  The focus here was on the State.  The nature and extent of Government 
ownership in the banks provide this novel context in which to consider accountability.  The 
massive increase in stakeholders which has accompanied the State support of the banks 
confirms that accountability has the potential to be ambiguous (Thomasson, 2009) and fluid 
(Sinclair, 2002).   The implications for quasi-nationalisation are discussed in the first 
empirical chapter next, which explores the negotiation of accountability post crisis using 




Chapter 8: Negotiating 




This chapter analyses the additional accountability mechanisms created during the crisis 
from agency and property rights theory perspectives.   These theoretical insights then allow 
the form and substance of quasi-nationalisation to be considered.   As majority shareholder, 
the State enjoys the traditional market mechanisms of accountability through annual reports 
and other related market information.  Yet the Government has also negotiated additional 
components of accountability when these banks faced failure.  The analysis with property 
rights theory, below, asserts that the current accountability structures present a challenge to 
property rights theory, with its preference for private ownership. Nonetheless, property rights 
theory allows the implications of public sector ownership to be considered in light of a new 
owner identity.   Following on from this, an agency theory perspective is considered.  
Agency theory highlights the importance of the share prices and of customers as incentives 
but fails to provide detailed insights into the mechanisms by which accountability is 
achieved with regard to bonuses. 
 Using insights from property rights theory and agency, the deeper implications of quasi-
nationalisation for the bankers and the politicians can be considered.  Overall, accountability 
is greatly influenced by the political process which agency contracting and property rights 
negotiations bring to the fore.  Yet the theories are quiet as to why negotiations proceed as 
they do.  Quasi-nationalisation in this respect provides a rationale for these peculiarities and 
advocates instead that the negotiation of accountability is less about political confrontation 
than it is about collaboration.   The mechanism of quasi-nationalisation reinforces the sense 
of the banks retaining a commercially oriented agenda.  Yet political negotiations can be 
done publicly and allow the State to intervene in times of heightened citizen interest.   
The banking crisis and the subsequent actions to enable stability in the UK provide a natural 
forum for considering property rights theory.  Whilst property rights theory has advocated 
that common ownership causes inefficiency and a lack of monitoring, the practical impact of 
quasi-nationalisation suggests otherwise.    
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8.1 Negotiating Accountability: A Property Rights Perspective 
The first part of the chapter analyses the accountability of the banks to the State using a 
property rights perspective.   The first two sections highlight the shortcomings of property 
right theory’s proposition against State ownership.  The first part looks at the failure of the 
apparently more rigorous checks of the private sector.  The second part looks at the need for 
more rather than less, State participation in banks which are ‘too big to fail’.  The third part 
of the analysis looks at the State’s rejection of the bank investments as an asset and its 
conceptualisation of its intervention as a ‘cost’.  The final sections consider additional 
conditions of Government investment in relation to pay and lending and how these are 
monitored, negotiated and dispersed.   
8.1.1 The Failure of Private Sector Scrutiny: Markets and Auditors 
The standard means of monitoring corporations occurs in market mechanisms and the 
auditing of them.  Property rights theory advocates that resources are utilised more 
efficiently under private ownership (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Boardman and Vining, 
1989).  This is due to a more challenging and extensive monitoring system (Alchian, 1974; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1973).  Under public ownership, there is little incentive to monitor 
State owned corporations because the benefits from doing so are negligible.  The only 
mechanism to express monitoring efforts is through the electoral vote, which monitoring and 
non-monitoring citizens have equivalent power over.  Thus, it suffers from an extensive free-
rider problem.    
Yet, in the UK, private sector monitoring mechanisms did not anticipate the banking crisis.  
Losses incurred have been socialised whilst the banks trade out of difficulties.    The 
following section discusses the lack of anticipation by private markets and the auditors of the 
big banks.   
Figure 8.1 shows the largest UK FTSE banks’ share prices from September 2006 to 
September 2009.  The subprime crisis is generally agreed to have begun in August 2007, 
with the Northern Rock liquidity support happening in September that same year.  There is 
an expectation under the strong form of efficient markets hypothesis (Malkiel & Fama, 
1970) that all relevant market information would be incorporated into the share price of the 
banks and rightly or wrongly, the efficient markets hypothesis has been singled out for blame 
for not predicting the crisis (Ball, 2009). Figure 8.1 shows that share prices only started to go 
downwards after the subprime crisis began in August 2007.  The crash pre-dated the major 
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readjustments in share prices of the banks, which may suggest a lack of anticipation on the 
part of market analysts. 
Figure 8.1: Banking Industry Share Prices: August 2006 – August 2009   
 
Source: Lloyds Banking Group Historic Share Price Comparisons: 
http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/investors/share_price_information/share_price_charting.asp accessed 2 
April 2013 
Share price crashes are an enduring feature of economic crises (Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2005) and may be responded to with regulatory change (Carnegie and O'Connell, 2013).  
Whilst this may place crashes in a cycle of banking failures globally and across time 
((Laeven and Valencia, 2008), it also points towards a continuing flaw in monitoring.  
Radical overhaul of regulation may be the answer (Carnegie and O'Connell, 2013) which 
could have a corroborating influence on Government protection of property rights.   
Private property rights may be enhanced by the quality of auditor information provided to 
the principals (Iossa and Legros, 2004).  In hindsight, the quality of auditor information for 
the banking industry has been negligible through the crisis.  The audit reports did not 
identify any issues with the going concern of the UK banks in the run up to the crisis.  Table 
8.1 below shows the audit report outcomes for the banking industry since 2002.  All the large 




Table 8.1: Audit Report Outcomes for the FTSE 100 UK Banks 
 
The UK banking crisis has not been reflected in the audit reports of the largest listed banks.  
Little is known about how audit processes help to arrive at the report itself (Sikka, 2009). 
Yet continued support of the State through equity investment has been required to keep 
HBOS, LBG and RBS as going concerns since 2008.  A significant uncertainty which may 
impact on the going concern assumption may often result in an emphasis of matter paragraph 
in the report (ISA 700, para 47).  Yet in this case, the auditors themselves have neither 
referred to the significant uncertainty nor the need for Government support.  Instead, it 
appears the relevant auditors relied on Government representations to assess the going 
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 Group Annual Report Opinions for UK Listing Purposes Only 
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 HBOS was delisted from the stock exchange following the LBG takeover in 2008.  Subsequent 
audit reports are for the old HBOS group and have not been required to meet listing rules. 
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 Unqualified opinion here also includes no emphasis of matter paragraphs, which did not impede the 
issue of a clean audit report (ISA 700). 
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 Transition year to IFRS for UK Listed Companies (IAS 1) 
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 Barclays HSBC 
2002 Unqualified
19
 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
2003 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
2004
20
 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
2005 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
2006 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
2007 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
2008 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
2009
21
 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
2010 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
2011 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
2012 Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified 
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concern for RBS in 2008 (House of Lords, 2010 p224).  It is unknown whether there was 
regulatory pressure to provide these particular reports (Sikka, 2009).  Nonetheless, the 
validity of this report remains tautological, with the main beneficiary shareholder, the State, 
having its own reassurances forming the basis of the clean audit report.  State (non)-action 
on the basis of a clean audit report can leave the profession having to defend itself when 
there is overreliance on its value (Wright, 1994). 
Property rights theory may initially seem to be too trusting in its predictions for the quality 
of the private market monitoring, given the scale and complexity of the UK banking crisis.  
Yet it also provides a basis to assess the implications of public ownership on commercial 
enterprises and what this may mean under the structure of quasi-nationalisation.  In this 
respect, quasi-nationalisation helps to balance out the failures of the market monitoring as 
well as some of the implications for public sector ownership as envisaged by property rights 
theory.  Private sector monitoring is still enabled with a stock exchange listing. The State 
then becomes a beneficiary of private sector expertise (Alchian, 1974).  In fact, the 
monitoring of the banks is heightened as high profile firms in the media receive more 
attention from investors than those who receive less press coverage (Fang and Peress, 2009).  
Yet at the same time, the Government is able to capitalise on its own position by smoothing 
the trading environment for the banks by facilitating clean audit reports at a time of 
considerable economic stress.  In other words, quasi-nationalisation presents a space for the 
banks to exploit and return to financial health.   The markets are left to run as before without 
radical overhaul from the Government.  The spectre of nationalisation can be diminished 
through a light touch to the corporations (Darling, 2011).  Yet political intervention and 
power can still be negotiated through ownership. 
8.1.2 ‘Too Big to Fail’ justifies more State Participation 
Property rights theory finds that State and mixed ownership firms are less efficient than 
those in the private sector (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Boardman and Vining, 1989) and 
thus private ownership is desirable.  There is an opportunity cost for not pursuing profitable 
opportunities as aggressively as in a private sector firm (Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978).  
Contrary to property rights theory thinking, the EU decreed that Government backing would 
create unfair advantages for the banks and distort the markets(Europa and Europa, 2008).   
The EU postulated that the banks had possible advantages of rapid expansion at the 
taxpayer’s expense or increased sales on the back of Government guarantees (ibid.).  It could 
also enforce preferences for particular member States (Europa and Europa, 2008).  Social 
and political goals instead of economic efficiency may be at the heart of Government 
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ownership (Eggertsson et al., 1996).  The costs are then borne by all EU citizens, whereas 
the benefits are concentrated in the British State. For RBS, the EU State aid directives have 
included the floatation of its insurance arm, Direct Line; divestments in Global Merchants 
Services and a Sempra Commodities JV, as well as the sale of 315 bank branches (RBS, 
2012, p41).  LBG too required a divestment of branches under EU State Aid (Europa, 2008, 
1495).  The Independent Commission on Banking recommended that the divestment of LBG 
be significantly enhanced to promote competition in the personal current account markets 
(ICB, 2011, p205).   
Moreover, LBG accepted that it needed to pay for Government protection received from the 
Asset Protection Scheme in principle even though the legal format of the scheme had not yet 
been completed.  When the time came to finalise the scheme, an upturn in markets generally 
allowed LBG to exit from the contracts (LBG, 2009).  Nonetheless, a fee was still payable in 
recognition of the increased confidence in LBG in the markets which meant it could trade 
more favourably (LBG, 2009, p217).  This benefit arose because the Government was able to 
consider the upside of keeping stability in the financial system overall.  As a common 
benefit, financial stability would not be funded by private insurance because of the free rider 
problem.  Yet the Government was able to invest in the national, common, interest – and so 
keep LBG able to run its business effectively. 
The identity of owners can have allocative effects under property rights theory (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1973, p22).  The size and concentration of the UK retail banking market means 
that these institutions are arguably ‘too big to fail’ which has resulted in the recommended 
‘ring fencing’  in the industry currently going through the UK Parliament (Osborne, 2013).  
The implicit subsidy of the banks has been estimated between £6bn and £100bn by 
Government during the financial crisis, through guarantees when banks fail (Bank of 
England, 2012a).  Government subsidies may encourage risk taking and transfers resources 
from other parts of social investment to the financial sector (Bank of England, 2012a).  As a 
result EU State Aid, the Bank of England and the Asset Protection Scheme state a 
commercial benefit to Government investment.  The benefit of Government ownership is 
contrary to the general prediction of property rights, which suggests less efficiency and risk 
taking in the State owned enterprise.  Property rights theory sees commercial advantage lost 
as the socio-political objectives enforced upon the organisations by politicians mean 
managers lose focus on profit making.  In addition, there may be a need for State 
Intervention to protect the public interest and restrain unnecessary risk taking which could 
threaten the health of the financial system again. 
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An alternative explanation exists under property rights theory, which may help to explain the 
value of State Aid via quasi-nationalisation.   Increased monitoring was necessary to give 
incentives to act in the interests of the State (Clarkson, 1972).  Less pleasant jobs may be 
neglected when there is no profit incentive to carry them out (ibid.).  Here, the overarching 
incentive of profit remained and could have impeded the economic objectives of financial 
stability and competitive markets negotiated via Government.  EU State Aid requirements 
helped to redress that balance towards the societal obligations of the banks to maintain 
competition within the banking industry.  Quasi-nationalisation then enabled management to 
divest in operations without the concomitant issue of political considerations as to what is 
divested when. 
8.1.3 Monitoring the ‘Cost’ of Intervention 
The UK banking crisis has been costly in many ways.  On the one hand, there was a huge 
cash injection at the crux of the crisis and exposure to extensive corporate losses (NAO, 
2011).   Yet the State has an asset in return, which they can sell when opportunity arises
22
.  
Property rights theory espouses that there is limited incentive to monitor the organisation 
(Geddes, 1997; Eggertsson, 1990; Clarkson, 1972).  Studies have also suggested that State 
owned or mixed ownership corporations are less efficient than similar private corporations 
(Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Boardman and Vining, 1989).  Yet in a competitive market 
with an arm’s length Government shareholder, these differences did not always hold (Kole 
and Mulherin, 1997; Caves and Christensen, 1980).  Property rights theory again provides 
some insights into the nature of public ownership, which allow the merits of quasi-
nationalisation to be considered.  This next section therefore considers how the investment in 
the UK banks has been presented by the State.   
The UK Government has opted not to recognise an accounting asset in the form of the 
banking investments under the Whole of Government Accounts project (HM Treasury, 
2012).  The Auditor General qualified the Whole of Government Accounts (WGA) produced 
by the UK Treasury due to the decision to exclude RBS and Lloyds from consolidation, 
saying it did not consistently apply its own policies and did not meet IFRS standards (HM 
Treasury, 2012).  This is particularly significant since the NAO's analysis on the WGA SFP 
includes specific mention on drop in market value of these assets.  Thus, the investments are 
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 The Government sold a 6% tranche of LBG shares on 17 September 2013 for 75p each(UKFI, 
2013c), 12p above the 63p share price  investment quoted in the UKFI’s annual report (UKFI, 2013b)   
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material from a WGA point of view (ibid, p51).  The Government's viewpoint is that these 
investments are short term and would unduly distort the WGAs (HM Treasury, 2012).   
That there is a ‘cost’ rather than asset for the State is also demonstrated by the UKFI’s own 
analysis of the market investments.  Here the investment is shown comparing the original 
cost and the current value of the shares:  
Figure 8.2: UKFI’s Analysis of the Bank Investments 
 
UKFI, 2012, p23 
The juxtaposition of the investment value versus the value of the same at 31 March 2012 
based on the closing share price of Lloyds that day (33.61p) suggests that the recoupment of 
the investment ‘cost’ is part of the decision to privatise or not.  This is discussed in further 
detail under agency theory analysis
23
.    
Property rights theory predicts limited monitoring of State Owned Enterprise.  Yet the above 
accounting examples suggest that the opposite applies, with a critical analysis of the 
investments being made in terms of value and inclusion to the State.  In fact, Quasi-
nationalisation allows the ‘cost’ to the State to be reinforced, by not accounting for a related 
asset.  The costs of allowing the banking system to fail in the country arguably justifies the 
injection of large amounts of public funds, and certainly has been the rationale behind the 
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 The idea of repayment resonates to other parts of the UKFI’s “When we launched UKAR in 
October 2010 we owed HM Treasury £48.7bn and by the end of 2012 that had reduced to £43.5bn. 
We still have a long way to go, but it remains our expectation and determination to repay that debt in 
full.” Richard Pym, Chairman of UKAR 11 March 2013" 
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rescue of Johnson Matthey in the past (Bank of England, 1985).  Yet there remains an 
expectation that original investment will be recouped in full or in part, when the time is right 
(Darling, 2008). Quasi-nationalisation as a mechanism structures the public funding not as a 
public good but as a commercial investment.  And Government as an arms’ length 
shareholder has not affected the efficiency of the private corporations in the past (Kole and 
Mulherin, 1997).  In fact, the notion of cost to the taxpayer/ State has perhaps been 
misdirected: 
“It’s often said, you know, that the bail-out of RBS has cost the taxpayer and the 
government and so on billions and billions and billions…but I think one of the 
messages that has been lost publicly is the people who’ve really lost money in RBS 
were the previous shareholders, which includes pension funds, private individuals, 
other asset managers, and so on. But the government’s loss at the moment is very 
modest, and certainly it’s our expectation that the government as a whole will be 
able to exit with a profit from its involvement in the Royal Bank of Scotland, and 
certainly our plans suggest that that is likely or expected.”(Royal Bank of Scotland, 
2011a) 
Quasi-nationalisation offers hope for the Government in recouping the investment.  But it 
also may offer a small compensation for the shareholders who were already involved prior to 
its rescue.  The banks have been offered the financial space to turn the business around and 
there may be some recouping of losses in the long term.  This was not available to those who 
had invested in the outright nationalised  Northern Rock (Anon, 2008). 
The preceding analysis has shown some shortcomings in the predictive power of property 
rights theory.  Monitoring has not been hindered by the Government ownership as predicted 
and profit incentives still remain.  State ownership has been seen to be an unfair benefit to 
the banks, rather than a hindrance to its activities.  Yet the theory does allow the implications 
of public sector ownership to be examined, and in this way, the design of the quasi-
nationalisation rescue performed on the failed banks to be considered.  In this regard,   
Quasi-nationalisation seems to have allowed the best of the private sector markets and 
incentives to continue, whilst retaining the opportunity for political intervention when 
necessary.   The next two parts of the property rights analysis consider the evolution of the 
additional objectives given to the rescued banks.  Although the monitoring remains 
problematic, it does demonstrate that an enhanced accountability within the industry has 
arisen as a result of quasi-nationalisation. 
8.1.4 Restricting the Sphere of Influence 
The additional conditions of State investment can be analysed under property rights theory as 
property rights which have been recently negotiated (Eggertsson et al., 1996; Libecap, 1978). 
135 
There was the opportunity to exploit vague delineation of property rights and lobby the 
Government to change these in the interests of management (Libecap, 1978; Riker & Sened, 
1996).  This had impact because the property rights pertaining to the additional conditions 
are limited to State ownership and are non-transferable.  In consequence, to free them of 
further obligation, property rights theory predicts that management will lobby to reduce the 
impact of the obligations upon the bank and to return to the private sector. 
Lobbying and change has been a feature of the relationship between the banks and the State 
since the Government Investment.  On the general level, the banks have criticised the 
capacity and inclination of the State to intervene. Without a clear specification of the rights 
of influence, the banks are relatively powerless to reduce the Government involvement with 
their operations.  Instead, they highlight the disadvantage of a politically driven agenda, and 
how this may be bad for State interests too: 
"We have been very clear that the process of politicisation of RBS is damaging to 
our business and it is damaging to the taxpayer's interest.  Our share price was 50p-
a-share some three months ago...the subsequent stuff over bonuses has reduced 
the share price, and therefore the value of the state's shareholding in us, by a very 
considerable amount - nearly 40 per cent.  That, by the way, is more than GBP 15bn 
of taxpayers' money."  (Thomas, 2009) 
There has been evidence that socio-political objectives of Government may depress market 
assessments of corporations in previous property rights literature (Boardman et al., 1986).  
Property rights theory would predict that management would be incentivised to reduce the 
influence of the State through further specifying property rights.  In this case, negotiate 
circumstances ex ante which would constitute acceptable intervention operationally.  The 
additional obligations already imposed on the banks offered this opportunity.  Capturing 
property rights through ever increasing delineation of property attributes (Eggertsson, 1990) 
would allow the banks to repatriate small pockets of power back to management.   
Surprisingly, the banks have not done this as property rights may predict.  Instead, they have 
presented a positive picture of the requirements: 
“A significant proportion of the Group's capital supports assets which account for a 
disproportionate level of risk and are not consistent with the strategy of building 
sustainable, relationship based businesses…Given the less capital intensive and 
higher returning nature of relationship-based businesses, the Group believes it will 
be able to support its growth ambitions whilst shrinking its balance sheet at the same 
time.” (Lloyds Banking Group, 2009a) 
Looking at the detail of the targets shows that there has been interest in keeping them opaque 
rather than specifying them further.  This is the opposite of what would be predicted (Barzel, 
1997; Libecap, 1978). At first, the targets for lending appear precise due to the inclusion of 
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numerical quantities.  However, the lending to business principle remains subject to current 
(depressed) levels of consumer demand and requisite (rising) costs of customer borrowing 
(Project Merlin, 2011). This is a logical caveat on the lending levels agreed but also an easy 
get out clause to the opportunistic bank who may fail to reach targets.  The Government 
conceded: 
“As subsequent events proved, trying to get an agreement on levels of bank lending 
that will stick is well-nigh impossible.  It is simply not possible to force a bank to lend 
to a particular borrower. “ (Darling, 2011)  
Thus, by blurring the boundaries of success, the banks have further recaptured more 
operational discretion for themselves.  Yet there was an incentive to keep the targets relevant 
as the Government would benefit directly from their execution.  This meant that the property 
rights recaptured by the management – that of further discretion in lending decisions – were 
implicitly accepted by the State.  This reiterates previous research which demonstrated the 
necessity of political incentives to the granting of property rights (Riker and Sened, 1991). 
As before, property rights offers an analysis of events in the public sector, including the 
negotiation of property rights in a novel situation.  It also offers an opportunity to consider 
the use of the quasi-nationalisation mechanism for the banks.  Property rights predictive 
power does not initially anticipate the acceptance of Government imposed targets for 
operational decisions.  However, the caveats to these targets allow operational discretion to 
remain in the hands of the banks.  To this end, Quasi-nationalisation allowed a smooth 
mechanism by which these property rights could be discreetly conceded back to the banks 
for borrowing decisions, without political debate.  
 Nonetheless, it is the opportunity for politics to intervene generally by rights through large 
State ownership which has been resisted by the banks.  This general capacity has caused 
difficulties in previous State owned enterprises as the remit of the politicians could often 
remain unclear (Kelf-Cohen, 1973; Tivey, 1966; O'Brien, 1937).  Whilst there has been a 
successful attempt to specify the property rights of the Government over targets, it is difficult 
for the banks to diminish the moral and contractual right of the State to intervene in an 
opportunistic way.  Viewed positively, this enables the State to continue to protect wider 
economic and social interests.  But it also leaves the banks vulnerable to intervention based 
on political motivations only, rather than any other form of incentive which may be in the 
best interests of shareholders or citizens (Davies, 1988; Boardman et al., 1986; Crain and 
Zardkoohi, 1978; Dell, 1973). 
137 
The experience of previous state owned enterprise thus comes to bear on the banks as well, 
despite the existence of a competitive market and profit maximising firms.  Social and 
economic objectives are difficult to define and thus hold the enterprises to account.  In 
considering the factors above, Quasi-nationalisation does not provide a solution to this long 
standing problem in the public sector.     
8.1.5 Reinterpreting Targets over Time 
Whilst the overall control of the targets can be problematic, changing attitudes towards the 
targets can be identified.  Property rights help establish this as attributes of property rights 
are negotiated in new situations (Eggertsson et al., 1996; Eggertsson, 1990).  As the targets 
are reinterpreted in a new light, there are political incentives for the State to collaborate with 
the new interpretations (Riker and Sened, 1991).  The following section documents this 
change in attitudes before considering the implications for the quasi-nationalisation structure.   
A key objective in the banking rescue of 2008/2009 was the availability of credit to banking 
customers to aid economic stability and growth.  At the beginning of the crisis, management 
stated their own commitment to ensuring the best for ‘UK plc’:  
”Would I prefer to have 1% more market share or save 50,000 businesses?  Well I’d 
prefer that we saved 50,000 businesses.” 
24
 (Hester, 2009) 
The targets for lending thus allowed resurgence in customer salience, sponsored by State 
conditions.  Yet these targets were reinterpreted over time in response to economic 
achievement.  Early on, the NAO concluded that banks would fail to meet their agreed 
lending targets (NAO, 2009). Then, in 2010, when lending targets were achieved, criticism 
centred on the expense of lending charged by the banks to small business customers or on 
providing the right type of credit to them (CBI/ ACCA, 2010, p7). The banks opted to offer a 
reinterpretation of lending targets and their design at the crux of the crisis in October 2008: 
“…we worked with government in terms of the reasoning behind the setting of those 
targets. What we were all concerned about, the banking population as well as 
government was that with the withdrawal of foreign banks… small and medium-sized 
enterprises especially would not have the necessary financing to continue their 
businesses. As we know, SMEs, the small and medium-sized enterprises, contribute 
over half the employment in the UK and contribute to over half of the gross domestic 
product. So we were very concerned. We worked with government to see how we 
could make up for that shortfall.”  (Eric Daniels, CEO of LBG, TC 2010 Q174) 
                                                     
24
 Interview on ‘Rebooting RBS’ BBC Radio 4, 26 August 2009 
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Instead of being a condition of Government investment, the above explanation suggests that 
the lending target was to plug a gap in credit availability caused by a reduction in market 
players.  This is a subtle, but significant change in management perceptions and priorities to 
one of overall economic wellbeing. A consistent ex post justification is also expressed by the 
RBS CEO: 
“All of the discussions I was involved in with the Treasury at the time were all about 
trying to smooth the path of economic adjustment. It was never about lending a 
particular sum; it was about trying to remove the panic factor of people being starved 
from credit improperly, which could have happened.” (House of Commons - Treasury 
Committee, 2010a) 
The rationale for the targets rested on availability of credit rather than the lending of a set 
amount of money. Targets have not been challenged by the banks but create further 
ambiguity as reflections on the conditions continue.  This has had the consequence of 
weakening the political influence, with no recourse available to the State in the event that 
their targets have not been met: 
“It is now well established and understood though that the lending agreements are 
conditional on there being attractive opportunities on commercial terms. In other 
words, the banks are not required to undertake high risk or uncommercial lending...” 
(House of Commons - Treasury Committee, 2009d) 
Reconstructing these targets from one of maintaining lending to one of maintaining the 
availability of credit allows management to explain alternative priorities, without dispute 
from the State.  Property rights theory found that slow adaptability to new information 
resulted in public funded exploration being less successful than private ventures (Karpoff, 
2001).  Quasi-nationalisation helps the State and the banks to collaborate to change the 
dynamics of the targets over time and avoid conflict.   Whilst it diminishes the power of the 
State to hold the banks to account, the resulting impact on efficiency could be negligible if 
politics is at arms’ length to the bank management (Kole and Mulherin, 1997). 
8.1.6 The Relative Efficiency of the Quasi-Nationalised Banks 
Property rights theory is critical of State ownership.  Managers are not incentivised to create 
maximum profits for the corporation as they do not get any direct benefit from their efforts 
(Alchian, 1974; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1974; Roland, 1972).  Increased profits are instead 
absorbed into the public purse for benefits of all citizens (Armen A.Alchian, 2008; O'Hara, 
1981; Alchian, 1974).  Management respond by expropriating resources from the firm in 
other ways (Armen A.Alchian, 2008; Alchian, 1974). On a related matter, there is the 
possibility that some resources are directed towards political ends for securing or winning 
votes in the SOE(Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978). Property rights research has indicated that the 
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efficiency of state owned enterprises is less efficient than privately owned corporations 
(Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Boardman and Vining, 1989).  This is also the case with 
mixed ownership enterprises (Boardman and Vining, 1989).  The key industry ratios were 
the basis this for conclusion in examples of ownership comparisons (Karpoff, 2001; Crain 
and Zardkoohi, 1978; Davies, 1977; Davies, 1971).  However, there was also an 
acknowledgement that competition helped to lessen the gap between state owned and private 
enterprise performance (Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978) and in one study of railroads, there was 
little substantive difference between the state and privately run corporations (Caves and 
Christensen, 1980).  As an arm’s length, temporary shareholder, the efficiency of the 
corporations was also negligibly different (Kole and Mulherin, 1997).  
 Table 8.2 below shows some key banking industry ratios for the two banks under 
consideration.  Alongside these are ratios for two competitor banks: Barclays and HSBC.  
Comparisons are naturally difficult to draw between the two sets of banks due to differing 
strategies and consumer base.  Moreover, the failed banks inevitably are tackling issues of 
failure, impacting results.  Nonetheless, Barclays itself also had impending difficulties with 
capital at the beginning of the financial crisis but was able to find alternative private sector 
investment.  
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Table 8.2: Key Banking Ratios for the UK FTSE 100 Banks 
Bank Name Net Interest 
Margin 
% 
Cost to Income 
Ratio 
% 
Return On Avg 
Equity (ROAE) 
% 
Return On Avg 
Assets (ROAA) 
% 
2012         
LBG 1.23 60.33 -2.94 -0.14 
RBS 0.90 85.34 -7.93 -0.41 
Barclays  0.83 63.59 -0.37 -0.02 
HSBC  1.59 54.45 8.78 0.58 
2011         
LBG 1.38 62.83 -5.81 -0.28 
RBS 0.91 74.12 -2.58 -0.13 
Barclays  0.88 64.70 6.20 0.26 
HSBC  1.78 57.58 11.18 0.72 
2010         
LBG 1.44 53.17 -0.57 -0.03 
RBS 0.98 69.32 -1.94 -0.11 
Barclays  0.96 64.20 7.54 0.32 
HSBC  1.77 53.21 9.77 0.59 
2009         
LBG 1.32 73.39 10.98 0.40 
RBS 0.69 77.34 -2.65 -0.11 
Barclays  0.73 56.23 19.43 0.60 
HSBC  1.79 46.17 5.68 0.27 
2008         
LBG 2.04 62.63 7.64 0.21 
RBS 0.76 114.64 -40.18 -1.61 
Barclays  0.73 68.58 13.24 0.32 
HSBC  1.87 51.52 5.52 0.27 
2007         
LBG 1.84 52.65 27.75 0.95 
RBS 0.99 54.63 11.27 0.56 
Barclays  0.89 60.16 17.02 0.46 
HSBC  1.92 51.14 16.34 0.97 
2006         
LBG 1.72 47.74 26.26 0.89 
RBS 1.38 53.01 15.65 0.79 
Barclays  0.98 60.56 20.05 0.54 
HSBC 2.21 50.68 15.17 1.00 
Source: (Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing, 2013) 
Table 8.2 details the net interest margins, cost to income ratio, Return on Average Equity 
and Return on Average Assets.  These are given for 2006 – 2012. These ratios give some 
indication of efficiency for the banks.  Net interest margin and cost to income ratio are two 
of the banking industry’s headline ratios in banking reports
25
, indicating operational 
                                                     
25
 Barclays, RBS, LBG and HSBC all present the Cost: Income and Net Interest Margins in their 
headline ratios.  See Annual Reports 2006  - 2012 
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efficiency and profitability.  The banks self-identify these ratios as critical indicators of 
efficiency in their sector, so they have been used for analysis.   Return on average assets also 
gives an indicator of efficiency.  Return on average equity provides information on the return 
to the shareholder. 
Table 8.3: Efficiency Rankings of the UK FTSE 100 Banks 
 
In Table 8.3, the top and bottom performers for these banking ratios are identified.   
Likewise, the top and bottom performers in the banking ratios are considered separately for 
2006, and 2007, prior to the current government ownership.   
The results are inconclusive.  What can be seen is that HSBC is consistently ranked at 
number 1 for efficiency in cost income and net interest margin pre and post crisis.  This may 
reflect the diverse markets the bank operates in.  The other banks, with a British focus, 
operate in a mature and competitive banking market.   
In terms of cost: income ratios, RBS has moved from being one of the best performers in the 
industry to coming at the bottom post crisis.  This may be due to the large expenses incurred 
with the swings in fair value of own debt, the payment protection insurance payouts and 
general costs associated with divesting the businesses.  What is clear is that the cost income 
ratios of all banks seem to have increased as a result of the crisis.    
These results should be treated with a degree of caution, as they are limited to the British 
banks.  Different accounting policies and different business strategies result in diverse ratios.  














Ranked 1 over the 
years 
HSBC HSBC Mixed: HBSC/ 
Lloyds 
HSBC 
Ranked 4 over the 
years 
Barclays RBS RBS RBS/ Barclays 
     
Ranked 1 pre-crisis HSBC HSBC/Lloyds LBG HSBC 
Ranked 4 pre-crisis Barclays Barclays HSBC/ RBS Barclays 
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A longer term perspective post State intervention would perhaps yield more informative 
results as these banks have certainly been the greatest affected during the financial crisis.  
Nonetheless, the results may be encouraging for quasi-nationalisation.  With this structure in 
place, there appear to be no radical decline in efficiency for RBS and LBG. Substantial 
differences have been found previously for mixed ownership enterprises (Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2001).   There  may be some evidence of the effect of competition (Crain and 
Zardkoohi, 1978) as the results do not point to consistent underperformance of the State 
owned banks.  Being arm’s length may enable the banks to stay efficient compared to their 
peers (Kole and Mulherin, 1997).  Moreover, there remains the incentive for management to 
share in the profits of the company through stock based remuneration packages (Alchian, 
1974). 
8.1.7 Diffusing Targets to the Wider Banking Industry 
In fact, the State has had an enormous influence on the whole banking industry in assuming 
further societal responsibility.     In 2011, the wider banking industry agreed to lending goals 
for businesses under Project Merlin (2011).  In this agreement, the largest UK banks, 
including HSBC, Barclays and Santander, who have not received any Government capital, 
agree to take collective responsibility for the lending targets originally aimed at RBS and 
LBG: 
“In entering this agreement, the banks explicitly recognise their responsibility to 
support economic recovery… The banks expect, in the light of the statements 
contained within this document, a commitment by the Government to the 
stabilisation and improvement of the relationship between the Government and the 
banks; to the creation of a level playing field internationally for UK banks…and, 
subject to increasing shareholder engagement, the acceptance of the right of self-
determination by bank boards. “   (Project Merlin, 2011, p1) 
Like the rescue package designed to provide stability across the wider banking industry, 
Project Merlin also has been designed to provide stability for the banks in fulfilling their 
societal responsibilities. It is argued here that renewed management priorities have been the 
catalyst to provide more detailed operational targets than previously. For example, in relation 
to RBS’ half year results and new organisational goals within, the CEO stated: 
“Now normally I would consider it foolhardy to put out the targets that we are doing 
today, and it probably is… we have to overcome natural reticence and give you a 
clear road map and also give our, if you like, public policy audiences a clear sense of 
accountability in terms of what we think we can accomplish.”  (Royal Bank of 
Scotland, 2009d) (Emphasis added). 
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This gives a clear indication that salience of other stakeholders impact upon the monitoring 
mechanisms designed for the private shareholder.  Management accept a wider sense of 
responsibility for the financial results beyond the shareholder as intended audience. 
Property rights theory would explain this action of the banks to be capturing property rights 
to a commonly owned resource previously – that of responsible banking and financial 
stability. Commonly owned resources can result in inefficiency (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; 
Hardin, 1968; Coase R, 1960).  The increasing delineation of aspects of property rights will 
help to encourage greater efficiency of the implicit support of the Government during all 
stages of the economic cycle (Barzel, 1997).   
To summarise, the consideration of the banks’ rescue under property rights theory highlights 
some shortcomings in the theory.  Property rights predict that resources will be utilised more 
efficiently under private ownership – yet it was the markets and banks who failed under light 
touch regulation.  Property rights advocates inefficiencies in managing public sector 
businesses due to political interference – yet it was the EU who decreed Government 
ownership would inspire unfair advantages for the two banks.   Temporary ownership does 
not impact on the State’s capacity or inclination to intervene (Kole and Mulherin, 1997). 
Property rights predicted that there would be a lack of monitoring of the banks – yet they 
been rigorously monitored both by the markets and the State.   Property rights predicted that 
there would be increasing specification of targets set by Government – in fact these have 
been kept deliberately vague and it is the general capacity for Government to intervene that 
has concerned the banks.  Finally, it is responsibilities rather than rights per se that have 
diffused these targets to the wider banking industry, who knew fewer restrictions residing in 
private ownership.   
Despite its problems, however, property rights theory does give a good insight into the 
implications of public ownership and quasi-nationalisation.  Moving beyond the historical 
political reluctance to nationalise banks (Darling, 2011), there are advantages to its structure 
borne out by the property rights analysis.  Private sector advantages remain within the banks.  
These help the banks in terms of profuse monitoring and competitive pressures.  
Nonetheless, the State retains a capacity to intercede in areas of great public concern.  
Moreover, quasi-nationalisation has perhaps helped in diffusing societal responsibilities to 
the wider banking industry.   This is particularly important in light of the failure of 
traditional market mechanisms.   
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Agency theory, looked at next, portrays an alternative perspective on the banking crisis.  The 
theory helps to explain the necessity of State intervention and monitoring.  Yet it is quiet on 
explaining the actions of management in the face of alternative motivations and needs further 
development in this regard.  Nonetheless, it provides an additional perspective on the 
implications of Quasi-Nationalisation.   
8.2 Negotiating through the Crisis: An Agency Theory 
Perspective 
The second part of the chapter considers implications of quasi-nationalisation using agency 
theory.  Agency requires the existence of conflicts and the alignment of incentives to be 
considered (Jensen, 2004, p15).   Because this is not a conventional relationship between 
shareholder and manager, the stated aims of the agents and principals are considered.  
Agency theory justifies the requirement of the State to monitor the companies closely in the 
face of market failure.  It also demonstrates that the main priority remains fixed on market 
measures, such as share price and the road to privatisation.  As a result, it is argued here that 
the State should be concentrating on the wider social goals, to change the orientation of the 
banks from profits to customers.  This remains problematic, in the wake of weak lending 
priorities to SME customers and major scandals.   Finally, the UK State’s desire to document 
the history of the bank failures and maximise the value of its support is considered by agency 
theory.   
8.2.1 The Muted Disciplinary Effects of the Markets 
The following section considers the unusual situation of quasi-nationalisation from an 
agency theory perspective.   Overall, this results in a muted disciplinary effect of the 
markets.  Depressed share prices and the market for takeovers have been identified as 
mechanisms which prevent inefficiencies occurring (Fama & Jensen, p313).  However, the 
current market conditions mean that these two disciplinary effects will be suppressed. 
Firstly, agency theory predicts that mass selling of shares is a sign of discontented principals 
and thus would be a moderating mechanism on agents’ consumption of non-pecuniary 
benefits (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p313).  In this case, the mass sell-off of shares by UKFI is 
the ultimate goal.   Thus the share price will not be a monitoring mechanism in its traditional 
sense of preventing inefficiencies occurring.  Here, it may represent an improvement in 
prospects but does not incentivise the management to exceed the State’s opt-out price.   
Secondly, the possibility of takeovers for these banks in the current economic climate is 
particularly low especially given their large market share and the potential competition 
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issues which could arise (UKFI, 2013b). The market is not a strong regulating force for the 
quasi-nationalised banks.    
Market discipline is further stifled by Government backing of the financial system.  Deposit 
insurance schemes have previously been cited as raising moral hazard as the managers do 
not bear the consequences of the risk that they bear (Houston and James, 1995).  Empirically 
the effects of deposit insurance has been to decrease the impact of bank runs (Angkinand, 
2009; Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008; Hoggarth et al., 2002) but it does also make them more likely 
to occur.  In the UK, moral hazard has perhaps been realised with the lifting of the deposit 
insurance limits when the banking crisis was at its peak.  Moral hazard is increased further 
by the use of State support designed to keep the banks solvent. 
Agency theory thus provides an insight into the rationale behind the EU State Aid 
requirements which were discussed above.  To reiterate, the EU decreed that the State Aid 
gave an unfair advantages to the State supported banks and ordered certain divestments to 
avoid distortions in the market.  Agency contracts demonstrate that there are dangers of 
unabated self interest in quasi-nationalisation.    This is exacerbated by the muted market 
disciplines of takeovers and share prices which are available for other corporations. 
Agency theory provides a penetrating insight into the consequences of quasi-nationalisation 
for the banks.  Property rights theory demonstrated that there were advantages to be enjoyed 
through retaining private sector influence in the banks.  Yet agency theory now demonstrates 
that the nature of this monitoring has changed as a result of market circumstances.  
Nonetheless, the next section sees that market discipline is still very much at the fore of the 
monitoring of the banks’ management.   
8.2.2 Interests Aligned on Share Price and Privatisation 
Agency theory points to the importance of the satisfactory share price and impending 
privatisation as the main motivator for both banks and the UK State.  Under agency theory, 
agents are assumed to be the self-interested utility maximisers and will act in their own 
interests rather than the principal’s (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p308).  Agent incentives can 
be used to align the principal and agents’ interests (ibid, p323).  Money is the ubiquitous 
reward, given its flexibility and ability to be tied to performance (Jensen, 2004).   The 
motivations for the top executives running LBG and RBS go beyond profit maximisation 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) but the opportunity to significantly enhance their reputations 
(Jensen, 2004; Fama, 1980) by repairing the failed institutions.  A key measurement of repair 
will be the ability of the banks to attract commercial investors once more through re-
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privatisation of equity holdings.  The share price is one key measure by which the market 
can assess the attractiveness of the banks as investments.     Overall, then the share price of 
the company will be an area of keen interest for the banks’ management.   
For the principal, the UKFI is looking towards disposing of the banks’ shares.  Again, this 
will be achieved through the shares in the bank being suitably attractive to investors.  The 
UKFI is also looking to share price performance by seeking to ‘implement an agenda to 
maximise value of shareholders’ and to implement a strategy of disposing of its market 
investments (UKFI, 2013b).  The remuneration committee, who take on the role of decision 
control (Fama and Jensen, 1983) have made an explicit attempt to align the LBG CEO’s 
remuneration with the recoupment of the Government’s investment: 
“The award for Mr A Horta-Osório will be delivered in the form of a conditional share 
award. This will be subject to the normal performance adjustment policy and will only 
vest if a share price of 73.6p
26
 has been reached for a given period of time or the 
Government has sold at least 33 per cent of its shareholding at prices above 
61p...The Board believes that these conditions are in the interests of all shareholders 
and support our common aim of repaying the taxpayer.” ((Lloyds Banking Group, 
2012)p102; emphasis added) 
Even so, The UKFI is not solely motivated by profits.  Privatisation is contingent on the 
price per share reflecting ‘good value’. Share price will naturally be affected by the financial 
performance of the banks in which the UKFI identifies profitability and capital adequacy as 
being the main drivers (UKFI, 2013b).   At this point, the UKFI’s decision is that the 
regulatory and operational environments are too uncertain to allow the share price to be 
stable enough for repatriation back to the private sector (UKFI, 2013b).  The UKFI carefully 
explain that this means the share price is realistic of ‘future earnings prospects’  and the 
method of disposal is sound, given the huge proportion of shares which will be sold over 
time, rather than based on the original cost of the investment.      
Thus there is an alignment of goals in the form of an adequate share price to enable 
privatisation.  Agency theory usefully contributes to the analysis by emphasising the critical 
motivations tied up in the share price as a number, both for executives and the UKFI.   
The findings of agency theory in this regard would thus point to the opportunity for the 
UKFI to incentivise the UK bank executives in other ways, since privatisation is already a 
                                                     
26
 This was the Government opt in price during the original rescue.  See figure 8.2 for aggregate 
values. 
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natural and monetised incentive.    Thus agency theory recognises the necessity of State 
monitoring on the one hand and the acceptance of the bank executives to this increased 
oversight on the other.  Under the wider umbrella of motivations, agency theory highlights 
that bonuses/ remuneration and serving the customer well are important factors in assisting 
the return to the private sector.  Unfortunately, both of these have resulted in unintended 
consequences, which are explored further next.   
8.2.3 Incentives – Awarding and Refusing Bonuses 
At the heart of agency theory is the desire to align the interests of the agent with the principal 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  A large part of aligning interests is through the use of 
managerial incentives such as remuneration (Jensen, 1994).  For the UK banking crisis, the 
nature and extent of bonuses has been a central topic of political debate.   Remuneration has 
also been subject to a large degree of scrutiny and regulation.  Shortly after the banks were 
taken over, the Walker Review recommended the change in the way that bonuses were 
awarded to bankers, with ‘claw back’ mechanisms in place for those subsequently found 
guilty of misconduct or misstatement (Walker, 2009).  Moreover, short term bonuses should 
be paid over the longer term, with 3 years minimum (Walker, 2009).  Politically, the onset of 
the financial crisis was attributed to greed and excessive remuneration (Hansard HC, 2008) 
All major party leaders at the time of the original intervention were in favour of the 
restriction of bonuses in the quasi-nationalised banks (Hansard HC, 2008).  Bonuses have 
become a political discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012).  
“We found that bonus-driven remuneration structures encouraged reckless and 
excessive risk-taking and that the design of bonus schemes was not aligned with the 
interests of shareholders and the long-term sustainability of the banks”(House of 
Commons - Treasury Committee, 2009b) 
There has also been a bonus tax added to banks who pay their employees more than £25,000 
in bonus each year to try and encourage more responsibility for remuneration in the UK 
banking sector rather than for increasing tax revenues (House of Commons - Treasury 
Committee, 2010b).  The coalition Government has continued to express their concerns 
about pay and remuneration (HM Treasury and Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills, 2012).  However, the monitoring of the State may be self-serving, as there are no 
associated cash incentives with bureaucratic oversight (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  These 
interventions may be fuelled by personal or political interests rather than taxpayers (Dudley, 
1994). 
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Yet this pro-active approach could be viewed as strength of monitoring for the banks 
formerly employed in excessive risk taking.  For in a weakness of the separation of 
ownership and control, the shareholder is unable to monitor the process of remuneration and 
can only disagree with the remuneration proposals presented at the AGM (Broadbent et al., 
1996).  The UKFI has required RBS and LBG to lead the way in reigning in their 
remuneration policies, whilst at the same time being subject to established private sector 
scrutiny mechanisms (UKFI, 2013b; Lloyds Banking Group, 2012; Royal Bank of Scotland, 
2011b; Lloyds Banking Group, 2011c; Royal Bank of Scotland, 2010a; Lloyds Banking 
Group, 2010a; Lloyds Banking Group, 2009a) 
Naturally, the agent would be expected to be resistant to the idea of the restraint on their pay.  
In the long term, though,  the manager will be paid for his own marginal product over his 
entire working life, smoothing out the results of his efforts, shirking and noise as his 
performance is assessed at each wage period (Fama, 1980).   
In the case of the banks, bonuses were awarded to the top management executives within the 
confines of the new bonus regulations.  However, ensuing media criticism meant that the 
bonuses awards were waived by the CEOs: 
 “ Stephen Hester subsequently decided to waive his bonus because the attention it 
received had becoming a damaging distraction for him and the Group…A balance is 
always required between minimising compensation costs, and so maximising profits 
in the current year, and protecting the business from which future profits can flow.  
We have sought to strike this balance fairly while erring on the side of restraint, 
reflecting the nature of our ownership.” (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2012b) 
Here the bonus waiver was connected with the media criticism of the banker’s pay.  
Combined with this, is an acknowledgement that restraint must be shown to those who are 
publicly owned.  
 “We firmly believe that remuneration policy at all levels, including senior executives, 
needs to incentivise staff to deliver strong, sustainable growth whilst reflecting the 
work required to reshape the business to fit the new, challenging environment. We 
also need, however to be mindful of public concerns about equality and that 
remuneration reflects financial results. In asking not to be considered for a bonus in 
2011, António made a principled decision with regard to his remuneration, a decision 
the Board fully supported.” (Lloyds Banking Group, 2011c)  
If in the long term the managers are expecting greater rewards from constraint today (Fama, 
1980) agency theory may explain the willingness of the CEOs in waiving their bonuses for 
the year.  In other words, they will recoup the short term losses through more lucrative 
contracts in future years, with enhanced reputations for their work and high integrity.  Whilst 
this explains why they may forsake remuneration, it does not, however, give an 
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understanding of why there was an award and subsequent waiver of bonus.  The CEOs are 
subject to public disappointment when their pay is deemed excessive and problematic.  
Moreover, they appear less strong by backing down on agreed management decisions.  A 
safer, and less public route, would have been to negotiate the contract with lower pay in the 
first place, in the expectation that future pay outs would compensate for the lower rewards 
currently.   Agents may be willing to forsake benefits if these are seen as a lesser evil of 
excessive monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, p338).   
An alternative mechanism for considering the bonus waiver under agency theory is offered 
through political constraints of pay (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a).  The large public pressure 
to constrain top level management pay is offered as an explanation for a lack of sensitivity 
between pay and performance of CEOs.  The conditions impose upon the contractual 
conditions ex ante rather than affecting the bonus awards ex post (ibid). Certainly restraint on 
pay has been regulated through the various initiatives in remuneration introduced by the 
Government to date.  It has been contended that the free market should determine pay to 
allow good performance to be rewarded.  In turn poor performance can also be appropriately 
remunerated (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b).  In addition, there may be poor incentive to work 
at maximum capacity if pay will need to be conceded before receipt.  However, the ability to 
partake in stock options of the corporation may help with the latter. 
 Yet this does not explain the willingness of the banks to give pay at higher levels in the face 
of public indignation.  Thus agency theory gives only a partial explanation of bonus waivers.  
It gives credence to the future career considerations of the CEOs and it also demonstrates 
that politics can constrain pay.   Nonetheless, it does not provide a framework to analyse the 
process by which these bonuses were awarded and waived rather than contractually omitted 
ex ante.   
Quasi-nationalisation may help explain this process.  For here, at least the banks save their 
own reputations by fulfilling contractual promises to pay bonuses and to retain a commercial 
orientation in their activities.   Note the anxiety to pay competitively to attract and retain 
talented staff in the extracts from the annual reports above.  Society/ Stakeholders, however, 
can then punish the well paid CEOs, as representatives for the banking industry generally, 
forcing them to concede earned pay. This confirms previous public sector studies which 
sought not to show excessive surpluses in order to justify current levels of funding (Pina et 
al., 2012).  In a similar vein, restraint on pay has been used to demonstrate austerity within 
the publicly owned banks.   
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8.2.4 Interests in Conflict over SMEs and Large Customers? 
Agency theory in itself is relatively silent over the merits of public or private ownership per 
se.  There is a recognition that the bureaucratic control may lead to politically motivated 
interests muting more legitimate goals of disperse principals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The undesirability of public ownership rests on the basis of empirical work which finds 
Government owned enterprises inefficient.  There is however, uncertainty in this area, 
including in banks (Andrianova et al., 2012; Tulkens, 2006). 
As a result, agency theory appears to have little basis for objecting to State ownership.  
Political motivations are certainly a concern.  It could be argued that the goal of financial 
stability may override these concerns as it is a common good for UK citizens, as well as 
shareholders.   Public policy initiatives, such as deposit insurance have been found to be an 
efficient use of State resources (Grove et al., 2011; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).   Moreover, 
it has been argued that banks have been efficient recipients of State Aid (Hainz and Hakenes, 
2012).  This is an important consideration as these resources could have been used elsewhere 
if they had not invested in the banks (Bank of England, 2012a). 
 Aside from the identity of owners, agency theory does provide some insights into the merits 
of shareholder concentration.  There may be efficiency gains, as the block holder of shares is 
very motivated to monitor the agent (Grove et al., 2011).  In this regard, the State is the 
interested party in the additional objectives set out at the first intervention into the distressed 
banks.  The additional objectives discussed in chapter 7 demonstrate the desire to keep 
customer lending continuing.  The rationale for bank investments was to enable liquidity in 
the real economy. Banks were encouraged to lend particularly in the SME sector.  There is 
some evidence of this alignment continuing (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Customers are now 
at the heart of the strategy of RBS and LBG.  LBG’s Annual Report 2011 & 2012 strapline is 
currently ‘Becoming the Best Bank for Customers’ (LBG, 2011, 2012).  RBS identifies 
customers as the main priority to become a good company and a good bank: 
“The Bank’s purpose is to serve customers well. The better we do this the better the 
results will be for all our stakeholders” (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2012b) 
However, this may come at the expense of alternative shareholders who wish to see the 
banks become much more risk averse.  Block ownership by the State silences these desires 
(Grove et al., 2011).   
While there is considerable congruence on the need to prioritise customers, some practices of 
the banks have been highly criticised.  Information asymmetry is increased in the banking 
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industry because the businesses are so complex (Grove et al., 2011).  In terms of lending to 
the economy, evidence points to restricted credit conditions for this consumer segment (Bank 
of England, 2011, 2012; 2013).  To help encourage further lending in the real economy, the 
Funding for Lending Scheme was set up to incentivise banks to lend to the SME customer.  
The incentive rested on the availability of cheaper credit from the central bank:   
“A bank with an initial lending stock of £100bn that plans to shrink its lending by 5% 
can access £5bn of Treasury bills for a fee of £75m per year (a 1.5% annual fee). 
But if the bank shrinks its aggregate lending by 3% instead, it can save £30mn on its 
annual fee (it pays a 1% annual fee). That saving can be used by the bank to reduce 
loan rates so that it can achieve a 3%, rather than 5%, fall in lending.” (Bank of 
England, 2012) 
Agency theory would explain the Bank of England scheme as an incentive for agents to 
pursue the policy of keeping credit affordable for SME clients (Jensen, 2004).  Incentives 
come not in the form of remuneration but in the interests of business and the prospect of 
improving the onward rates the banks are offering customers.  The funding for lending 
schemes are a contributory factor for credit spreads tightening for small corporations for the 
first time since 2004, although this was offset in part by an increase in fees and commissions 
(Bank of England, 2013a).  In contrast, the medium and large sectors spreads had fallen 
significantly, with a small drop in medium corporation fees and commissions (ibid, p5).  
Even with a direct financial impact on the banks, the large clients are being favoured over 
the smaller enterprises that may be more risky for the banks, as commercial imperatives are 
prioritised with support from the State to help increase share prices.    
RBS was fined £87.5million in February 2013 as a result of its involvement in the LIBOR 
rigging scandal expanding over the financial crisis from 2006 – 2012 (Financial Services 
Authority, 2013).  21 traders in RBS had been responsible for colluding on the LIBOR rate 
on a number of occasions in such a way as to gain advantage for their derivatives traders 
(ibid, p 2).  In addition, RBS traders colluded with panel banks and broker firms to 
manipulation both CHF and JPY LIBOR (ibid, p3), including “wash trades” which had no 
underlying commercial rationale but were to garner influence with other firms.  The FSA 
also found that RBS had a lack of any controls in its LIBOR trading activities, a delayed 
response to implementing controls in line with industry guidance and a complete failure in 
management oversight of LIBOR trading (ibid, p5).   
RBS was part of a conglomerate of banks that were subject to regulatory fines.  Part of the 
motivation in other banks was to help keep LIBOR rates artificially low during the crisis to 
give an impression of stability and financial health in these institutions.  However, the 
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readily acknowledged primary motivation of the rate rigging was directed towards the 
individualistic bonus rewards (Banking Standards Inquiry 2013b).  There was an admission 
that there had been a focus on the de-risking of the bank and the cultural attitudes of the bank 
took a back seat (Banking Standards Inquiry 2013a).  It is unclear whether the bank itself 
benefited from these corrupt practices, although individual traders would stand to make 
significant personal gains based on favourable trading positions.   Under agency theory, no 
explanations are pro-offered about the inherent conflicts within the individual (Donaldson, 
1990). Thus, there is no explanation for bankers who here have acted in a way which either 
does not maximise their own utility or who forsakes greater profit for the sake of reputation 
(Donaldson, 1990).    
Another scandal which undermined the banks’ ostensible commitment to customer care 
occurred with the payment protection insurance (PPI) scandal.  In 2010, the FSA ruled that 
the practice of selling payment protection insurance alongside loan products should be not 
allowed.  The practice was applied retrospectively.  Customers could only be marketed this 
product 7 days after they had signed up for a loan.  In January 2011, the British Banking 
Association took the FSA to the high court for a judicial review to this retrospective 
application of PPI selling.  The high court reported back in April 2011 and found for the 
FSA.  Thus, the  Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) mis-selling scandal has required large 
scale provisions in LBG (Lloyds Banking Group, 2012; Lloyds Banking Group, 2011c; 
Lloyds Banking Group, 2010a) which have caused the bank to be loss making under a 
statutory basis again for 2012 (Lloyds Banking Group, 2012, p2).   PPI was a highly 
profitable product, helping to subsidise the low or loss making margins being made on cheap 
credit.  It has been suggested that this would skew incentives to sell the PPI to all customers 
to help increase profitability (Banking Standards Inquiry, 2013b).       
Again, agency theory provides some good insights into the implications not only of public 
ownership but also of how concentrated share ownership may cause power imbalance.  
Agency theory highlights that there is a common goal of creating a better experience for the 
customer - for both State as principal and the banks as agents.  Yet, it is unable to account for 
why the LIBOR and PPI scandals are occurring under public ownership, for it does not 
provide alternative motivations for individuals who are not acting in their own or the 
business’ best interests. 
Quasi-nationalisation is problematic for changing the cultures of the banks.  With relatively 
arm’s length management, there has been an evolutionary approach to changing banking 
practices.  A step change in culture of the bank takes time to achieve.  Too little political 
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intervention, then, may be a problem as well as too much.  The next section considers 
political intervention in further detail. 
8.2.4 Political Interference in Lending Decisions – Cadbury and Kraft 
Agency theory has identified that the shareholder concentration can stifle minority owners’ 
interests, as well as increase the effectiveness of monitoring (Grove et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, there is a concentration of power in the State, who may use the banks to pursue 
political objectives, rather than corporate ones (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  The ownership 
of the bank has caused political debate with regard to certain decisions made.  RBS funded 
the hostile takeover of Cadbury by Kraft Foods.  After it was completed, Kraft reneged on a 
promise not to close the Cadbury Somerdale factory.    The Prime Minister reiterated the 
commercial freedom of the banks and the markets (Hansard HC, 2010).  However, there has 
been anger at RBS’ involvement in the Kraft takeover in Parliament:  
“When British taxpayers bailed out the banks, they would never have believed that 
their money would be used to put British people out of work” (Hansard HC, 2010)  
There has also been the suggestion that the Government could have intervened and required 
RBS to fulfil societal objectives when Cadbury was taken over (Business Innovations and 
Skills Committee, 2010).  In terms of agency theory, the decision control aspect of 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983) has spilled over into the House of Commons.    This 
portrays the ultimate conflict for the State.  While it benefits from the commercial activities 
of RBS and its contribution towards profitability, when social objectives for employment are 
at odds with its commercial decisions, the banks (and its investors) are open to criticism.   
8.2.5 The State as Saviour – Nationalising and Quantifying the Story 
of Failure  
The concentration of ownership can result in more effective monitoring and holding of 
management to account (Grove et al., 2011).  The State has been pivotal in this regard during 
the crisis.  The self-interested nature of agents means that a full account of the banks’ 
failings which contributed to the crisis is not published in the annual report.  Information 
asymmetry is exploited, as there is no personal gain from exposing all the failings of the 
bank (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Yet there is a political incentive to make the banks 
accountable for their failings (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  The State, through political 
impetus and block ownership, accomplishes what is not possible elsewhere – the authorised 
account of failure.     In order to provide a public account of RBS’ demise for citizens, it has 
been the Government agencies report rather than the bank itself (Financial Services 
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Authority, 2011).  However, this also results in conflicting interests of multiple principals 
(Benz, 2007).  The State is taking on multiple roles.  As interested shareholder, it is 
enforcing accountability of the management.  Yet as regulator, it implicates itself in the 
demise of the banks.  Even though this additional form of accountability has been achieved, 
it has a number of drawbacks.  It fragments the duties and responsibilities of the principal, 
caused by a number of principals involved in the scrutiny of RBS (Benz, 2007).  Moreover, 
it undermines the status of the annual report, which should account for the activities of the 
corporation in its recent past and, indirectly Governmental policy in relation to the banks 
(Steccolini, 2004). 
The failure of RBS is attributed to the inherent riskiness of the bank prior to and during the 
crisis.  Here published accounting information is subject to retrospective application of the 
new Basel III rules, which are yet to be formally implemented
27
: 
“RBS’ liquidity position at end-August 2008 would have translated to an LCR
28
 (as 
currently calibrated) of between 18% and 32%, versus a future standard requirement 
of 100%.  RBS would, therefore, have had to increase by between £125bn and 
£166bn its stock of high-quality unencumbered liquid assets or, alternatively, reduce 
its reliance on short-term wholesale funding in order to comply with the LCR 
standard.” (FSA, 2011, p23)   
Tied up within this illustration of failure, therefore, is an admission of the inadequate 
regulatory regime in place at the time of the crisis.  Yet another principal is added to the 
demands on the agents (Benz, 2007): future regulation.  Financial accounting captures the 
scale of the inadequacy previously. 
Quasi-nationalisation thus helps to provide a comprehensive account of the reasons behind 
the failed businesses.  This is achieved simultaneously with the repair of the banks.  The 
reasons for failure do not impact too much on the future potential of the banks to reprivatize.  
At the same time, the reports allow the State to fulfil its goal of holding the banks to account 
for political advantage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   
 
 
                                                     
27
 Basel III rules will be implemented incrementally with liquidity ratios in place from 2015  
28
 Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
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8.3 Concluding Remarks 
Using insights from agency theory and property rights theory, the quasi-nationalisation of 
RBS and LBG has been considered.  Whilst the theories both contained shortcomings that 
could not address some of the particular circumstances of quasi-nationalisation, they did 
nonetheless provide a deep insight into the potential impacts of public ownership. Property 
rights theory’s opposition to common ownership invariably results in it being critical of State 
investment.  Agency theory also provides a predictive model at the level of the individuals 
concerned and tries to identify conflicts through differing goals.   
Property rights theory generally revealed some advantages to quasi-nationalisation.  Where 
private monitoring in the banks was clearly deficient, the incentives to monitor a private 
corporation still apply in quasi-nationalisation.  The audit report was unchanged throughout 
the turbulence of failure and quasi-nationalisation.   The clean audit reports were facilitated 
by Government guarantees to the auditors, but lowered the information value of the report to 
other shareholders.  A property rights analysis did not predict that Government ownership 
could be used to a commercial advantage, where EU State Aid rules suggested otherwise.  It 
did demonstrate that there was a necessity to incentivise the management to consider public 
goods, such as financial stability, as well.  Quasi-nationalisation nonetheless retained the 
natural incentive of profitability.  The State is treating the banks like a commercial 
investment rather than a funded service.  In this way, the cost of the intervention is 
monitored by the State, even if no corresponding asset is rightfully accounted for in the 
Whole of Government Accounts.  Property rights also gave some consideration to how the 
targets agreed at the time of intervention were set out.  Even if the actual effect was to keep 
the targets deliberately vague rather than more specific, quasi-nationalisation allowed the 
State to concede power quickly in response to changing economic circumstances.  In 
considering headline banking ratios, property rights predicted inefficiency to result.  It seems 
that the relative efficiency of the banks hasn’t dramatically changed since intervention, 
despite social and economic goals being worked into the quasi-nationalisation agreement.   
The competitive efficiency of the banks thus demonstrated that the arm’s length approach to 
quasi-nationalisation was a good decision.    
Agency theory provided an alternative perspective.  First of all, it considered the nature of 
market discipline since quasi-nationalisation.  This was considered oppressed in the 
particular economic circumstances.  Monitoring of banks management would thus be even 
more important.  Nonetheless, there was considerable interest alignment amongst all to 
improve the share price of the banks and so assist a return to private sector ownership.  
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Quasi-nationalisation allowed a mutual goal to exist in this regard.  On the other hand, the 
political interest in bonuses has meant that the CEOs have been obliged to return earned 
incentives in recent years. Quasi-nationalisation has meant that the banks have been made to 
lead by example for restraint in pay in the banking sector.  The agency analysis provided 
reasoning for the decline in remuneration in the form of political costs and also in 
expectations of future earnings.  Yet it did not give any insight into the mechanism by which 
award and waiver was appropriate.  Quasi-nationalisation pointed to the obligation to keep 
up with competitors, but also allows the flexibility to respond to citizen feelings regarding 
pay.   
The potential for political intervention, however, may not have gone far enough.  Agency 
theory pointed towards another aligned interest between the State and the banks in terms of 
prioritising customers.  Yet there have been a number of scandals where customers were not 
served well.  Quasi-nationalisation could have provided the opportunity to change the culture 
of the banking world much faster than perhaps has been the case through arms’ length 
management.  Moreover, the relative independence of the banks has resulted in the State 
publishing on the failings of the banks, rather than requiring the banks to expose themselves.  
This involved implicating the State in poor regulation.  It therefore highlights the potential 
conflicts that the State has to deal with in having many interested parties involved in the 
management of the quasi-nationalised banks.   
Was quasi-nationalisation the solution to the banking crisis then?  It has generally been a 
positive exercise.  It was a practical measure, politically achievable and has allowed an 
increased sense of responsibility to be diffused among the entire banking industry.  Political 
accountability is fairly light, given the scale of investment.  Yet it retains the flexibility of 
intervention on demand.  The banks have not failed but have been given the breathing space 
to return to profitability.  Overall, then quasi-nationalisation have proven to be a fruitful 
mechanism for ensuring financial stability in the UK. 
Theoretically, both agency and property rights theory were found wanting.  Property rights 
theory’s preference for private property rights does not hold up to scrutiny in the case of the 
UK banking crisis.  There have been a number of benefits to public ownership which were 
not predicted by property rights.  Agency theory did provide some pertinent explanations for 
why quasi-nationalisation had been problematic at points, but was not able to provide 
explanations for the means by which objectives were achieved.  As a result, it has been 
suggested that agency is considered alongside other theories to gain deeper insight into 
corporate behaviour (Grove et al., 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989).   
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The next chapter just does that.  It looks at the classic mechanism of accountability in the 
annual report.  Utilising theories of impression management and stigma, it explores how the 




Chapter 9: Creating Impressions in 
a Banking Crisis: The Annual Report 
as Stage and Stigma Management 
This chapter considers the banking crisis through the lens of financial reporting for RBS and 
LBG.  The banking crisis has been the subject of much criticism in the media.  The annual 
report provides an insider view of the banks’ response to these criticisms. 
Impression Management and Stigma provide the theoretical framework for this analysis.  
There is an expectation that organisations will engage in a variety of impression management 
techniques in order to present themselves in the best possible light (Goffman, 1968, p9).  
Stigma provides a particular form of impression management, as the stigmatised entity seeks 
to minimise its impact on social interactions (Goffman, 1968).   Naturally, banks employ 
impression management in the interests of giving off the best possible impression of their 
corporations.  It has already been established that the annual report may act as a public 
relations document (McKinstry, 1996).  The annual report is not merely there to disseminate 
financial information, but there to promote the corporate image of the banks. 
This chapter moves away from the conceptualisation of the annual report as a one 
dimensional performance.  It is not; many audiences are using the document for their own 
ends.  Multiple audiences have been considered in impression management literature 
previously (Neu et al., 1998).  The  banks themselves may have multiple reputations that 
they wish to uphold (White and Hanson, 2002).  Yet at the same time, the report itself must 
be coherent: 
“In those instances where the individual presents a product to others, he will tend to 
show them only the end product, and they will be led into judging him on the basis of 
something that has been finished, polished and packaged.”(Goffman, 1956a) 
This chapter conceptualises the annual report as two different performances.  The front end 
of the annual report may be conceptualised as the ‘corporate narrative’ – where the banks 
explain themselves in the financial crisis.  Its regulation is much looser compared to the 
regulatory accounting information contained elsewhere (‘the back end’).  It has been 
recognised for some time that there may exist a conflict between the two stories being 
reported (Hopwood, 1996a; Smith and Taffler, 1995) 
“Where an apparent conflict exists between the message conveyed by the narrative 
and the financial statements, attempts to reconcile the conflict may frequently result 
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in undue emphasis being placed on the less reliable source [the narrative]. The 
nature of the conflict between alternative sources and its implications for the users of 
accounting messages remain a complex research area worthy of further 
development.”(Smith and Taffler, 1995) 
Football clubs still reported upbeat front ends when their financial results were extremely 
poor (Morrow, 2005).  Likewise, for the banks, the annual report is addressing many shifting 
areas of accountability connected with Government ownership (Sinclair, 2002); stakeholders 
(Friedman and Miles, 2006; Freeman R, 1984) and with the investors to whom the annual 
report primarily connects to (IASC, 1989). It is inevitable therefore those performances are 
in conflict: 
“In their capacity as performers, individuals will be concerned with maintaining the 
impression that they are living up to the many standards by which they and their 
products are judged.  Because these standards are so numerous and so pervasive, 
the individuals who are performers dwell more than we might think in a moral world.  
But qua performers individuals are concerned not with the moral issue of realizing 
these standards, but with the amoral issue of engineering a convincing impression 
that these standards are being realised.” (Goffman, 1956b) 
This chapter attempts to provide a holistic study of the banks’ annual reports.  Three 
performances are identified: the Lloyds Banking Group Corporate Narrative; the RBS 
Corporate Narrative and the Statutory Story.  Sometimes, these performances reinforce each 
other; at other times, they undermine the desired projected impression.  This approach allows 
the tensions or contradictions in performances to be considered as well.  This chapter 
emphasises how important these narratives are in order to understand the crisis within these 
banks.  Accounting shapes the narratives in several ways, but the story of the statutory 
numbers is relegated to an austere back end of the annual report.    
The prominence with which the failure of the banks is presented perhaps offers a novel 
perspective on impression management compared to previous research.  The approach to 
negative news is more complicated than covering up the huge losses or focusing on the 
positives (Morrow, 2005; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003).  Distance created between the losses, 
contained within the separate division or accounting figures allows the banks to promote 
satisfactory trading performance despite their respective failures.  The toxicity of the losses 
is conceptually contained, providing room for a positive story amidst very poor results. 
There are five main sections to this chapter.  The first section looks at the annual report as a 
whole and considers the proportion of regulated accounting information to corporative 
narrative.  The second part then considers the corporate narrative of Lloyds Banking Group.  
Within the portrayal of the banking crisis, LBG maintains its poise and tries to externalise 
the banking events.  However, accounting numbers means that the banking failures are 
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discreetly acknowledged within the analysis of performance.  Accounting thus creates a 
tension to the performance LBG wants to portray.  In the third part, RBS employs a different 
strategy for its corporate narrative.  Here, the story is not one of externalising events, but 
containing them internally and creating a performance of fundamental business change.  
Accounting is disruptive as it portrays shifting perceptions of the history of the crisis.  
Perhaps because of this shifting perception, cultural change via the ‘tone at the top’ is 
created only in the latest years of reports.  The fourth section considers the role of the 
statutory accounting story and how it sits in the annual report.  The performance of the 
accounting information is austere and limited to a select audience.  Audit, likewise, plays a 
minimal role in the accounting performance, yet at the same time validates the story.  
Finally, the chapter considers the wider performance of the banking industry, and how these 
performances are supported by their fellow UK large banking corporations. 
9.1 The Corporate Narrative and the Statutory Story  
The analysis begins by considering the basic features of the corporate narrative and statutory 
story in each of the annual reports of RBS and LBG.  In Goffman’s ‘Presentation of Self’ 
(1973), an individual’s impression management is mastered through the ability to control the 
impression that others receive through the impressions which are given off (ibid, p2).  The 
preliminary aspect is for the individual to define the situation in which the encounter is 
taking place.  As Goffman observes: 
“…it will be in his interests to control the conduct of the others, especially their 
responsive treatment of him.  This control is achieved largely by influencing the 
definition of the situation which the other comes to formulate, and he can influence 
this definition by expressing himself in such a way as to give them the kind of 
impression that will lead them to act voluntarily in accordance with his own plan” 
(ibid, p3) 
In the context of an organisation’s annual report, the definition of the basic situation is well 
established – the annual report provides the financial results of the company throughout the 
last financial period.  For RBS and LBG, it also provides a direct channel to explain the 
Government ownership to private shareholders.   However, there is a multitude of readers 
interested in the content of the annual report and companies must consider the interests of its 
readers and their tacit background knowledge (White and Hanson, 2002; Neu et al., 1998). 
This section looks at the very basic features of the annual report.  The overall length of the 
annual reports is considered.  This provides a glimpse into the performances devoted to 
corporate narrative and that devoted to the accounting story.  It provides a preliminary 
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indicator in changing approaches to the communications of the companies (Merkl-Davies et 
al., 2011; Laine, 2010; McKinstry, 1996).  LBG’s and RBS’ length of documents and 
proportion as a whole of the report devoted to regulatory requirements is shown in the table 
below.  
Table 9.1: RBS Annual Report Length and % Regulatory Information 
RBS Annual Report,  
2006 - 2012 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of Pages  262 252 299 390 445 490 543 
Statutory Information
29
 % 55% 56% 48% 45% 43% 45% 37% 
 
Table 9.2: LBG Annual Report Length and % Regulatory Information 
LBG Annual Report,  
2006 - 2012 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of Pages  133 166 200 272 296 371 372 
Statutory Information
28
 %   65% 61% 63% 61% 58% 50% 50% 
 
The tables above show the absolute number of pages in the annual reports of LBG and RBS 
for the years 2006 – 2012.   There has been a significant rise in the number of pages over the 
period.  The 2012 reports are twice as long as the reports produced in 2006.  Since the 
financial crisis, both banks have been concerned about being open and transparent.  This 
may lead to a more positive corporate reputation and a decrease in the cost of capital 
(Armitage and Marston, 2008).   Alternatively, it may be a means of promoting a positive 
picture through upbeat narrative commentary and subduing the story of the negative 
                                                     
29
 Includes all information subject to audit and requires positive reporting.  Following McKinstry 
(1996) includes information in the Chairman’s Statement; the Director’s Report, Corporate 
Governance Report and Remuneration Report; and the Financial Statements and related notes. 
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accounting results (Morrow, 2005; Smith and Taffler, 1995).  More non-statutory 
information has been included to assist in managing the impressions of the reports.   
The banks follow the convention of including the corporate narrative first, and then 
following on with the statutory accounting information.  Regulation has affected the 
financial parts of the annual report.   The increase in pages is in line with the big UK banks 




 respectively in the proportional increase in size 
from 2008 – 2009 (Deloitte, 2010).  Deloitte attributed this to the acquisitions of new 
businesses in the UK and an increase in the disclosures under IFRS 7, relating to financial 
instruments.  However, the table above shows that for RBS and LBG, regulatory information 
declined in overall share of the annual report.  
The approach taken here distinguishes between the regulatory information – the accounting 
story; and the corporate narrative (non-regulatory information).  The corporate narrative is 
incrementally becoming the more noteworthy contribution for the banks.  It creates a new 
mission in the production of the annual report, one which has moved from providing 
financial information to one which is a vehicle for the intended corporate message.  
Impression management implies that accountants may be outsourcing their role: 
“some organizations resolve this dilemma by officially delegating the dramatic 
function to a specialist who will spend his time expressing the meaning of the task 
and no time actually doing it.” (Goffman, 1956b) 
For those whose interest lies in a detailed exposition of the financials, the accounts may hold 
a more critical aspect.  It can be seen as one of the more uncontrollable aspects of the 
performance, being so rigidly regulated.  It may also be the location where impressions 
fostered on the front stage are contradicted (Goffman, 1956a).  The audience may look to 
features of the performance that can’t be readily manipulated to assess the sincerity of the 
performance (Goffman, 1956b).  Here it is not about whether the performance is true or false 
but whether the numbers justify the impressions given off elsewhere in the report (ibid, p59).  
The implications of this are in the establishment of trust.  The impressions originally seen in 
the front end of the report can be reviewed again with trust and a co-operative audience.  But 
even relatively minor things that give a false impression may be lead to the whole 
performance being called into question (Goffman, 1956b).  Thus it is crucial to ensure 
consistency in numbers and approaches between the front end corporate narrative and that of 
the regulated accounting information at the back end of the report. 
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As a result, the next two sections consider the capacity for impression management in the 
corporative narrative of LBG and RBS.   The banks undertake distinct strategies for 
managing the impressions of the crisis befalling them and their road to recovery.   
9.2 Considering Corporate Narratives  
The necessity of State rescue can be deemed a deeply discrediting event which tarnished the 
banks’ reputations.   Readers are most likely aware of these damaging events prior to reading 
the annual report.  Thus: 
“the issue is not that of managing tension generated during social contacts, but 
rather that of managing information about his failing.” (Goffman, 1968) 
An obvious stigma will be part of the definition of a situation whether or not the stigmatised 
wants it to be (Goffman, 1968; Goffman, 1956b).  Concealment of the stigmatising attribute 
becomes impossible (ibid).   Instead, organisational responses to the stigma of bankruptcy 
embody informational control techniques like defining the situation (Sutton & Callahan, 
1987, p422).   
Defining the situation in wake of the financial crisis and the Government ownership is 
therefore a central task for both RBS and LBG.  The banks take divergent approaches to 
defining their own situation.  These embody the particular circumstances of their failures and 
the ability to move out beyond the stigma of their failures.   RBS uses the explicit technique 
of ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ assets/businesses to contain the failed part of the banks and the 
opportunities continuing to arise in the remaining parts.  LBG uses the HBOS acquisition to 
capture failure.  It is reshaping of this which underpins its definition of the situation.  
Interestingly, this does not undermine the previous impressions given by the old Lloyds 
TSB, nor indeed the identity of the group as presented in the annual report.   However, a 
closer inspection of the events leading up to Government intervention helps account for the 
different approaches.  The Corporate Narrative for LBG is explored next. 
9.2.1 Lloyds Banking Group: Maintaining Poise 
Despite the Government investment in Lloyds banking group in 2008, this has not 
challenged the fundamental corporate identity that LBG consciously project.  This stability is 
demonstrated in the consistency of their corporate narrative.  The front covers below show 
enduring features throughout the crisis.  This is a bank that wants to continue as before, built 
on a reputation of prudence and a UK focus.  The difficulties occurring during the crisis are 
managed by the bank in a technique described as ‘passing’.  Passing involves concealing the 
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stigmatising attribute.  It may not be an absolute concealment but involves many different 
variations (Goffman, 1968).  LBG deflect the crisis and its stigma from the bank by creating 
an impression that it was an external, rather than internal, event.  This is achieved with the 
repeated use of the phrase ‘market dislocation’.  Finally, the tension between the corporate 
narrative and accounting is revealed as the combined business reconciliation and the 
statutory profit show a transaction in a light which is not politically expedient for the bank. 
LBG presents itself as a strong bank building upon its Lloyds TSB heritage.  The identity 
and ethos of LBG does not appear to have been extensively upset by its acceptance of 
Government help or the HBOS acquisition.   Instead, it hints it has been an aide to the State, 
having rescued the Government from the burden of HBOS’ liabilities rather than one which 
has fallen victim to the financial crisis itself: 
“The acquisition of HBOS provides a unique strategic opportunity to create the best 
financial services business in the United Kingdom. The combination of Lloyds TSB 
and HBOS creates a new stronger organisation and helps support the stability of the 
UK financial system.” (Lloyds Banking Group, 2008) 
That the enlarged group has been subject to State intervention does not undermine the 
inherent strength and stability of the original Lloyds TSB. It is called one of the ‘safest 
banks’ (Lloyds Banking Group 2008 p6) and its business approach is the basis of the newly 
combined group: 
 “The strong risk management culture and more prudent risk appetite previously 
prevalent within Lloyds TSB has been applied to the enlarged Group.” (Lloyds 
Banking Group, 2009a) 
Indeed it was the strength of the Lloyds business model which allowed it to take over HBOS 
at the height of the crisis.  HBOS continues to suffer losses as it had heavy exposure to the 
commercial property sector.  By applying the LBG prudent approach, captured by the more 
prudent provisioning of the group, HBOS will provide synergies and future growth 
opportunities.  What is not at question is the fundamental business model which Lloyds had 
worked with over the previous years.  Yet Lloyds TSB would have been obliged to raise 
£7bn extra capital itself had it not taken on HBOS at the height of the crisis (Lloyds TSB, 





9.2.2 Front Covers of Annual Reports for LBG 2007 - 2010 
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Pictures and images are important in the annual report.  They reinforce the corporate 
message.  They provide visual stimulus as to the value of the corporation, which may not 
otherwise be captured in the financial numbers (Davison, 2010; Davison, 2009; Preston et 
al., 1996).  The front covers of the reports show a consistency amongst Lloyds Banking 
Group before and after the takeover of HBOS.  The black horse dominates the front cover 
and the limited colour scheme is apparent in all photos.  In 2008, even though HBOS was not 
integrated into the accounts, the new Lloyds Banking Group logo was used, along with a 
new strapline of ‘Creating the UK’s Best Financial Services Provider’ and ‘Becoming the 
Best Bank for Customers’.  This is the mission statement of the newly enlarged group.  The 
previous strapline, ‘Building Strong Relationships’ remains an important feature of the 
bank’s strategy. 
This sends a strong initial image to the reader of the report – the bank is still a successful 
business with ambitions intact despite the financial crisis.  The fundamental identity of the 
bank remains strong and competitive despite the drop in market fortunes.  Overall, there is an 
impression of maintaining its own poise – it has not questioned its identity in face of the 
financial crisis and the integration of the failed HBOS.   
Like the bowler hat in an image study of Bradford & Bingley (Davison, 2009), the horse is 
not a picture of products or services the bank renders.  Instead, the image speaks to 
metaphorical or suggestive levels of impressions.  The horse can be seen as strong, sturdy, 
powerful creature but also one which has been a long standing servant to humans.  These 
images may all evoke the qualities of the horse that Lloyds Banking Group wish to emulate. 
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9.2.3 Containing the Crisis: Market Dislocation 
Whilst there is consistency and confidence exuded from the annual report front covers, LBG 
must acknowledge the failures associated with loan impairments and Government rescue.   
LBG tries to contain the crisis through the use of accounting for ‘market dislocation’.  The 
use of ‘market dislocation’ in its annual reports is looked at here. 
From 2007 – 2009, LBG uses the term ‘market dislocation’.  The term implies that short 
external events to the organization have had an impact on the results, but which are not a 
tangible part of everyday operations at the bank.  Lloyds appeals to the externality of market 
movements.     In this way, the stigma is externalized to the organization and is happening to 
everyone else as well as them (Sutton and Callahan, 1987).  Results could be blamed on the 
external environment (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003).  In this way, LBG can continue to 
maintain poise (Goffman, 1956b). 
Market dislocation is a prominent feature of the annual reports, and is used to explain 
performance in the group’s results analysis.  It is first used in 2007, when there is a £280m 
movement in the wholesale and international banking divisions explained in these terms.  
Some graphs exclude the ‘market dislocation’.   An example of this is shown at Figure 9.1.   
This means that positive corporate messages can be emphasized.  Trends are shown to be 
increasing upwards; profits are increasing, with the £280m ‘market dislocation’ charge 
excluded.  Selectivity of information in graphs like  this has been a feature of impression 
management research (Jones, 2011).     
Figure 9.1: Selectivity of Information in Graphs, 2007: Excluding Market Dislocation 
 
 
Market dislocation is used as a phrase multiple times at the height of crisis.   The Chief 
Executive’s Review explains its use: 
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“Whilst we cannot overlook the impact of the dislocation on our results, these 
numbers are more reflective of the on-going performance of the Group.” (Lloyds 
TSB, 2007) 
In the 2008 accounts, ‘market dislocation’ is used in a number ways.  Figure 9.2 
demonstrates its use in key narrative.  In the ‘Key Highlights’ section, the performance is 
reported, excluding market dislocation.  In this way, year on year growth can be asserted, 
allowing a strong performance to be maintained.  At the same time, it is also a new 
accounting, allowing a quantification of the market turmoil.  In turn, by quantifying this 
figure, the key highlights can exclude its effects from the performance commentary.  A more 
regular trading year is presented to flush out any short term changes to the trends through 
accounting adjustments. 
The 2008 report does not explain the basis for the ‘market dislocation’ calculation or the 
items recognized within it. The 2009 report gives some indication that it relates to trading 
portfolios marked to market and gives a sideways acknowledgement that it has had an effect 
on subdued income growth.  Yet there is always space between the combined business 
performance and the statutory performance, with a majority of the differences coming down 
the ‘market dislocation’ and HBOS gain that LBG have.  In the 2010 report, perhaps because 
the crisis in the banking markets is less dramatic, the term does not get used at all.   
LBG uses ‘market dislocation’ to distance itself from its failures.  This is achieved because 
in 2008 Lloyds did not consolidate the HBOS accounts and could still keep its self-view as a 
safe player in the banking industry.  The impression is given that these losses are not the 
responsibility of the Lloyds management teams.  Stakeholders are given the 
acknowledgement and apology for the position of the bank over the crisis, but are offered 
hope for the future through strong remaining businesses, retail brands and a new board.    
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Figure 9.2: Summary of Group Results, LBG 2008 
 
(Lloyds Banking Group, 2008) [Emphasis added] 
9.2.4 The Corporate Narrative of Numbers: Pro-Forma Accounting 
The corporate narrative within the Lloyds banking group features a great deal of numbers.  
These numbers, however, are not the regulated accounting required for production.  Rather, 
they are ‘pro forma’ ones outside the regulatory scope of the annual report.   It usually 
involves selective editing from the larger body of information contained in the regulated 
accounts (Weetman, 2011).  This selective accounting information may not in itself represent 
a true and fair view.  Alternatively, investors may prefer this information as it is more 
indicative of  ‘core earnings’ than the regulated accounts (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). 







Figure 9.3: Headline Figures, LBG 2009 Report  
 
(Lloyds Banking Group, 2009a) [Emphasis added] 
At the bottom of the figure, LBG provide a reconciliation between their ‘combined business 
basis’ and the ‘statutory’ profit before tax.  This is identified as significant under impression 
management, for it is the area between the front and back stage of the performance: 
“one of the most interesting times to observe impression management is the moment 
when a performer leaves the back region and enters the place where the audience is 
to be found, or when he returns therefrom, for at these moments one can detect a 
wonderful putting on and taking off of character”(Goffman, 1956a) 
This is in fact, one of the most revealing performances for the bank.  Here, impairment 
(underlined) is prominently shown for the year, causing an extensive loss for the bank.  
However, the statutory results actually show a profit.  It is counterintuitive to what might be 
expected, where a profit would be formulated in the pro forma numbers covering a loss in 
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statutory results.  However, the single transaction causing the loss to be reported rather than 
a profit is the HBOS takeover.  Three figures relate to the HBOS transaction in figure 9.3 
above, although only one item explicitly names HBOS in the results.  The first is the Fair 
Value Unwind of £6,100m shown just before the Loss before tax on a combined business 
basis.  The second is the £11,173m of negative goodwill credit shown as part of the 
reconciliation to statutory profit before tax.  The third is the pre-acquisition results of HBOS 
plc.   
The negative goodwill credit arose from buying HBOS for less than the book value of its 
assets.  It is a standard accounting adjustment as per IFRS 3 (IASB, 2008, para 34).  The fair 
value unwind has arisen as adjustments to the acquisition balance sheet reflect current 
market based credit spreads for HBOS’ lending portfolios and own debt (Lloyds Banking 
Group, 2009a).   
The HBOs transaction was one facilitated by Government and therefore carries a political 
dimension.  The conclusion of the HBOS deal and the additional Government support 
offered through the APS occurred within days of each other (16
th
 Jan 2009 for the former vs. 
19
th
 Jan 2009 for the latter).  The Government support was to be one of last resort, in the 
event of not being able to fund sufficiently through market mechanisms (HM Treasury, 
2008a).  It is argued therefore that the bank has to present a failed group, to justify their own 
level of support from the State.  As a result, the loss mutes any suggestions that LBG were 
profiteering from the sale of HBOS to Lloyds TSB when markets were at crisis point back in 
September 2008.   
This left LBG with a profitable transaction which must be conveyed as being an expensive 
take over.  This means presenting a front which can fit with the immediate situation, even if 
this is a poor impression (Goffman, 1956b).  In general, the preferred choice is to incorporate 
the accredited values of society (Goffman, 1956b) and this is shown here by the option to 
show a pro-forma loss.   
This then, is a stigma of a completely different sort.  The stage must be presented to the 
audience which conforms to the collective representation of society – the crisis, the loss of 
money and the loss of jobs.  Here, the story is not one of striking at a massive opportunity, a 
£11bn immediate gain on ‘negative goodwill’ on a troubled company which is what the 
statutory accounting portrays.   Taxpayers, as well as shareholders, must then have the story 
confirmed of a bad result, a bad decision to take on HBOS, through short term accounting 
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numbers of profit before tax, even if the rationale for Government support in the case of 
capital adequacy was a longer term concern. 
Thus, the regulatory account provides a conflict with the corporate narrative.  It tells a story 
of gains from others’ misfortune, not only of HBOS but of the Government too.  LBG do not 
want to be that bank.  The preference is to be seen as a good corporate citizen, who took on 
HBOS, rather than a bank that was setting out to take advantage of the poor economic 
conditions.   
Overall, regulatory accounting forces the stigmatising attributes of the LBG business to be 
revealed.  The company attempts to ‘pass’ these by dressing them as ‘market dislocation’ or 
through the ‘combined businesses’ approach.  Yet, regulatory accounting forces these to be 
revealed in prominent pages by the bank.  The bank cannot safely or legitimately talk about 
its business without explaining the crisis as well.   
The corporate narrative of RBS is now considered.  What is dealt with here is another means 
of managing the stigma of Government rescue and financial crisis.  In contrast to LBG’s 
attempt at passing, RBS opt to highlight change.  
9.3 RBS’ Corporate Narrative:  A Performance of Fundamental 
Change 
RBS deal with the stigma of failure in a markedly different way to LBG.  Instead of 
reinforcing the company values, the bank is now undergoing fundamental change.  The 
origins of the crisis are found within the bank and are being managed.  The bank is going 
back to its roots of UK based customer banking and opting to leave its global businesses 
behind.  This is demonstrated through the construction of the front covers of its annual 
reports, but also in how it reports on the crisis itself.  RBS explicitly set up a ‘non-core 
division’ which represents its troubled past and which is to negotiate the wind down of its 
operations.  For RBS, the extraordinary external environment is to be acknowledged and 
categorized as separate from the bank’s ‘real’ business.  In this way, invisible costs of doing 
business – here the response to poor business decisions by divestment - are dramatized and 
rendered visible (Goffman, 1956b).   It also allows sympathy to be gained from the audience 
and thus may be seen as a more rational response compared to other forms of passing (Sutton 
and Callahan, 1987).  The following sections look at how the corporate identity is presented 
in the annual report front covers over time, before discussing other aspects of the corporate 
narrative.   
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9.3.1 Annual Report Front Covers of RBS: 2007 – 2012 
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It can be argued that the annual report covers of the RBS group reflect the changing fortunes 
in the bank (Davison, 2009) and the different corporate messages they want to project  
(Preston et al 2006).  In 2007, a strong successful corporate image is presented.  There, on 
the covers, is the evidence of its financial success, with growing dividends and ROE.  This is 
a company worth investing in. Its corporate culture is projected through images of workers 
and a business environment of the office.  Ethnic diversity encapsulates an image of a global 
business.   In 2008, there is a stark change with the Government taking a majority share in 
the group.  There is only 1 image, a sober photo of the RBS Group logo.  This could be 
interpreted as a reflection of cost cutting and driving through an agenda for change by 
responsible managers (ibid, p119).     
The report of 2009 sees a return to the photo montage used in 2007 and previously. Yet the 
nature of photos is now quite different to the 2007 covers.  UK based brands are shown as 
well as the RBS logo itself.  RBS customers feature, rather than workers.  There are shop 
front images, ones known to retail customers, not the images of inside offices, capturing the 
environment shown in 2007. This suggests confidence in the RBS businesses – at core, the 
business is still successful in banking but has evolved to be meeting the needs of a changed 
environment.  It highlights the increasing concern for the RBS small business customer, with 
a large photo of the motorcyclist in a prominent position.  Importantly, the numbers used in 
2007 disappear.    
In 2010, the montage again features images familiar to the group’s retail customers.   In 
contrast to 2009, here the customers of RBS are shown interacting with the RBS staff on the 
cover, rather than featuring separately.  This could be interpreted as customers are building 
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relationships and getting positive help from the bank.  The Customer Charter is also given a 
picture on the front cover.  Some RBS staff look directly at the camera, rather than being 
pictured doing other things.  The various brands of the group are featured in the background.  
This sends messages of a bank which engages with the customer, shareholder and is not 
exclusively dealing in high concept business.  Interestingly there is a return to some office 
images like used in 2007 and ethnic diversity is present in a stronger manner.  This may 
highlight a return of confidence in the bank but sits at odds with the customer focus, UK 
based bank that is being projected elsewhere.   
The 2011 cover is a step away from the photo montage back to the corporate logo used in 
2008.  The logo of RBS is not faithfully reproduced but large scale pieces of the logo are 
incorporated.  The colours are stronger blue and the font of the title is in white, to make it 
stand out.  It appears more confident than the 2008 cover, with its thematic collage of the 
logo rather than just a straightforward photograph.  This is not a year for reinventing the 
company but perhaps one which has become more comfortable in the clothes that it has worn 
previously.   
2012 front cover photos represent a much simpler montage for the bank.  There is only RBS 
and NatWest brands shown.  It is in black and white.  There are two pictures showing a 
worker helping customers, and then two with customer and a worker individually.  Ethnic 
and gender diversity are shown.   The bank continues to slim down its global reach and has 
made significant divestments, including those of Direct Line and the planned divestment of 
Citizens.  These images represent the external image the bank wants to project, and its 
current stance of putting customers at the heart of its recovery.  The next section considers 
the chairman’s statement, which also shows features of change. 
Overall, the front page of the annual report is a critical graphical representation of the 
impression that the banks want to convey.  In impression management terms, it can be seen 
as a crucial device in defining the situation.  For RBS, messages of change and increased 
focused can be interpreted.  This contrasts with LBG, whose front covers show consistent 
graphical themes, projecting an underlying confidence in the banking group’s ethos. 
The front cover may be the start of fostering the desired impressions, but consistency in 
message throughout the annual report is important as well.  Therefore, the next section of the 
chapter considers another well-read aspect of the annual report – the Chairman’s Statement. 
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9.3.2 The Chairman’s Statement: Addressing a Different Audience, a 
New Style of Performance 
The chairman’s statement is one of the most read parts of corporate annual reports and has 
had extensive research conducted on its content (Clatworthy and Jones, 2006).  It is a critical 
part of defining the situation of the annual report and interpreting this in narrative form for 
the reader.  Theoretically, the impressions presented in the Chairman’s statement will reflect 
the standards by which the banks are trying to live up to (Goffman, 1956a).   
The tone and content of the 2012 RBS Chairman’s statement is different to those of prior 
years.  There is the image of the Chairman himself, standing more informally with his hands 
in the pockets. The tone and lexical content of the statement suggest a different audience to 
previous years.  The top tier of management is referred to as ‘Your Board’ from ‘The Board’ 
employed in previous years. The tone is humble.  The vocabulary is simpler: 
“We are delivering what we said we would do in our strategic plan. We have made 
RBS safer. It is much closer now to being in the good financial health that would 
allow shareholders to receive a dividend and the Government to start to sell its 
stake. The challenge that remains is to serve customers better and to do business in 
a way that makes you and us proud to be part of RBS.” Philip Hampton, (Royal Bank 
of Scotland, 2012b) 
It is aimed at the lay person, rather than the sophisticated investor. This may be associated 
with the upbeat results RBS are reporting.  Although the bank is still loss making, it has a 
positive story to tell about achieving the strategic targets first outlined in 2009.  The 
readability of the document is difficult under negative conditions but will become more 
readable if business prospects improve (Linsley and Lawrence, 2007; Courtis, 2004)   
Contrast to the tone of the 2011 annual report where the tone is more authoritative and 
edging on the defensive: 
“It is the Board’s view that running the business on commercial grounds is the best 
way to make the bank safer and more valuable for everyone who depends upon it. I 
do not believe there is a workable alternative if our aim is to provide the opportunity 
for the UK government to sell its shares in the public markets in a reasonable 
timescale.”(Royal Bank of Scotland, 2011b) 
Here, the discussions of the day are widely apparent as to the State ownership of the bank.  
The Chairman uses the platform of the annual report to comment on these debates more 
generally.    
The message between 2011 and 2012 does not change in that the exit of Government is a key 
strategic priority.  The language, however, has changed considerably and appears to seek 
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more empathy in the later year.  This gives a markedly different impression to that in 2011.  
Goffman acknowledges:  
“Often we find that if the principal ideal aims of an organization are to be achieved, 
then it will be necessary at times to by-pass momentarily other ideals of the 
organization, while maintaining the impression that these other ideals are still in 
force.  In such cases, a sacrifice is made not for the most visible ideal but rather for 
the most legitimately important one.” (Goffman, 1956b) 
The legitimacy of the corporation may be best served by appealing to the customer focus of 
the bank rather than its ‘commercial orientation’. Both retail and commercial banking 
provide robust net interest margins for the bank.   Impression management thus could 
suggest that the corporative narrative and chairman’s statement is not sourced directly from 
accounting results.  In contrast, it is generated from the key (socio-political) discourses of the 
day.   
9.3.3 Key Financials in the Corporate Narrative  
Like LBG, RBS has pro-forma accounting in its corporate narrative.  Pro-forma accounting 
is thus a key mechanism of impression management.  The numerical aspect of pro-forma 
gives it a legitimacy which may not be present in other corporate narrative.  Like, LBG, RBS 
employs ‘passing’ in an interesting way with pro-forma accounting.  Prima facie, there is an 
expectation that negative aspects of the organisational performance would be backgrounded 
within the content of the annual report (Courtis, 1998). RBS, however, ensure that the 
market turmoil is presented in the key financial results.  The important aspect is to manage 
the stage and audience’s impressions by defining the situation for the reader.  For RBS, this 
is done by exerting prominence in the annual report, even before the Chairman’s statement, 
of the market events.  This achieves two things: it promotes trust in the reader, because it is 
consistent with poor results evident in the statutory accounting; and it allows the bank to 
project the best impression possibly by defining the market turmoil in its own way. There is 
nonetheless a difficult balance to maintain as the statutory results, reported alongside the pro 
formas, can undermine the impressions generated.   The extract of the key financials below 
demonstrates this.   
  
178 
Figure 9.4: Headline Figures, 2008 RBS Report 
(Royal Bank of Scotland, 2008b) 
The above extract from the RBS Accounts shows how the pro forma and statutory 
accounting in the 2008 report is presented.  This is the first page of the report, arguably the 
most important in terms of defining the situation for RBS.   Similar to LBG, this 
reconciliation can be seen as the passage between the front stage and the back stage and 
where contradictions may occur (Goffman, 1956a).  Viewed critically, the pro forma account 
can be construed as a means to create a better impression.  Pro Forma accounts are placed 
more prominently and show an ‘underlying’ profit of £80m.  The losses on a statutory basis 
show RBS losing £40bn further down the page, exerting less prominence. Yet in the case of 
RBS and LBG, proformas also can be viewed as an important segmental analysis for readers.   
The pro forma numbers isolate and show the effect of the unusual market events, which are 
left unexplained by statutory results.  In this way, RBS acknowledges that there has been an 
extremely poor performance resulting in huge losses for all shareholders, including the 
Government.  Headline information, whether positive or negative, is shown.   
The placing of the statutory information after the pro forma analysis could also be viewed as 
a comment on the information value of this compared to the pro forma numbers.  It is argued 
here that the reader is subtly encouraged to collude with RBS in devaluing the importance of 
the statutory information: 
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“… if the individual’s activity is to become significant to others, he must mobilize his 
activity so that it will express during the interaction what he wishes to convey” 
(Goffman, 1956a) 
The relevance of statutory accounting is questioned in the following years by RBS as the fair 
value of its own debt makes for counter intuitive results.  For instance, in the 2012 results, 
RBS suffer a £4.649bn accounting write down because their fair valued debt has gone up.  
This leads the CEO to conclude: 
“It was a big loss but most of that was technical [wrinkles nose] and in accounting 
terms, the underlying profit was the highest we have achieved since 2008” (Royal 
Bank of Scotland, 2013d) 
Fair value movements have been a controversial topic throughout the crisis, and encourage 
pro-cyclical movements in asset values. The Chief Executive is perhaps expressing 
frustration that positive business activities are nonetheless being pushed out of profit by 
accounting adjustments, over which the bank has little control. Therefore, tangible work 
effort is promoted through the pro forma numbers.    
Moreover, RBS focus on the divisions made between core and non-core to promote the 
restructuring and change of the bank since the financial crisis.  This is discussed next. 
9.3.4 RBS: Constructing the Core and Dismantling of Non-Core 
The global financial crisis, the extent of Government support and the media coverage 
devoted to the collapse of the banks ensure that there is no possible way for the banks to 
conceal the assistance required to continue trading.  Therefore, impression management 
through defining the situation is imperative in helping to repair damaged reputations.  The 
stigma is widespread as RBS has been prominent in the news with regard to Government 
failure.  Their reputation precedes them.  Goffman considers the implications of this: 
“ Where an individual has a public image, it seems to be constituted  from a small 
selection of facts which may be true of him, which facts are inflated into a dramatic 
and newsworthy appearance, and then used as a full picture of him.  In 
consequence, a special type of stigmatization can occur.  The figure the individual 
cuts in daily life before those with whom he has routine dealings is likely to be 
dwarfed and spoiled by virtual demands (whether favourable or favourable) created 
by his public image.” (Goffman, 1968) 
For RBS, the stigmatizing attribute of corporate failure may dominate its other corporate 
reputations (White and Hanson, 2002).  The overriding media picture of RBS is a failure. 
Nonetheless, successful and profitable activities remain within the large banking group. RBS 
seek to manage a delicate balance between celebrating its profitable areas, demonstrating 
change, and isolating the poorly performing parts of the bank.   
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 RBS respond to this by creating a separate division in its books termed ‘non-core’.    This is 
first proposed in the 2008 annual report: 
“We will create a “non-core” Division of RBS during the second quarter of 2009, 
separately managed, but within the existing legal structures of the Group and matrix-
managed to donating Divisions where necessary. This Division will have 
approximately £240 billion of third party assets, £145 billion of derivative balances 
and £155 billion of risk-weighted assets, comprising individual assets, portfolios and 
businesses of the Group that we intend to run off or dispose of during the next three 
to five years.” (2008, CEO Review, p5) 
In 2009, the non-core division is presented in the annual report and has its results reported.  
The non-core is thus defined: 
“Our Non-Core Division is central to the strategy that will return RBS to self-
sufficiency.  On the one hand, it is managing assets that are no longer core to our 
strategy and the continuing operations of RBS, and which we plan to sell or to run 
down. On the other, partly because Non-Core will reduce the asset side of our 
balance sheet, it will improve our funding position and make RBS a safer bank. Non-
Core Division was created to facilitate the re-shaping of RBS on its journey to self-
sufficiency and is responsible for one of the largest bank restructurings being 
undertaken globally and one of the largest in history.” (Royal Bank of Scotland, 
2009a) 
 Although as a proportion of business, the non-core dwarfs the efforts of other divisions
30
, 
the label defines and encloses the crisis.  The bank benefits in dual ways from the creation of 
the Non-core division.  It gains credibility from accepting responsibility for the failure by the 
audience, and thereby gets the audience predisposed to accept the impression that it makes in 
both this area and the rest of the report.  The stigma is openly disclosed – and then an 
attempt is made to move it backstage (Goffman, 1956a p43).  
The impression projected suggests that this not a failed group which is presenting results.  
Rather, it is a group which contains a poisonous component.  It is nonetheless separable from 
the rest of the healthy business and with hard work can be removed to the benefit of the other 
divisions.     In this way, the ‘core’ represents the hope for the future, whereas the non-core 
is a product of the troubled past. 
9.3.5 Restating RBS’ Biography 
Whilst passing is managed through the creation of the non-core division, Goffman notes in 
Stigma (1968) that personal identity is an important part of the management of stigma.  In 
social situations, personal identity may impact on the ability to conceal or pass the 
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 £14.3bn of operating losses in 2009 compared to a Group overall loss of £2.59bn statutory loss. 
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stigmatising attribute.  The biography of the individual, along with the visible marks on the 
person, makes up this identity.  Goffman notes features of biography.  It is often subject to 
retrospective construction and there is an assumption that only one such biography exists.  
When this past biography appears unusual, there is an expectation that further information is 
divulged, despite the social cost to the entity concerned (ibid, p64).  Divulgement is a means 
of managing stigma, as any discrepancy between social identity and ‘personal’ identity 
which is later revealed can be more costly than admitting to the discrepancy directly (Burns, 
1992).   
RBS shows evidence of a shifting social identity as it responds to changes in its own 
biography, prompted by changes in regulation and updated with current events in the 
organisation.  This responds to changing social expectations in the form of financial 
reporting regulation from the IASB and corporate restructuring. This is part of the decision-
usefulness of the Financial Statements, to remove irrelevant items from the accounts so that 
the remaining business can be usefully assessed. 
Yet there is also a suggestion that the move to close the gap between the organisation’s 
social identity and its personal identity is a result of a process of construction of the personal 
identity as time goes by rather than solely a rectification of social identity.  Here, 
retrospective sense making as a feature of impression management (Merkl-Davies et al, 
2011) is illuminating. 
To further consider the features of biography and retrospective sense making, the year of 
crisis as presented by RBS is discussed below.  The crisis numbers are reclassified over the 
years.  Unfortunately, reclassification with the benefit of hindsight can serve to obscure the 
financials.  This is particularly difficult when the year in question is one of complete change, 
as 2008 was for RBS.  Below, an abridged group income statement is shown over the years 
2008 – 2010.   Analysis of pertinent differences then follows.
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Table 9.3: The Year of Crisis: 2008 as reported 2008 – 2010 
Year 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 




Source AR 2010 AR 2009 AR2008 2010 2009 2008 
 £m £m £m £m £m £m 
Total income 20,730 25,868 25,868 19,367 20,599 21,234 
Operating expenses (35,065) (54,202) (54,033) (16,188) (16,188) (15,916) 
Impairment and 
insurance net claims 
(11,356) (12,502) (12,502) (11,349) (11,349) (10,879) 
Impairment losses on 
reclassified assets 
-- -- -- -- -- (466) 
Fair Value of Own 
Debt 




(25,691) (40,836) (40,667) (6,938) (6,938) (6,027) 
(Loss)/profit from 
continuing operations 
(23,524) (38,513) (38,344) (7,016) (7,016) (6,847) 
(Loss)/profit from 
discontinued 
operations, net of tax 




[before write-down of 
goodwill & other 
intangible assets] 
-- -- -- (8,110) (8,110) (7,855) 
Write down of 
goodwill and other 
intangible assets, net 
of tax 




(24,306) (24,306) (24,137) (24,306) (24,306) (24,051) 




The table above provides an abridged income statement of RBS in 2008 as presented in the 
2008, 2009 and 2010 annual reports
31
.  The numbers given most prominence are the pro 
forma numbers, being referred to in the Chairman’s Report, the Chief Executive’s report and 
used in the financial highlights at the beginning of the document.  As the Chairman’s report 
is the most read part of the annual report, the use of the pro forma numbers is significant.  
Moreover, the profitability or otherwise of the company is projected through the ‘underlying’ 
or ‘operating’ profit. This suggests that the board is focused upon the business of the bank 
rather than statutory accounting of the group.    
Looking directly at the bottom line in table 9.3, the reader can see that the 2008 loss 
attributable to shareholders is relatively stable over the various publications and formats at 
circa £24bn.  However, the means of reporting this has been subject to some reorganisation 
over the 3 years.  Taking the statutory figures only, IFRS regulations and corporate 
restructuring have meant that 2008 has been restated to provide comparatives with later 
years.  The big change has been the disposal of a number of ABN Amro assets, leading to 
them being classified as discontinued operations under IFRS 5.  The effect on the 2008 
numbers is that the results of that particular operation is removed from the body of the 
income statement and instead inserted as a net figure into the line ‘discontinued operations, 
net of tax.’    The consortium that acquired ABN Amro was led by RBS and utilised an entity 
called RFS Holdings.  RBS consolidated RFS holdings into its own accounts after 
acquisition in October 2007 until ABN was legally separated in 2010.  From that point 
onwards, the activities which were attributable to the other consortium partners were 
classified as discontinued operations and this is shown accordingly in the 2008 statutory 
results from the 2010 report.  Income reduces by £5bn whilst operating expenses reduce 
substantially from £54bn to £35bn.  A large proportion of this (£15bn) is to do with 
impairment costs which are have been put ‘below the line’.   ‘Below the line’ refers to the 
operating profit number which is the headline figure to indicate quality of earnings
32
 for the 
underlying business of RBS.  As a result, the 2008 figures, through 2010 lenses, look 
different to that which was reported in 2008.  It is arguable that making 2008 really poor was 
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 2008 comparatives are not used from 2011 onwards in the accounts. From 2011, the lows of 2008 
are used to demonstrate progress within the corporate narrative. 
32
 Quality of earnings describes the portion of earnings which are persistently achievable in later years 
to give some indication of future potential of a company (Abdelghany, 2005).  It excludes any one off 
items in the results.   
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an opportunity for the new board to suggest business failure resulted from poor decision 
making by the previous incumbents (Godfrey et al, 2003).  Subsequently the new board 
members would then make decisions which would lead RBS back to profitability again.    
However, much may be attributed to the regulatory requirements in the form of IFRS 5 and 
IFRS 2.  Between 2008 and 2009, the overall statutory profit also changed by £169m.  
Again, this was driven by regulatory demands in the form of IFRS 2 Share Based Payments.  
This added £169m to the staff costs in 2009. 
RBS did not use pro forma figures at all until 2008.  The reasoning given at the stage was 
due to the consolidation of the RFS Holdings into RBS.  To aid assessment of the figures, 
only the business units which were to be retained by RBS were included in the pro forma 
results  (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2008b)  Moreover, significant one off items, such as the 
credit write downs, were also shown separately for the group.  By 2009, however, the credit 
market write-downs were classified as part of the net non-interest income line.  In 2010, 
there was a separate line item for the gains arising on the fair value of own debt.  RBS values 
some of its own issued debt at fair value.  Wider credit spreads on the group’s debt in the 
bond market means that a gain is recorded (i.e. the value of RBS’ debt is reduced at fair 
value – RBS have a lower liability – results in a gain in the income statement).  This meant 
that the operating profit shown in the 2010 accounts precluded this movement and the pro-
formas for 2008 were restated accordingly.  As Gaynor et al (2011) contend this makes for 
counterintuitive movements in the income statement, but one which follows regulatory 
demand.   
Each year, history is rewritten as the crisis of RBS is reinterpreted and refined for investor 
consumption.  As pertinent issues arise, the group revisits its past results to allow this 
progress to be reflected from a point of crisis to calmer times (Godfrey et al 2003).    In so 
doing, the reader is left confused about what happened in RBS at the point in crisis, thereby 
obscuring the mark of progress that the company may have made since then.  This echoes 
some of the findings of Carlin (2004) in constant movement in indicators makes the measure 
of progress difficult; and thereby, decreases the impact of accountability from the reporting 
organisation. 
Again, the conflict between the statutory accounting information and the corporate narrative 
serves to undermine the performance that RBS tries to generate in its impression 
management.  RBS is eager to demonstrate fundamental change.  Yet this change is itself 
dynamic and moves incrementally over time.  Whilst change is apparent from the tones of 
the front cover from 2008, it is only in 2012 that culture change is demonstrated by the 
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change of voice in the Chairman’s statement.  The words have caught up with the pictures of 
a new bank.   Accounting provides alternative forms of constructing this change.  The 
regulatory numbers creep into the corporate narrative but largely reside outside the front end 
of the report.     
Even though the statutory accounting numbers remain backgrounded in the annual report, 
they still retain an important clarification role.  They create an obligation on the part of the 
banks to explain why the regulated numbers are different to the board perspective of 
business performance.  Therefore, the next final part of the chapter considers the statutory 
story further.   
9.4 The Statutory Story: Alternative Performances in the Annual 
Report 
This section considers the use of statutory accounting within both RBS and LBG.  The 
statutory accounts are relegated to the back of the large report on the businesses.  Using 
Goffman’s impression management, its status is considered further below.   
9.4.1 The Statutory Accounts and Related Notes: Compliance over 
Information 
Impression Management offers alternate views to how the accounts are utilised in RBS and 
LBG.  The receiving audience is important.  They are the raison d’être of the earnings 
announcement process.  Yet the numbers reside in the back pages.  They are preceded by 
management commentary and pro-forma accounting.   Images are omitted from the statutory 
content.  The format of the primary financial statements are driven by the regulations in 
IFRS 1 (updated by IFRS 5, 7, 9) and IAS 7(John Wiley & Son, 2013).  The notes originate 
from disclosures required in the IFRS standards and UK regulation.   
On the one hand, the placement of the accounts at the back may create an impression that 
these are part of the back stage: 
“Some aspects of the performance are accentuated and other aspects, which might 
discredit the fostered impression, are suppressed.  It is clear that the accentuated 
facts make their appearance in what I have called a front region; it should be just as 
clear that there may be another region – a ‘back region’ or ‘backstage’ where the 
suppressed facts make an appearance.” (Goffman, 1956a) 
This is a relevant analogy for certain readers who may not be as interested in the detailed 
financials.  It is the area for constructing the front stage impressions (ibid.).  In the 
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backstage, the performer can relax and step out of character (Goffman, 1956a).  Here, the 
impression fostered is that of accounting, rather than of the corporate identity.   
Yet labelling the statutory accounts as backstage is inaccurate, as they are not part of a 
private process (ibid, p116).  Rather, the accounts are always public.  Goffman recognises 
that regions can change dependent on performances: 
“…still there are many regions which function at one time and in one sense as a front 
region and at another time and in another sense as a back region ” (Goffman, 
1956a) 
The statutory accounts then act as a public back stage or front stage dependent on audience.  
The consideration of the publics involved in the reading of the annual report is therefore 
critical (Neu et al., 1998).  The statutory accounts are full of technical terms and numbers, 
opaque to the untrained.  Figure 9.5 demonstrates: 
Figure 9.5: Lloyds Banking Group income Statement 2012 
 
(Lloyds Banking Group, 2012) 
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Figure 9.5 is an extract of the income statement for Lloyds Banking Group, 2012.  The 
colour of the font is in the corporate colours of the organisation.  Otherwise, the performance 
fostered is austere and numerical. The boxes surrounding numbers can cause confusion 
rather than clarity.  They direct the trained to how the numbers add up; to the uninitiated this 
is not immediately obvious.  What is added and what is subtracted is bracketed rather than 
shown in mathematical notation.  The technical terms are also difficult for the untrained.  
‘Impairment’ is naturally associated with assets to the accountant, but may conjure up 
connotations of physical disability for the lay person.  ‘Non-controlling interests’ is another 
phrase which may be confusing to the lay person.  The words are not explained.  The income 
statement does not invite engagement for those unwilling to be a financial detective. It is 
accountants performing to members of the same clan:  
“…in the social sphere which encompasses his display of professional competency, 
he will be much concerned to make an effective showing.” (Goffman, 1956b) 
The statutory accounts are a performance for the financially trained.   Non accountants may 
self-select and opt to not remain in the audience. 
As a backstage item, the results here can form as a distraction from the performance that the 
banks want to give off.  For the lay reader, such as many tax payers, accounting will be the 
“long tedious hours of lonely labour” that contribute to the front stage performances located 
in the front end.   Here it is speculated the interest lies in the viability of the banks as 
standalone entities or in their customer service approach.    At the extreme end, the regulated 
accounting has become the ‘dirty work’ (Goffman, 1956b) contributing to the creation of the 
glossy annual report’s corporate narrative.    
9.4.2 The Audit Report 
The front stage occupies a small but very crucial position on the performance delivered by 
the audit report.  That impression has changed over time as the engagement partner signs off 
in his/her own name rather than on behalf of the firm.  It is a report which appeals to the 
personal integrity of the auditor with overtones of ‘my word is my bond’.   
Like the statutory accounts, the audit report remains consistent with the relevant auditing 
standards (Financial Reporting Council, 2013a) and has not been altered given the financial 
crisis or the State as shareholder.  The continuing clean audit report is very surprising.  It has 
not responded in any way to the immediate events surrounding LBG and RBS.  Goffman 
suggests that routine fronts can become institutionalized: 
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 “The front becomes a “collective representation” and a fact in its own 
right”(Goffman, 1956b) 
Such information may seem tedious but suggests that the regulatory information is an 
instrument of compliance rather than one intended to inform (Skaerbaek, 2005; Hopwood, 
1996b).  Even if a desire to change is present, the audit report would have to choose between 
regulated alternatives under ISA 700 or engage in lengthy discussions with the client to 
avoid risking litigation.  There are scant examples of audit reports which are not qualified 
but contain non regulatory prose within
33
.  Qualifying the opinion may be a poor fit with the 
impression wanting to be showcased (ibid, p29).  An alternative viewpoint expressed by 
Goffman may be more critical of processes such as auditing:   
“The audiences must not acquire destructive information about the situation that is 
being defined for them.  In other words, a team must be able to keep its secrets and 
have its secrets kept.” (Goffman, 1956a) 
The report is bolted on to the financial statements and does not contribute to the 
communication of corporate values.  Yet it also legitimates the numbers and impressions 
published, contributing to the robustness of the performance required by financial analysts 
(Goffman, 1956a).   The implication is that the audit report may act as a distraction to the 
back stage or contradictory performances played out to an alternative audience.   
“By bringing the specialist into one’s organization and even one’s team, there is also 
greater assurance that he will employ his skills in the interest of praiseworthy but 
irrelevant matters such as a balanced view, or the presentation of interesting 
theoretical data to the specialist’s professional audience.” (Goffman, 1956a) 
Impression management offers an interesting interpretation of the auditors’ role in the 
financial statements.  Instead of portraying the auditors acting in the interests of shareholders 
under agency theory (Fama, 1980), they become part of the team creating impressions in the 
annual report.   
Even when regulatory requirements to abstain from preparation of the financial statements 
are applied, auditors are intimately connected to the financial reporting performance in the 
annual report.  Their own performance is inconsequential – ‘irrelevant’ in Goffman’s 
language. Yet it encourages those who create it to ensure that the performances surrounding 
it are consistent with the financial statements (International Federation of Accountants 
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 More information will be required in Audit reports for periods beginning on or after  1 October 
2012 (FRC, 2013) 
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(IFAC), 2012).  In this sense, then the auditors are implicated in all aspects of the annual 
report performance.   
Auditors are not alone in supporting the performances of the banks.  The audience may be 
asked to invoke tact and ignore any inconsistencies in the performance (Goffman, 1956a).  
Moreover, there may be other members of the team who are there to provide a supporting 
role (Goffman, 1978, p214).  These include major competitors to the banks, which are 
considered next. 
9.5.1 Teamwork in Impression Management: The Wider Banking 
Industry 
This section looks at the wider banking industry.  Although Goffman is mainly interested in 
the impressions that an entity ‘gives off’ to ensure that they are thought of well, there is an 
acknowledgement that the successful creation of impressions is through tacit co-operation of 
a whole team of performers and a sympathetic audience (1973, p76).  This provides a further 
seam of investigation for examining the role of the wider UK banking industry in both 
responding to RBS’ and LBG’s demise, but also in a role as intimates (Goffman, 1968), 
helping to protect the banks as they gain momentum to become standalone private 
companies.  First of all the relevant themes of Goffman are explained before considering the 
impact on the industry. 
It is not only the individual with the stigmatising attribute who may suffer its consequences.  
Goffman also notes that closely related persons may also incur differential management.  He 
notes that this is  
“A relationship that leads the wider society to treat both individuals in some respects 
as one.” (Goffman, 1968 p30) 
Such ‘courtesy stigma’ leaves the closely related individual in an in between situation.  They 
are not categorised as someone without the stigma, yet they do not belong fully within the 
stigmatised group (ibid, p32).  Their own relation to wider society is thus affected.    
Although there is not much further elaboration on courtesy stigma in Goffman’s book, the 
presence of courtesy stigma has been noted as a feature of bankrupt company managers’ 
families previously (Sutton and Callahan, 1987).  More recently, it was noted as the impetus 
for the accounting profession to take remedial action when a Canadian bank collapsed after a 
noted audit failure (Neu & Wright, 1992).   Given the importance of the auditors involved in 
the failure, it was not in the interests of the profession to scapegoat the particular auditors 
(ibid, p662).   It is argued here that the banking industry have met a similar fate.  Whilst RBS 
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and LBG have suffered the stigma of extensive public bail out through the State equity 
investment, other large UK banks have also received stigma over the extent of support to the 
banking industry.  This has concentrated particularly on the socialisation of losses from the 
banks whilst the financial services industry has received huge financial rewards previously.   
The original State ownership package in October 2008 did not directly name RBS and LBG 
as its intended recipients.  Rather, the package was offered to the entire banking industry and 
invited volunteers to take advantage of the Governmental support.  Right from the peak of 
the crisis, therefore, the whole industry was designated as requiring recapitalisation.  
Although the take up of Government support was limited to RBS and LBG, expectations 
regarding supporting the economy, bonus payments and lending to small businesses 
appeared to diffuse to other large banks within the UK.  
Bonus payments, which had caused widespread political outrage, were one area of concern 
addressed by many banks.  Although recommendations were established by the FSA later on, 
restraint on bonuses was exercised by other banks from the reporting date of the 2008 year 
end:  
“At HSBC, we are committed to the principle of sensible market-related pay, 
structured to align executive actions with long-term shareholder interests. A small 
number of individuals in a market system will inevitably receive compensation that is 
high in absolute terms, but this must be genuinely linked to long-term shareholder 
interests. It is clear that the banking industry got it wrong in the go-go years: we will 
play our part in helping the industry respond appropriately to the new realities” 
(HSBC, 2008). 
The Barclays annual report for 2008 expressed a similar sentiment.  Further to that, the 2008 
report refers to a group responsibility to restore confidence: 
“There is a universal benefit to be obtained from a return to confidence in the 
banking system and from the restoration of the reputation of the banking industry in 
general. I give you my assurance that we at Barclays will do our utmost to play our 
part in procuring this vital objective.”   (Barclays, 2008a) 
The stigma of public bail out then was perceived by organisations beyond RBS and LBG.  
They had all utilised the Bank of England’s assistance through the Special Liquidity Scheme 
and the Quantitative Easing Programme.  The global financial crisis had discredited the 
banking industry across the world.  Yet courtesy stigma is still a useful concept to help 
explain how the additional obligations which were attached to RBS and LBG as a condition 
of Government help became a more widespread requirement.  In a voluntary agreement in 
February 2011, the wider UK banking industry acknowledged their responsibilities through 
the Project Merlin agreement: 
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“In entering this agreement, the banks explicitly recognise their responsibility to 
support economic recovery. The components of the agreement are lending, tax, pay 
and other economic contributions beyond those. The banks expect, in the light of the 
statements contained within this document, a commitment by the Government to the 
stabilisation and improvement of the relationship between the Government and the 
banks” (Project Merlin, 2011, p1). 
Earlier on in the thesis it was acknowledged that the impact of the agreement was diminished 
by various sub clauses which allowed the banks to retain much discretion over their 
commercial decisions, whatever their stated social obligations.  That the banks felt it 
necessary to reach agreement on these principles, which had originally been directed 
specifically at the State owned banks, had now diffused beyond these organisational 
boundaries.   
The diffusion of State requirements to fully privately owned banks may call into question the 
link between ownership and accountability.  Management and controls have been cited as the 
more important influence on enterprise performance and requirements rather than public 
ownership per se (Heald, 1985; Dudley, 1999; Stuart & Geyser, 2009).  Nevertheless, the 
opposite view is taken here.   On the contrary, the diffusion of State requirements across the 
industry can be viewed as strong evidence that ownership does impact on accountability to 
such a large extent that it transcends organisational boundaries. Stein ( 2008) identified the 
encouragement of a moral train of thought in board members with the introduction of 
corporate governance codes.  A similar reprioritisation can be found here by the corporations 
themselves.  Encouraged by the experience of courtesy stigma, the banking industry has 
acknowledged their responsibility in the economic wellbeing of the entire country and the 
resultant increase in attention to social welfare.   
Impression management theory thus allows a wide circle of analysis.  It considers the 
impressions given off but also how the interactions sit alongside other interactions taking 
place.  There is evidence to suggest that the entire banking industry has been stigmatised in 
the financial crisis, even though the Government investment was restricted to a small number 
of banks.  Further to this analysis, the consideration of teamwork is presented next, as the 
UKFI managing the Government’s shareholding, unites with the banks to demonstrate a 
working relationship between RBS, LBG and the State. 
9.5.2 Teamwork in Impression Management: The Silence of the UKFI 
Goffman’s work in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life devotes some time to 
considering the teamwork that is achieved in sustaining suitable impressions.  He states: 
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“…we commonly find that the definition of the situation project by a particular 
participant is an integral part of a projection that is fostered and sustained by the 
intimate co-operation of more than one participant” (Goffman 1968, p67). 
This is a particular challenge for the banks in the capacity of the UKFI.  Although it exists to 
co-operate with the banks and assist their business recovery, their own duties towards the 
State can result in considerable tension in managing impressions.  The UKFI states that it is 
acting in line with an institutional shareholder.  Yet the expectation is that the size of the 
shareholding is so significant that the agency should appear to be considerably more 
involved than has been first presented  Indeed, the UKFI have been criticised for being too 
secretive (House of Commons - Treasury Committee, 2009a).  The UKFI do not participate 
publicly in shareholder meetings. If the nature of the accountability is akin to that of an 
institutional investor, their public role of holding the banks to account could be more 
prominent.  Nonetheless, the public responsibility of managing the shareholder impacts upon 
the relationship between the UKFI and the banks.  This allows the strong monitoring role of 
private shareholders to continue, particularly if they are incentivised to create value for the 
Government.  This is encouraged through the stressing that the ownership of the companies 
is a temporary phenomenon and there will be an active agenda to return the banks to private 
ownership.  If additional monitoring is occurring, it is not visible to the electorate, despite its 
requirement to report to the Treasury on the other conditions attached to the Investments in 
the banks (UKFI, Oct 2009).  
Contrary to expectations, this public opportunity to exercise the banks’ accountability 
mechanisms is not fulfilled.  Whilst there is indirect evidence that the banks and the UKFI 
are extremely engaged with one another (UKFI, 2013b), there is no public dialogue 
occurring between the two bodies.  All of this is done in private and then fed back to the 
public in separate channels.   
9.6 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this chapter was to consider the banking crisis through the lens of financial 
reporting.  Impression management (Goffman, 1956b) and Stigma (Goffman, 1968) provided 
the theoretical framework.   The annual reports revealed aspects of the banking crisis and 
how the banks responded to their respective failures.  But the reports also encompassed 
multiple performances, where the corporative narrative at the front provided different 
impressions from the austere accounting back end.  These tensions in relations have been 
noted previously in research (Jones, 2011; Morrow, 2005; Smith and Taffler, 1995).  
Nonetheless, the banking crisis reverberates in the accounts provided by the two banks and 
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the particular techniques for explaining it can be found through consideration of the 
regulatory accounting story and the corporate narrative. 
In LBG, the corporate narrative was one where the banks’ fundamental identity was not 
questioned as a result of the crisis.  This was despite the fact that it had received extensive 
Government support.  There was the suggestion that LBG had been altruistic in its takeover 
of HBOS.  Yet the reconciliation between pro forma numbers and the statutory figures 
suggested that LBG enjoyed considerable commercial gains received from the HBOS 
takeover.  These were moved backstage by the pro forma numbers.  The opportunities 
provided by the HBOS deal were more critically appraised by the Independent Commission 
on Banking (  2011) who recommended further divestments in the interest of competition.  
Moreover, the nature of the crisis was externalised and new accounting for the ‘market 
dislocation’ helped to separate LBG’s own failure from the market shocks occurring during 
the reporting periods.   
RBS took an alternative approach to accounting for the crisis.  In their case, RBS 
demonstrated an eagerness to embrace a complete corporate change.  Over time, the visual 
images on the front cover changed to reflect the new strategic priorities.  The pro forma 
accounting prominently acknowledged the failure and responsibility was accepted for 
corporate losses through the creation of the ‘Non-core’ division. On a wider basis, the use of 
pro forma accounting had the effect of stripping out some of the effects caused by the 
controversial fair value accounting (Barth and Landsman, 2010).   Failure thus was 
internalised for RBS, whereas it was kept distant at LBG.   
Nonetheless, the change in corporate priorities took some time to take hold.  The year of 
crisis was reconceptualised over time as accounting standards required comparatives to be 
restated.  The language of the Chairman’s statement also changed over time as the news of 
strategic targets being met began to be reported. 
Both banks displayed ambivalence to the statutory story which resided in the annual reports.  
In line with current trends, the pro forma accounting numbers stripped out the statutory 
results from the corporate narrative and relegated the technical accounting production to the 
back of the report.     The accounting story was sombre compared to the corporate narrative.  
It appeared to be a front stage performance only for the most technically minded readers.  
Yet it was also a validated performance as the audit report confirmed and supported it. 
Finally, the wider banking industry acknowledged responsibility for financial stability by the 
signing of the Project Merlin agreement and through Chairman’s Statements on the issue of 
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pay.  This demonstrated that wider parties were supporting the performance of RBS and 
LBG by acknowledging the banking crisis had occurred to all those in the market.   
In companies whose failures have been dramatic and well known, impression management 
offers a framework which can analyse the response to that failure.  The banks acknowledge 
the government support but seek to move beyond it by containing crisis in their own distinct 
ways.  Accounting, by its necessary presence, sometimes can disrupt the performance in the 
corporate narratives.  Nonetheless, a partial or biased account of the crisis is given, allowing 
upbeat stories about trading performance to endure despite negative financial results.  
Impression management still remains a strong feature of their financial reporting.   
The next chapter considers how these results are communicated to a mass audience via the 
press.  In this way, the banks fulfil a democratic accountability to citizen stakeholders. 
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Chapter 10: From Business Page to 
Front Page: Accounting in the 
Headlines 
This empirical chapter moves beyond the financial reporting of the banks and looks to how 
these results are reported in the press.  The media is an important channel of public 
accountability of the quasi-nationalised banks.   
Using Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis and Media Discourse (Fairclough, 2010; 
Fairclough, 1995), the headlines on the accounting results are considered.  Analytically, 
there are two levels of investigation made.  The first is the ‘Order of Discourse’.  The 
process of reporting on the accounting results by the banks is considered.  In addition, the 
aggregate headlines generated by the accounting results are analysed. The second level of 
investigation is the ‘Communicative Event’.  The communicative events in this case are the 
headlines and leaders.   Headlines are analysed with regard to theme of discussion and their 
linguistic construction. Leaders assist in providing context for the headlines.  
The investigation confirms that the accounting results make headlines, often via the use of 
the profits of the banks or remuneration disclosures.  The results are used in many 
imaginative ways to draw the readers into the article.  The results are used to comment on 
other bank issues.  Accounting is seen as a neutral phenomenon, which can challenge the 
banks’ strategic discussions.  Bonuses dominate the headlines during the research period. 
However, bonus discussion is an important part of the Press’ role in corporate governance 
(Jansson, 2013).  Moreover, the discourse does change as the banks look to reprivatisation in 
later years.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows.  Section 10.1 discusses the order of discourse 
surrounding the results announcements.  Section 10.2 considers the industry’s interest in the 
RBS and LBG annual financial performance.  Sections 10.3 – 10.7 look at the yearly 
headlines generated after results are made, and consider these in the context of the banks 
themselves and news of the day.   
10.1 The order of Discourse: the Results Announcements. 
This section considers the means by which accounting results are delivered to the 
newspapers each year.  Announcements are part of the most newsworthy stories, especially 
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when they come pre-packaged for onward communication through journalists (Fairclough, 
1995; Gans, 1980).  Publication of the results and the associated press release occurs at 7am 
in the morning, with the management webcast at 9am (RBS) /930am (Lloyds Banking 
Group, 2013a).   The CEOS and Chairman will usually then perform interviews with the 
media.  Stephen Hester, the CEO of RBS has usually been in the media prior to the analyst 
meeting, often 8am on the Today programme. For some time after the analyst meetings, 
there will be discussions again with the media (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2013a) 
There are multiple genres within the announcements.  There is the genre of the earnings 
announcement itself, and a different, more colloquial genre with the media and analyst 
meetings.  Within the realm of the newspapers, there is the genre of hard news and of the 
particular language construction of business news (Koller, 2004; Jucker, 1992).  The tabloids 
have their own particular genre, being more colloquial and playing on polyphony and cliché 
to entertain and grab the attention of readers (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013; Chovanec, 2005; 
Schaffer, 1995).  The broadsheets have a more formal genre (Fairclough, 1995).  In previous 
studies, the genres are intertwined in a complex manner throughout the articles (Fairclough, 
1995).  Translations of the official discourses helps to legitimize these sources to the 
audience (ibid, p71).   Numbers are also favoured by journalists as they lend an air of 
authenticity to the article (Bell, 1991).  Nonetheless, these orders of discourse have become 
conventionalized (Fairclough, 1995).  However, RBS and LBG have faced considerable 
challenges since the crisis.  The banks’ results then do not only provide information on their 
own business; they also provide an indirect means of commenting on the decisions of 
Government.   Viewed in this light, the banks’ results can be seen as a political commentary 
(ibid, p71).   
The following section discusses the newspaper headlines in detail for LBG and RBS.  The 
first section and Table 10.1 discusses the overall headlines by year, newspaper type and 
organisation to present an overview of the data being worked with.  This shows that 
coverage remains high as public investment in the banks continues.  In addition, it shows 
engagement across all market segments of newspapers, indicating the high public interest in 
the earnings results.  Finally, it demonstrates that LBG has been subject to less press scrutiny 
than RBS. 
The second section of the analysis looks in detail at the headlines for both organisations by 
year.  Here, the overarching impact of accounting on the headline is identified before 
discussing aspects of the linguistic construction in detail.  Features of linguistics which serve 
to penetrate the headlines further are discussed in the narrative which follows. 
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Ultimately, what the headlines demonstrate is both the high degree of public scrutiny across 
all market sectors of the banks’ results.  In addition, accounting is being utilised to help 
inform the public of their investment in the banks.   
10.2 The Newspaper Industry’s Taste for Earnings Stories 
Table 10.1 below shows the overall number of headlines dedicated to LBG and RBS’ 
earnings the day after the year end announcements.  The headlines were downloaded from 
Factiva.com (Factiva, 2013).   
Table 10.1 Headline: Analysis by Number and Newspaper Type 
Year Newspaper Type RBS LBG Total Articles: 




 77 30 
Mid Market 
2
 11 5  
Tabloid 
3
 5 1 





 37 16  
Mid Market 
2
 7 3 
Tabloid 
3
 8 2 





 21 51  
Mid Market 
2
 4 4 
Tabloid 
3
 5 3 





 41 14  
Mid Market 
2
 8 5 
Tabloid 
3
 9 3 





 26 19  
Mid Market 
2
 8 1 
Tabloid 
3
 7 7 




The above table indicates that there is extensive media coverage of the annual accounts in 
both RBS and LBG the following day.  There are multiple articles in selected titles, with 
commentary and analysis from a range of authors.  The public interest in the banks’ 
performances means that there are headlines devoted to accounting results in the tabloid 
papers.  This is particularly true for RBS. 
Comparing the two banks’ coverage, RBS receives the most coverage, with double the 
amount of headlines.  This may be due to the fact that the taxpayer has a larger overall 
investment in the bank than in Lloyds Banking Group.  As a result of this large investment, 
there has been a sharp contraction in the size of RBS’ Balance Sheet.  In contrast, LBG has 
less press coverage as it took over the failed HBOS and has needed only half of the 
Government equity investment of RBS.  It also maintained the CEO and Chairman prior to 
the crisis for the first two reporting years afterwards. 
The size of RBS’ losses in its 2008 results, and the relatively fresh approach from the 
Government to support the banks with the equity injection in October are reasons for the 
large number of headlines.  The poor results of 2009 are reflected in the headlines of 2010, 
with the bonuses of the executive staff dominating.   
By 2011, the overall number of headlines has risen sharply.  This represents a decline in 
headlines for RBS, whose strategy has been implemented and is generally successful in 
selling off its risky assets and streamlining its business.  On the other hand, LBG’s coverage 
has increased.  There are two reasons for the increase.  Firstly, Lloyds announced a provision 
to cover the PPI mis-selling scandal.  This generated a lot of headlines, including a number 
on the personal banking front about how to claim.  In addition, there was a new CEO in 
place from March 2011, who was anticipated to make changes to the overall strategy of the 
bank.  The bank had been required to make a number of disposals for State Aid 
commitments as required by the EU (European Commission, 2009).   
Newspaper headlines increase in 2012.  For RBS, these increases are attributable to the 
Direct Line IPO and the possibility of privatisation in the near future.  LBG also has 
privatisation as its agenda.  Nonetheless, bankers’ pay continues to provide headline news.   
In 2013, there is an overall decline in newspaper reporting.  RBS has fewer headlines as 
there are no major corporate transactions announced.  LBG headlines increase modestly due 
to the increasing prospects for privatisation.   
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The rest of the chapter now looks at the individual years of reporting for the banks to 
demonstrate the means by which accounting is invoked in headlines of the press.  The nature 
of headlines is important for the accounting results: 
“Journalists don’t only recount events, they also interpret and explain them, try to get 
people to see things and to act in certain ways, and aim to entertain.” (Fairclough, 
1995, p91) 
The journalistic understanding of the accounting results is thus very important in considering 
the public accountability of the banks. 
10.3 2009 Headlines: 2008 Results: Accounting for 
Nationalisation, ‘Fred the Shred’ and Bonuses 
2008 was an extremely disappointing year for both LBG and RBS.  Both had received 
extensive Government investment in order to continue trading. The year end results were 
widely anticipated to present huge losses and depress the share price of the banks, which 
were already sitting well below the strike price of the Government bailout.  As a result, there 
was great interest in the financial results of the banks.   The Press can shape public debate: 
“Reports are rarely even-handed with all the various voices represented.  Some are 
given prominence, and some marginalized.  Some are used to frame others.  Some 
are legitimized by being taken up in the newsreader’s or reporter’s voice, others are 
not.  Equity and balance cannot be assessed by merely noting which voices are 
represented, and for instance, how much space is given to each; the web of voices 
is an often subtle ordering and hierarchization of voices.” (Fairclough, 1995, p81) 
The following analysis looks at the role of accounting, whether direct or indirect, as 
contributing to the construction of the headlines.  This reveals a multitude of roles.  At one 
end, accounting acts as the informant, bringing the results to the public and allowing the 
newspaper to report the finances.  It is not just the bottom line which is reported but the 
extent of losses which make the headlines.  At the other end, some headlines focus on the 
individuals rather than on the corporations that they head. These two aspects to the headlines 
of 2008 – that of the corporation and its status, and that of the individuals who headed them 
up- are considered 
At points, the accounting and financial information is hidden from the headline entirely.  
However, these headlines are all products of a financial reporting process – the release of 
results and the subsequent media discussions between organisation and journalists.  Thus, 
accounting is in all headlines, an input. 
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10.3.1 Factual Headlines: Accounting as a Serious Informant 
Accounts contribute to the traditional construction of a newspaper headline which 
summarises the facts of a story (Dor, 2003).  Focus is given to the bottom line – losses 
sustained in the banks during the crisis are reported.  However, these losses are reported in a 
number of ways.  The loss is quantified in some headlines.  Others, in contrast, focus on the 
loss itself. Some of these headlines also carry an additional piece of information to help 
orient the story in the context of the crisis: 
Lloyds Banking Group slumps to GBP10.1bn loss Specialist team to run HBOS loan 
book (The Herald) 
ROYAL BANKRUPT OF SCOTLAND; Boss loses £24billion...but keeps pension of 
690K-yr (The Sun) 
Thus accounting becomes the dominant focus of the headline as well as its stimulus for the 
stories in the first place.  Yet diversity exists in the bottom line which is reported as headline 
figures.  For LBG, the pro forma loss of £10.1bn which excludes the HBOS gain in the 
accounts is provided by the Herald (Lloyds Banking Group, 2008).  The Sun probes 
somewhat deeper into the accounts of RBS and reports on the statutory loss rather than the 
pro forma accounting which the press release and annual report highlight (Royal Bank of 
Scotland, 2008b). 
For other papers, it is not the extent of losses that make headline news, but the implications 
of the loss on the future of the bank.  The following 3 headlines consider the results of RBS: 
RBS seeks extra £25bn as it posts record loss (The Times) 
RBS investment banking arm makes GBP 11bn loss - but bosses still defend it (The 
Scotsman) 
Bank plans to self-help after 'unambiguously bad' results (Financial Times) 
Lexically, the 3 headlines above imply varying characteristics of RBS.  The first headline, in 
the Times, suggests that by ‘seeking’ the extra £25bn, the bank has lost direction and 
momentum.  It omits to state that the further £25bn will be State backed.  In the Scotsman’s 
headline, the bank is active in a more negative sense, in that is ‘makes’ a loss as actively as 
one can ‘make’ money.  Yet the hyphenated phrase afterwards implies an air of naïve 
confidence in investment banking, which could be considered out of touch with reality.  The 
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FT, on the other hand, emphasises that the bank is actively trying to regain independence and 
will look to trade its way out of trouble.   
The accounting results set a tone for the pieces, implying that the annual results are a serious 
business, and not to be sensationalised or ridiculed.   This resonates with the characteristics 
of the accounting professional (Carnegie and Napier, 2010).  Nonetheless, implicit values 
still run through the construction of the headlines in the papers.   
All of the headlines above could be seen as a response to the phenomenon of 24 hour news 
availability through the TV and internet (Fairclough, 2010).  The earnings results of the big 
banks are already public knowledge as the readers are expected to have learned of the losses 
through other forms of media.  Instead the news focuses on a variety of angles for the losses.   
Accounting therefore contributes to the financial accountability of the banks as results are 
reported upon in the papers.  Not only does the press provide the information as messenger 
for a mass audience but it helps in the interpretation and implications of the results.  In this 
way, the public accountability of the companies is facilitated as the results stimulate further 
consideration of the overall business strategy of the banks. 
10.3.2 Nationalised Entities: Accounting as Decree 
The particular circumstances of the banks in February 2009, shortly after the second 
intervention with the Government Asset Protection Scheme, means the accounting results act 
as a window on to the status of the banks.   
'RBS and Lloyds nationalised in all but name' -Bank Governor tells MPs  Daily 
Telegraph 
Saving HM Royal Bank of Scotland; RBS insurance scheme is muddled - but might still 
work (Financial Times) 
Here, the ‘HM’ is akin to Her Majesty’s, the official department or office of the crown.  This 
is commonly used for Government departments and vessels in operation for protection of the 
realm.  In the Times’ headline shown below, the headline is spun around a version of 
National Westminster Bank, a large and important subsidiary of RBS: 
Nationalised Westminster Bank; Public anger at bankers' rewards is justified, but 
agreements made in the full knowledge of government must not be jettisoned out of 
expediency (The Times) 
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National: Banking Crisis: Expert view RBS is bust, and we have nationalised it but 
don't want to admit it (The Guardian) 
The first sentence of the Guardian’s article shows how the accounts act to provide clarity for 
the public: 
“The death throes of British finance have been slow and painful to watch, but 
yesterday [results announcement] was the day the penny finally dropped: our banks 
are bust.” The Guardian, 27 Feb 2009 
Accounting thus acts as a decree of status on the banks – one whose significant public 
ownership may be classified as outright nationalisation.  Yet, the earnings announcements 
make no such determination.  Instead, accounting here is a front for this decree which 
originates not from accounting rules and regulations but rather from a journalistic viewpoint.  
Accounting is used as a legitimate point of entry to reignite this talk of public ownership and 
nationalisation.  This has implications for accounting and how it is communicated to a mass 
audience.  Accounting is not just a vehicle for the earnings discussions and how these then 
generate further discussion.  It can also be used as stimulus to further public debate. 
The accounts may also have direct effects on individuals.  One of the aspects of the 
newspaper discourse during the crisis was that of bankers’ pay.  The accounting results 
reveal the details of pay for executive staff.   
10.3.3 Sir Fred Goodwin’s Pension: Accounting as Moniker 
Fred Goodwin was a prominent individual in the 2008 result headlines even though he had 
stepped down as Chief Executive of RBS in October 2008.    The accounts confirmed the 
pay he received post resignation via the directors’ remuneration report in the annual 
accounts.  Popularly known as ‘Fred the Shred’, Sir Fred had been well known for cost 
cutting exercises which kept RBS very efficient.  RBS managed to retain a cost: income 
ratio
34
 at around 41%, the lowest in the industry.  Fred the Shred was a name derived from a 
business approach exemplified by cost cutting in his previous institution of Clydesdale 
Bank.. 
After his resignation, ‘Fred the Shred’ moved from being an admiring, although forceful, 
nickname to one of disdain.  The Chief Executive had retained contractual rights on pension 
payments despite popular pressure to relinquish them.  Fred the Shred had previously been a 
                                                     
34
 Cost: Income is a key ratio measuring efficiency in the banking industry 
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person of admiration, particularly in the Scottish Press where RBS was a huge employer and 
source of pride for the nation, to one of widespread disgust.  His unapologetic retention of 
the right to the pension was reported on quite negatively.  Although it appealed to the tabloid 
end of the market, the name was one originating in the London financial market place.  As a 
result, it was referred to widely in the broadsheet newspapers as well: 
Fred the Shred's GBP16m pushes ministers and RBS into a corner Government and 
former bank bosses drawn into row over pension details THE LEAK (The Herald) 
The Herald uses the nickname as an informal and thus derisory comment.  Here, Fred the 
Shred is contributing yet more to the banking crisis but his obstinate refusal to decrease his 
pension helps set the tone of the piece.  Unusually, here the power is attributed to the 
downfallen character’s pension and it is the Government and the bank which occupy the 
position of subordinate objects.  This emphasizes the domineering character of the bank but 
also suggests Government incompetence, which had allowed such riches to be retained post 
failure. 
Further newspaper headlines made reference to this nickname by mentioning shredding in 
their titles as an intertextual reference of this character.  The tabloid papers use the nickname 
to call for further accountability for Sir Fred: 
Shred Fred; THE SCOTTISH Sun SAYS (The Sun) 
VOICE OF THE DAILY Mirror: Shred his pension (The Mirror) 
The Times, on the other hand, removes explicit reference to Sir Fred from its headline, 
instead concentrating on the political ramifications of the pension package agreement: 
Darling survives a toxic shredding - for now (The Times)  
‘Darling’ refers to the Chancellor of Exchequer, Alistair Darling.  By using ‘shredding’ in 
the headline, the reader is told that the piece refers to his relationship with Sir Fred Goodwin.  
As an unmentioned agent in the piece, Sir Fred retains power over the Government’s 
involvement in RBS.  Yet, isolated from its original phrase nickname, shredding one again 
takes on a sinister air.  Sir Fred’s greed is the emphasis in this tabloid headline: 
FRED THE SHRED :<$><$> I'LL KEEP THE LOT (Daily Star) 
This is one of the few examples which involves the Tabloid Newspaper the Daily Star.  It is 
unusual to see ‘smileys’, usually associated with instant messenger programmes and 
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electronic communication, be used in conventional printed press reports, whose vernacular is 
part of the brand of newspaper.  However, this one adds to the headline in a move beyond 
grammatical or lexical structure.  The symbols produce a pair of eyes where money ($) are 
being the sole focus of the individual concerned.  Symbols of money and inevitably, 
accounting, help emphasize the greediness of this tarnished banker.  
10.3.4 Headlines on HBOS: Accounting as Privileged Exposé  
In light of the criticism over pay with Fred Goodwin, HBOS also faced questions over 
executive pay.  In particular, Peter Cummings, former HBOS senior executive, was given a 
large financial pay out despite the fact that HBOS had collapsed prior to the Lloyds rescue.  
This had been a large sum of money at the time when the bank had received a great deal of 
Government investment.  
The tabloid end of the market was the most critical of the pension pay-outs, personalising the 
story to the beneficiary, Pete Cummings.  This acted to demonise the individual.  The phrase 
‘fat cat’ was used frequently, used to suggest a wealthy person who had received excessive 
remuneration.   
PETE THE POCKET; Shamed HBOS fatcat nets £344k pension First there was Fred 
the Shred...now meet (The Sun) 
THE NEW £10M BANK FAT CAT  (Daily Mail) 
NEWBANK FAT CAT'S £10M PENSION POT; DAILY MAIL REPORTER (Daily 
Mail) 
In contrast, the quality end of the market focused on the inquiry as the main object of the 
headline rather than the persons being investigated.  This could be due to the fact that Pete 
Cummings was not previously a high profile individual in the media.  Alternatively, the 
semantic structure of the headline could suggest a shift in relative power of the senior staff at 
the banks.  It has been noted previously that powerful persons or institutions are often the 
active agent in a newspaper headline and the less powerful person or institution is the object 
(Fowler, p96).  The senior staff members become the object and in so doing, become 
represented in a less flattering light (Fairclough, 1995): 
Lawyers examine payoff of banker blamed for losing billions at HBOS (The Times) 
Government inquiry into HBOS payoffs  (The Independent) 
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The headlines thus cue a shift in relative power in the staff members of the former HBOS 
bank and the newly combined LBG.  Where once the prestige and privilege of the bankers 
was extremely high, the Government ownership of the bank has humbled them.  This is 
reflected in the semantic structure of the headlines, where the once powerful institution and 
its management become less influential by shifting from being active agents in the headlines 
to being passive agents or demoted to objects under the scrutiny of their Government 
rescuers. 
Accounting retains a central role in this shift in headline construction.  It is only by the 
release of the annual reports and accounts, and in particular the directors’ remuneration 
report, that the senior staff can be held to account.   
Finally, we see nominalization occurring as a noun is used in place of a verb: in this case, the 
use of ‘inquiry’.   
HBOS payoff inquiry; IN THE NEWS (The Times) 
Nominalization is arguably an extremely effective shortening device.  It helps keep 
newspaper headlines succinct, but can also result in ambiguity.  A large amount of 
information is omitted when nominalization occurs (Fairclough, 1995; Fowler, 1991).  In the 
particular example above from the Times, the inquiry makes up the headline but it does not 
specify who is making the inquiry.  Readers are only alerted to the fact that HBOS is the 
subject of the inquiry.   
In summary, accounting is used in conventional and imaginative ways in 2008.  It can be 
characterised as a sensemaking process.  It was the beginning of a discourse surrounding the 
banks and their political nature.  This was exemplified by the discussion on accounting and 
the status of the banks as nationalised entities.  Failure was personified in the large payments 
made to the executive staff who were sacked after leading the banks into failure. 
10.4 2010 Headlines: 2009 Results: Acrobatics, Acquisitions 
and Bonuses 
The headlines generated from the 2009 year end results for RBS and LBG present 
accounting in a different light.  Whereas there was the use of the accounts as a decree and a 
moniker, the 2009 results features less sensationalist analysis of the banking figures.  
Nonetheless, there remains considerable imagination in the way that accounting is used to 
draw the readership’s attention.  Here, it is lexical devices, including vocabulary and literary 
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techniques, such as metaphor, which help develop an image of the bank through the use of 
accounting information. 
There is a contrast between the approaches given for RBS and LBG in the 2010 headlines 
discussing the 2009 year end results.  LBG is portrayed, both lexically and transitively as a 
bank continuing to fail.  RBS, on the other hand, receives more positive reporting. 
10.4.1 Accounting in Hindsight: The HBOS Acquisition 
The difficulties in LBG are headlined in a number of ways.  Metaphorically, the debts of 
HBOS are portrayed as heavy or a great weight.  Grammatically, the use of Lloyds as an 
object, vulnerable to the vagaries of the HBOS bad debts also emphasizes the challenges 
lying ahead.  But it is the accounting numbers that are quoted which are most diverse. 
£58BN TOXIC SHADOW OVER LLOYDS; DAILY MAIL REPORTER 
Mountain of bad debt leaves Lloyds £6.3bn in red again (The Independent) 
HBOS legacy hurts as bad debts at Lloyds hit GBP 24bn (The Scotsman) 
Lloyds faces struggle to impress (Financial Times) 
£42bn bill for Lloyds from toxic HBOS (Financial Times) 
It would be expected that the £42bn, £58bn and £24bn numbers quoted against the expected 
losses of HBOS would all be a consistent number.  Instead, the accounts are used in different 
ways to arrive at the debt burden of HBOS.  Probing further into the FT.com article shows 
that this £42bn loss is a cumulative figure, combining losses of £30bn from the HBOS bank 
in the last two years, along with the signalled £12bn anticipated loss in the coming year.  For 
the Scotsman, the £24bn quoted is the total amount of impairments reported in loans for the 
year of 2009, a more direct extract from the annual report, most of which relates to HBOS 
bad debt legacies.  The largest number, quoted by the Daily Mail, is the total (gross) amount 
of impaired loans, rather than the impairment being written off. 
As a result, the headlines on the same story present a markedly different picture of the crisis 
facing LBG over the HBOS acquisition.  It is questionable whether accounting information 
thus becomes a credible accessory to the headline, rather than generating the news itself.  It 
is argued here that the size of the numbers is an effective device in attracting readers to the 
article (Chovanec, 2005; Bell, 1991). 
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10.4.2 Financial Reporting Quality  
The nature or process of accounting was not a prominent feature for the financial reports.  
Likewise, the newspapers do not discuss in details the vagaries of the accounting process.  
However, there is an exception in the Financial Times. 
Story of contrast over disclosure and transparency (Financial Times) 
This story is one comparing the relatively good disclosure given by RBS with the rather less 
transparent results given by LBG.  The analysts and investors were questioning it, 
particularly with regards to segmental analysis.  Significantly, this is perhaps the only article 
to provide commentary on the quality of the accounting provided by the annual results, 
rather than on the reported numbers.  Another important qualitative factor is the direct 
comparison of the two banks.  This is quite rare.  It may reflect the better resources and 
knowledge of the business press journalists who can assess the quality of the reporting and 
potentially uncover fraud or poor practice (Miller, 2006). 
10.4.3 Metaphor: Accounting as acrobatics 
In reporting the 2009 results, the Chief Executive of RBS cultivated a neutral metaphor 
which was then used to generate accounting headlines.  The tightrope was referred to 3 times 
by Stephen Hester in the newswires conference.  He highlighted the difficulties of restraint 
on pay with ability to recruit talented staff; and remaining a commercial business whilst 
paying due respect to the public nature of ownership: 
“Whatever my personal, political and philosophical views, my job is to lead RBS to a 
successful commercial turnaround; and so I have to accept with and deal with the 
commercial realities of the market place. We’re trying to do that in a responsible 
way, in a restrained way; we’re trying to be leaders in reform, but we nonetheless 
are bounded by the business realities that we face and within which we have to get 
back taxpayers their money. So, in that sense, I believe that we have walked the 
tightrope appropriately.” (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2010b) 
This idea of tightrope was then referred to in the Press: 
Hester's long tightrope walk to freedom will continue (Financial Times) 
Royal chief juggles and treads state tightrope to City delight (The Herald) 
RBS jumps (Daily Mail) 
The freshness of the acrobatic metaphor may draw readers to the article (Koller, 2004).  In 
addition, the headlines are more positive for the bank.  They place the CEO firmly in control 
of a journeying bank.  Where Fred Goodwin was responsible for the failure of RBS in the 
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previous year, Stephen Hester is attributed responsibility for the more upbeat results 
(Hayward et al., 2004).   
Accounting thus becomes an opportunity to update the discourse on the banks.  The 
discourse of the newspapers may be inherently conservative to satisfy readership 
(Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005), but the banks are also able to update the press on their 
progress.  Over time, this can help change the discourse related to the banks.  In some cases, 
the banks are also able to successfully cultivate headlines.  There may not be verbatim 
reporting of the news releases (Sissons, 2012) and they may be critically assessed by 
journalists (Maat, 2007) but some upbeat messages can still filter through.   
 The accounts thus act as an opportunity to update the press on the achievements of the 
company.  The spoken word for the press calls may be as important as the press release on 
which the information is based or the analyst meetings (Westphal and Graebner, 2010; Bell, 
1991). 
10.4.4 Bonuses 
As in 2008, bonuses remain a sensitive topic for the banks as results are posted.   In the 
current year, it is aggregate payouts rather than individual circumstances that are criticised. 
For RBS, there is a useful contrast between the losses of the bank and the total in bonuses 
paid out.  This is designed to showcase excessive pay rewards: 
Bank loses £3.6bn - but still finds £1.3bn to pay its staff bonuses (The Times) 
RBS staff collect £1m in bonuses as bank reports £3.6bn net loss (Financial Times) 
Here, the nature of the Financial Times’ headline is less critical than the Times by being 
more matter of fact in its reporting.   This may be a response to the type of readership in each 
of these papers, with more highly paid business people making up a greater majority of the 
readership for the Financial Times.  Newspapers respond to the prejudices of their readership 
in a competitive environment (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). 
A more popular way of reporting the bonuses was reporting on the numbers receiving very 
large bonuses: 
RBS under fire again as 100 bankers each get £1m bonus (The Herald) 
100 BANKERS GET £1M (The Sun) 
Bankers pocket £1m; IN THE NEWS (The Times) 
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100 RBS BANKERS GET BONUS OF AT LEAST £1M (Daily Mail) 
Now RBS creates 100 millionaires (and you're paying for it) (The Independent) 
Pay row: RBS admits 100 bankers got bonuses of more than pounds 1m (The 
Guardian) 
RBS to award 100 bankers £1m bonuses despite losses (The Herald) 
Bonuses are a natural headline for the papers.  It is interesting to the reader as the amounts 
can be related to the individual personal experience.  The individual is grabbed by the 
immediate relevance on an individual, rather than aggregate pay packet. On the other hand, 
such a huge amount, like the £3.6bn loss reported in the Financial Times and the Times does 
not have immediate relevance at the individual level.   
This information provided by the accounts is that the average bonus pot for the GBM 
divisional staff.   The actual relationship between the £1m bonus and the staff numbers is 
probed further by the journalists through the press conference with RBS.  The rationale 
behind the Press interest is also stated.  The relevant extract of the wires conference is given 
below: 
“Becky Barrow – The Daily Mail  
I am sorry to go back to the issue of bonuses but just to be clear you have got 
16,800 bankers in GBM and they share a bonus pool of £1.3billion.  Can you guide 
us as to how many of those bankers receive a bonus of more than £1 million? 
Stephen Hester/Phillip Hampton – Royal Bank of Scotland 
No. 
Becky Barrow Because you don’t know, or because none of them received a bonus 
of more than £1 million?  
Philip Hampton  Why do you want to know?  
Becky Barrow It is always interesting. You know, it must exasperate you our 
obsession with bonuses but I would say that a lot of people who own this bank i.e. 
office tax payers, receive a basic salary of £25 000 per year and don’t get a bonus. 
So, I think it is a legitimate question and it would be very interesting to know the 
answer.  
Philip Hampton I am not sure it is an important business question but it may be a 
matter of public interest, in fact I am sure it is. It would certainly be a good number of 
people, but I would much rather not put a specific number on it. We are certainly into 
more than 100.” (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2010b) 
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Thus the annual results are not just about the information reported therein.  Accounting 
becomes an instrument for dialogue between the Press and the bankers.  In so doing, what is 
being reported on is not so much the performance per se; but the story/angle which is the 
preference of the journalistic community even before the press conference.  Here, the 
relevance is made back to the taxpayer owners of the bank and their own earnings capacity.  
As with the acrobatic metaphor, the importance of the media dialogue becomes apparent.   
This particular relationship is reported on across the range of newspapers, including the 
tabloids whose own particular linguistic structure resembles those of the quality end of the 
market.    Nonetheless, there remain a number of uniquely tabloid style headlines generated 
from the bonus story in the Sun: 
PROFIT & LOTS; SLUMP? IT'S ALL RIGHT FOR SOME (The Sun) 
WHEN THE GOING GETS TROUGH... (The Sun) 
The form refers directly to the traditional accounting statement, although here it is given a 
twist to suggest the excesses of pay.   The implication is that it doesn’t matter what the 
accounting results are, there will be always excellent remuneration.  These are then linked to 
the poor general economic conditions.   ‘Slump?  It’s all right for some’ has the effect of 
separating both accounting and bankers from the general readership of The Sun, fostering a 
‘them and us’ culture.   The juxtaposition of all of these elements in the headlines entails 
great inferential leaps from the reader.   
 “The upshot of all this is that local coherence relations are very significant indeed in 
the ways in which text position people as subjects and cumulatively shape identifies 
and how texts work ideologically.”(Fairclough, 1995) 
Whilst the readership may be suffering from job losses and cutting public budgets, the 
bankers continue to thrive in the tough times.   
10.5 February 2011 Headlines: 2010 Results – Bonuses, tax and 
Executive Performance 
In 2011, the results of LBG and RBS were considerably better. Both had downsized their 
balance sheets and had returned to profit.  Nonetheless, the attitude was fairly neutral 
towards results.  This is in contrast to a press release which is generally more self-promoting 
(Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2012; Bowen et al., 2005; Bell, 1991).   
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The newspapers had a dip in reporting on 2011 announcements.  There is an opportunity to 
consider what else was going on in the news at the time of the announcements.  There were 
various items on the BBC and a move up to Salford and the pay of some of the stars of the 
BBC (for example, Andrew Marr: £600k/year). There was also a continuing story about the 
founder of WikiLeaks Julian LeSange and his extradition to Sweden on rape charges.  
Nonetheless, the main stories were RBS and LBG on the day (Factiva, 2013). 
Three themes are considered in reporting 2010 results.  The first continues the dominance of 
the bonuses reporting.  The second considers other societal responsibilities in the banks to 
pay tax.  Finally, the headlines reflect on the management performance of Eric Daniels, the 
LBG CEO who stepped down this year.  Accounting results provide information not only on 
results but on corporate governance generally for the banks.  The headlines generated for 
2010 allow the Press to fulfil their own role in corporate governance as an accountability 
mechanism (Jansson, 2013). 
10.5.1 Bonuses: A Stagnant Discourse 
As in prior years, the nature of executive pay remains a prominent feature of the news 
headlines.  In contrast to previous years, however, the dialogue between the banks and the 
media is muted.  These numbers are not openly discussed in the analyst presentation (Royal 
Bank of Scotland, 2011a).  The media discourse with the bank was as follows: 
“Our profits are down; therefore the bonus pool is down; and therefore the number of 
millionaires is also down. The only thing that’s gone up is the number of people that 
we’re paying a zero bonus to, which is not an inconsiderable number. It’s some tens 
of per cents who get precisely zero, because we don’t splash these all over the 
place, and we pay our top people very well, and if people are not performing they 
don’t get very much, and sometimes they don’t stay” (Royal Bank of Scotland, 
2011a). 
Apart from this there is no specific information in the annual report, remuneration, additional 
disclosure or the news announcement about the amount of staff receiving bonuses in excess 
of £1million (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2011b).  Thus, there must have been another source 
outside the official discourse which allowed the journalists to cite these figures  The  press 
may be making reference back to previous stories (Bell, 1991) and the wider discourse about 
bonuses generally.  The headlines bear a similarity to those in the previous year: 
100 RBS BANKERS' £1M EACH FOR LOSING £1BN (The Sun) 
£1.1bn What RBS lost in 2010 £1.1bn What it paid in bonuses (Scottish Daily Record) 
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LOSSES OF £1BN ...BUT BAILED -OUT RBS STILL PAYS 100 BANKERS £1M 
(Daily Mail) 
Winners and losers in the RBS bonus stakes as losses top £1bn (The Times) 
Thus, the discourse is influenced to a greater or lesser extent by discourses other than the 
current year’s accounting results.  Again conservatism of the press in confirming reader 
beliefs and larger discourses about bankers’ pay comes to the fore.    The bonuses contribute 
to the media panic about remuneration in the banking sector (Leach, 2006).  The fact that 
numbers of people received a smaller bonus did not make the headlines, with the exception 
of this one in the Mirror:  
 Pay may seem high, but the number of millionaires is down - RBS chairman Sir Philip 
Hampton as loss-making bank hands out bonuses (The Daily Mirror) 
Nonetheless, the critique on bonuses remains as the adjective describing RBS as ‘loss-
making’ is positioned to the ‘handing out’ of bonuses.   Word choices are significant in this 
respect (Fairclough, 1995).  The bank is portrayed as liberally distributing money it does not 
have to staff members.  An alternative perception on the bank would be that it was fulfilling 
its contractual obligations with employees.   
“There are always different ways of saying the same thing, and they are not random 
accidental alternatives” (Fowler, 1991, p4) 
The bonuses are portrayed in a negative light for the banks.  Responsibility is attributed to 
the top management of the banks.   The following headline, through verb choice and naming 
of the RBS Chief Executive, displays a similar tactic: 
Hester to take £2m bonus as total payouts rise by a third (The Independent) 
There is a personal element added to the bonuses in the current year.  ‘Take’ contains 
connotations of stealing rather than earning.  The bank performance is again turned into an 
individual’s story (Hayward et al., 2004).  The reference to previous media stories (Bell, 
1991; Gans, 1980) and the need to sustain media panics (Leach, 2006) for continuing 
newspaper sales reverberates with the repeated nature of the stories.   
The discourse is slow to change when society still criticizes the banks for their inappropriate 
handling of the economic crisis, and there may exist tensions between the organisational 
reality of the corporations and the Press portraiture of them (Kjaergaard et al., 2011). 
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10.5.2 Accounting for Social Responsibility: Tax Payments 
Unlike RBS, LBG made a profit in 2010.  However, even this good piece of news can be 
critiqued.  The profit is shown in a negative light in some headlines which suggests Lloyds is 
deflecting on societal responsibilities: 
LLOYDS MAKES £2.2BN PROFIT... GUESS HOW MUCH TAX IT'S GOING TO 
PAY? NOTHING (The Daily Mirror) 
LLOYDS BANK MAKE £2.2BN PROFITS... BUT PAY ZERO TAX (Scottish Daily 
Record) 
Two newspapers emphasise the £2.2bn profits highlighted in LBG’s press release.  It then 
uses ‘but’ as a contrasting coherence relation (Fairclough, 1995) to state that no tax is being 
paid.  Numbers add to the authentic feel of the headline (Bell, 1991). The responsibility for 
the banks to pay tax is linguistically constructed through the actor being the banks 
(Fairclough, 1995; Fowler, 1991).  From this, the interpretation of the writer is indicated, as 
they choose to interpret the profits in light of the actual tax payments to HM Treasury.  As 
Fairclough asserts:  
“When people represent in language events, actions, relationships and states, the 
people and objectives involved in them, the time and place and other circumstances 
of their occurrence, and so forth, there are always choices available…these choices 
are also partly a matter of grammar.  The grammar of language differentiates a small 
number of ‘process types’ and associate ‘participant types’.  It may seem at first 
glance that the difference between an action (with a causal actor) and an event 
(without a causal act) is a difference in reality, in the nature of things, but that is not 
so, at least in any simple sense.  When people represent in language something that 
happens, they have to choose whether to represent it an action or an event.” 
(Fairclough, 1995) 
The placement of Lloyds as the actor, and the profits as the object, has an important 
interpretation here.  The news becomes the annual results and it is foregrounded as the most 
important story (ibid, p97).  The results are the hard news (Bell, 1991), the event worthy of 
reporting.  But the profits by themselves are not.  This may be partly to do with the increase 
in 24 hour news reporting and the requirement to bring more analysis and a new angle to the 
announcement by the later printing of the papers (Coulmas, 1997). 
Contrast the Times headline below, which uses ostensibly the same facts but what with a 
different object and foregrounding: 
Lloyds won't pay tax until profits hit £15bn; Departing boss still weighing up whether 
to accept £1.45m bonus (The Daily Telegraph) 
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The foregrounding of the ‘won’t pay tax’ becomes the main focus of the story – and in so 
doing, it is more critical than the tabloid constructions. Surprisingly, it is also more 
sensationalist.  Sensationalism is traditionally more common in the tabloid end of the market 
(Chovanec, 2005).  The connotation of ‘won’t’ suggests a refusal to pay tax, rather than LBG 
being entitled to offset current profits against past losses for tax purposes.  It also 
incorporates the massive number of £15bn, which is not a result for the year but a future 
aggregate.  The wording of the headline implies that this would have to be £15bn a year, 
rather than on a cumulative basis.  Moreover, the next clause about LBG’s Chief Executive 
bonus refers to a different discourse but its juxtaposition with LBG’s tax policy implies his 
bonus decision is affected by taxation.  The informal tone adopted is surprising in a 
broadsheet business article.  It may point to the trend towards more colloquial vocabulary 
and the emphasis on the personal in news generally (McKay, 2006). 
Using an intertextual analysis (Fairclough, 1995) shows that the headlines are rather 
misleading.  The £2.2bn profit relates to the combined business basis (see (Lloyds Banking 
Group, 2011b).  The taxable profits are worked out separately from the accounting results 
themselves.  The accounting tax charge was positive (Lloyds Banking Group, 2011b).  
However, the bank had large deferred tax losses with which it could offset any current tax 
liability for the year. 
“…choices of vocabulary and sentence structure give particular shape to experience 
affecting how reality is depicted in deep and significant ways.  Basically reality is not 
‘out there’ easily available to be grasped in any straightforward and simple way; it is 
socially constructed with language playing a centrally important role, so that the 
patterning of vocabulary and sentence structure shows us reality in a particular light 
and guides our comprehension of it. “(Fairclough, 1995, p250) 
The taxation of the banks relates to a longer term discourse regarding wider societal 
responsibilities (Fairclough, 1995).  The banks had just released the Project Merlin statement 
in early February 2011, where those in the group had an “expectation to contribute a 
cumulative £8billion in total tax take” (Project Merlin, 2011).  The discussion on tax at the 
results announcement was actually very little.  However, the finance director did say: 
“In terms of paying corporation tax, I would love to be paying corporation tax. What 
that would be doing is having the wonderful situation of paying tax on profit and 
delivering value to all of our shareholders which obviously will include taxpayers 
through the shareholding held by UKFI. I look forward to getting there as soon as we 
possibly can. Obviously the larger the profits you make the nearer the effective tax 
rate would actually trend towards the statutory rate” (Lloyds Banking Group, 2011a) 
The accounts become a foil and a means of critiquing other parts of the banks.   For RBS, 
there was a similarity between the amount of losses and the bonuses paid out.  It would be 
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inconsistent to criticise LBG for paying bonuses when the bank had been profitable.  Tax, 
like bonuses, are part of an easy translation of the public official discourse into the private 
domain of the audience for whom the journalists write (Fairclough, 1995).  This is important 
as there is a greater need to take the official report genre and create the genre of the 
newspapers themselves (Dor, 2003).  This also helps to attract readers (Schaffer, 1995).   
10.5.3 Accounting for Executive Performance  
The need to translate the official discourse into one of individual stories also occurs in the 
assessment of management performance.  The accounting results provide an opportunity for 
the media to reflect on the outgoing Lloyds CEO, Eric Daniels.  This is important for 
corporate governance generally (Bednar, 2012), as the media may be influential when it 
comes to board appointments. 
UNREPENTANT DANIELS BEATS A LONELY RETREAT; COMMENT BY ALEX 
BRUMMER CITY EDITOR (Daily Mail) 
As Daniels sails off into sunset, he leaves new skipper a ship in fair shape; Comment 
(Daily Telegraph) 
MERGER STILL CASTS CLOUD OVER LLOYDS (Daily Mail) 
The shipping forecast means yet more trouble for banks; Wighton on Saturday (The 
Times) 
The legacy of the HBOS transaction is still a talking point for the banks. In this context, 
metaphors are used to describe the leaving of the CEO.  The news is personalised to the CEO 
and attributes success/failure to him.  There are two interpretations given to the success of 
Eric Daniels’ career at LBG.  The Daily Mail sees the merger as a disaster for LBG whilst 
the Daily Telegraph considers that the results are improving.  The use of metaphor is quite 
common in the business press and is particularly apposite here as the banks have all been on 
a journey (Koller, 2004). 
Thus, accounting results in the headlines does not always focus on the bottom line.  
Reflecting wider responsibilities about the acknowledged responsibility to pay tax and 
reflecting on the leaders of the organisation is part of the wider corporate governance of the 
banks.  The press fulfils its own role as a corporate governance mechanism holding 
corporations to account (Jansson, 2013).   
216 
 
10.6 February 2012 Headlines: 2011 Results on Ownership, 
Bonuses and Alice in Wonderland 
The 2011 results present some consistent themes in headlines to previous years.  There 
remains an interest in the ownership of the banks as well as in the nature of bankers’ 
remuneration.  There exists an unusual analogy drawn between the accounting produced, 
describing it as ‘Alice in Wonderland’.  From an accounting perspective, in 2011, both banks 
made large losses.  These arose due to exceptional items rather than underlying business 
results.  RBS took on an extra £1bn of losses due to a lower risk strategy, which resulted in 
the sale of European assets as the Euro Crisis deepened.  LBG created a new provision for 
payment protection insurance.   Yet it is the consistent themes of ownership, bonuses, losses 
and metaphor which continue to headline the 2011 results.   
The Financial Times took a political slant to the RBS results: 
How to free RBS from the shackles of state ownership (Financial Times) 
RBS chief warns of the risks from political interference (Financial Times) 
Here the nature of the story was not about the accounting news but is still relevant to the 
readers of the newspaper.  It grabs the attention of its audience who will respond to the most 
worrisome aspects of the news being presented (Leach, 2006) – in this case the political 
interference for the shareholders.  The analyst’s meeting began with a discussion regarding 
the nature of ownership and UKFI, trying to reassure those present that all shareholders have 
been considered.  The first headline portrays the bank as a prisoner of the State, 
sensationalising the item (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013).  However, the second headline is less 
dramatic.  This perhaps demonstrates the impact that editors and subeditors, who generate 
headlines from the article provided,  have regarding what is presented in the foreground 
(Bell, 1991).  Yet there is consistency in the approach given by the newspaper to its story.  
Newspapers are ruled by commercial interests and aim to make a profit.  To do so, the paper 
needs to attract readers and for this cohort focused on markets, there may be a natural 
scepticism of public ownership (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005).   
Whilst FT steers clear of the issue, other publications continue with the bonuses debate.  






Bonuses remain a prominent issue in the discussion of the banks’ results. However, the 
accusatory nature of the bonus payments softens in the broadsheets.  Instead, the discourse 
moves to political aspects of the remuneration debate: 
Public and political pressure forces RBS to slash bonus pool (The Times) 
RBS in new bonus storm as it prepares to give staff payouts worth £785m (i) 
The midmarket and tabloids papers focus on the payouts, rather than the implication of 
political pressure.  The bonuses relate both to the amounts paid out to the investment bankers 
only of £400m and the £795m is to all staff: 
A £2bn LOSS, yet the state-owned RBS is paying £800m bonuses (Daily Express) 
Anger as RBS 'cuts' bonuses... to £400m (Daily Express) 
RBS TRADERS TO GET £390m BONUS; But pay is frozen for High Street staff (Daily 
Mail) 
These headlines move away from the individual pay packets headlined in the prior year back 
to aggregate sizes.  Nonetheless, the linguistic style of headlines may foster a distinction 
between the readership of the tabloid/ mid-market end of the newspaper and the wealthy 
bankers.  It is resonant of the need to reinforce cultural stereotypes (Fowler, 1991) or societal 
values (Fairclough, 2010).   Here, the papers with the less wealthy readership, attracted by 
tabloid titles, are generally of a lower social class than those of the broadsheets (Seale et al., 
2007).  These stories encourage dissatisfaction at the extremely high wages being earned in a 
bank which is receiving taxpayer support.  RBS is attributed the blame as headlines make 
RBS the actor/agent (Fowler, 1991).    
This has important implications for the discourse over the banks: 
“…we may say that there are always alternative ways of wording any [aspect of a] 
social practice, that alternative wording may correspond to different categorizations, 
and that such alternative wording and categorizations often realize different 
discourses” (Fairclough, 1995, p114). 
The media does fulfil a duty of accountability with regard to remuneration of executives but 
this is influenced by nature of the publication being. 
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10.6.2 Lloyds Losses 
The loss at Lloyds was also reported by the Press.  The reasons for the loss were outlined in 
the headlines: 
DEBT SENTENCE (Daily Mirror) 
Lloyds at a loss over mis-selling scandal (Daily Express) 
Bad loans lead to £3.5bn Lloyds loss (The Herald) 
LLOYDS IS £3.5BN IN RED AFTER PPI SCANDAL (Daily Mail) 
Annual loss at Lloyds rises to £3.5bn after PPI scandal (The Independent) 
Lloyds losses top GBP3.5bn - and bank warns of more to come (The Scotsman) 
In line with noted tendencies, the word play in the headlines is concentrated in the mid-
market/tabloid end of the papers (Chovanec, 2005; Schaffer, 1995).  Two causes are 
attributed to the losses in the papers.  These are the PPI provision and the bad debts written 
off.  In the Herald and the Independent, the loss and loans are made the actor and Lloyds is 
the object.  Representation as objects rather than agents can help to dampen the power of the 
entity discussed.  In contrast, the Daily Mail headline confer full responsibility on Lloyds 
itself by making the bank the actor of the clause (Fairclough, 1995). 
Interestingly, the Scotsman and the Independent in the final headlines have accounting 
results as the actor.   Accounting results here are imbued with responsibilities.  
10.6.3 Metaphor in Headlines: Alice in Wonderland 
Unusual analogies continue to make up headlines to capture readers’ attention (Chovanec, 
2005; Dor, 2003; Schaffer, 1995).   
RBS's 'Alice in Wonderland' accounting; Eurozone turmoil 'spooked' bailed–out bank 
so much it took an extra £1bn of losses for 2011, admits... (Daily Telegraph) 
 Hester's £700bn 'Wonderland' balance sheet starts to shrink; RBS results reveal 'Alice 
through the looking glass' world of accounting where... (Daily Telegraph) 
Accounting in these headlines is significant, even if critically dressed.  The ’Wonderland’ 
accounting relates to a more risk adverse approach to banking assets in Euro markets.  When 
prospects for the Euro markets were looking bad, the bank took the decision to crystallise 
losses of £1bn rather continue to hold the risk.  The implication of the wonderland 
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accounting is that there are weaknesses in the business still – and this is exemplified through 
loss making  approaches.   Yet this isn’t really about accounting but a strategic decision 
made by the bank itself to fully realise these losses in the current year, rather than wait until 
the planned time of sale. 
For Lloyds, the corporate logo is drawn upon to sum up the performance for the year: 
BLACK HORSE STILL LOOKS LAME; COMMENT (Daily Mail) 
Despite a good underlying business performance, the exceptional items, such as provisions 
for PPI, are perhaps causing undue pessimism on the banks.  This would be consistent with 
the societal attitudes towards the two banks, which have been strongly criticised for needing 
public support.  The dissonance between the organisational reality and the media portrayal of 
the organisations can cause tension for members of the organisation (Kjaergaard et al., 
2011).  Yet there is also evidence of critical reading of press releases, where the less 
attractive numbers provide the drama for the headline (Maat, 2007). 
10.7 February 2013 Headlines: 2012 Results: Spring Cleaning, 
the Bottom Line and Privatisation Prospects 
RBS had complex accounting in 2012.  The underlying profit hit targets but the bank 
reported a loss based on a large charge against the fair value of its own debt.  This is  
counterintuitive (Gaynor et al., 2011).  The major news items were the potential 
privatisations in the future of both RBS and Lloyds.  Bonuses headlined at the tabloid end 
and in relation to Mr Horta-Osorio.  Profits were discussed alongside the bonuses.  RBS’ 
IPO success with Direct Line also made headlines. Other divestments were headlined, 
including the announcement to sell Citizens, its US bank and the offer of TSB banks as part 
of Project Verde.   
Generally, 2012 results have less sensationalist headlines.  There appears to be a more 
discreet reporting style, shown by fewer metaphors, intensifiers and the use of the banks as 
subjects rather than objects (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013; Fairclough, 1995).  Some of the 
more unusual facets of headlines are discussed below.   
10.7.1 Accounting Metaphors at RBS and LBG 
Metaphors such as war and games and machines were used in the headlines.  Unusually, 
metaphors of domestic chores were used in relation to RBS.  This originated from the wires 
call for the announcement. 
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“…we are spring cleaning this house, it’s getting to look shinier and I do think that we 
have a strong future serving customers well, being valuable for shareholders and 
contributing to society.” ((Royal Bank of Scotland, 2013b). 
Thus the call ended with the metaphor of spring cleaning.  This translated into a metaphor 
used across the newspaper markets: 
 RBS SPRING CLEAN; CITY FOCUS (Daily Mail) 
The Daily Mail’s headline can be read in two ways.  One is that RBS (Group) are spring 
cleaning in an active sense using the present continuous sense.  Alternatively, it can be read 
as a nominalization, with the verb becoming the noun ‘spring clean’.  Nominalization omits 
both the actor and the subject, allowing space in the headline (Fowler, 1991).  But it also 
makes it abstract and distances the subject from concrete events (Fairclough, 1995).   The 
leader suggests that the metaphor is inadequate when it describes the task for the bank as 
‘Herculean’, which the spring cleaning analogy.  The suggestion is that the spring cleaning 
analogy does not adequately capture the scale of activities required to help bring the bank 
back to financial health. 
Spring cleaning in this sense is quirky when related to the banking industry.  The use of 
spring clean can also be seen as the hook to attract the attention of the reader’s eye in the 
competition for attention (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013; Chovanec, 2005). 
The second clause ‘City Focus’ helps to direct the reader to the genre of the article and its 
business news language. 
Contrast the spring cleaning metaphor used by the Financial Times: 
 Spring-cleaning edges RBS nearer to sell-off (Financial Times) 
Here, the actor is omitted in the headline.  This places RBS as the object of the ‘spring 
clean’.  RBS is then given a passive role through the transitive verb of ‘edge’.  This helps to 
designate a less powerful RBS (Fowler, 1991).   The responsibility for actions is then 
implied by the object, RBS, rather than the State.  Responsibility for this sell off is implied 
by an anonymous actor, the State,  rather than on the organisation headlined (Fowler, 1991).     
The careful placement of the CEO’s metaphor of a fresh, new RBS fits well into the 
discourse of the bank.  Journalists do not take this at face value.  The promotional aspect of 
the metaphor is toned down with the use of syntactic choices which put RBS as passive 
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character.  This is resonant with previous work on press releases (Maat, 2007) where 
corporate disclosures were reviewed with scepticism.   
Another distinct metaphorical device present in the headlines is the use of navigation.  These 
are concentrated in the broadsheet end of the market.  Broadsheets are more willing to use  
more literary devices such as metaphors to gain readers’ attention rather than the punning 
and clichés more concentrated in the tabloids (Chovanec, 2005). 
 Lloyds sale on horizon after rise in share price (The Times) 
 'Light at the end of the tunnel' as RBS rallies; Bank's chief targets 2014 for 
Government to start selling some of taxpayer's stake (The Daily Telegraph) 
 RBS has return to private sector in sight despite suffering £5.2bn loss (The Times) 
This reiterates the navigational metaphors that have been present in previous years.  The 
metaphor is picked up through important sources for the journalists and translated into 
headline news– the Wires call and prior stories on the topic (Bell, 1991; Gans, 1980).  The 
journey for these banks is the return to the private sector, reinforcing the political and 
organisational communication that the Government ownership is a temporary phenomenon.  
The newspapers then amplify these official discourses in their articles (Fairclough, 1995) and 
restate the dominant views of society, with privatisation being seen as a desirable outcome 
(Fowler, 1991).  The headlines are generally upbeat.  Nonetheless, the journey is some way 
off yet being completed with ‘horizon’ and ‘end of the tunnel’ suggesting some distance 
hence.  ‘Targets’ used in the Daily Telegraph and ‘in sight’ used in the Times provides a 
sense of space but also have overtones of military practice, a common, masculine metaphor 
used in business discourse (Koller, 2004). 
The positivity of the headlines is tempered by its linguistic constructions.  The use of 
nominalization in the Times Headline is apparent in the use of ‘Lloyds sale’.  It does not 
refer to the Government as the main owner selling its asset, Lloyds shares, and therefore 
avoids responsibility being handed to the State.  Nominalization has been used in this way to 
direct responsibility (Fairclough, 1995; Fowler, 1991). Lloyds in fact have no say in when 
privatisation occurs, as this is handled exclusively by the shareholder.  Nonetheless, the 
‘Lloyds sale’ with the syntactic structure, suggests that Lloyds’ results have a direct 
correlation with the decisions of HM Treasury.  By shifting responsibility for the 
privatisation onto the banks, the newspaper continues to allow the crisis, and its solution, to 
lie squarely in the realm of the banks.  
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10.7.2 The Bottom Line: Reporting on the Financial Results of the 
Banks 
In terms of financial results, the banks still reported a loss for 2012.  The accounting, 
nonetheless, was potentially difficult for communication.  Each bank had an underlying 
profit, suggesting good quality of earnings.  It was large accounting charges which resulted 
in losses being ultimately incurred.  For RBS, there was a £3.5bn charge as a result of an 
increase in the fair value of their own debt.  Financial instruments must be fair valued under 
IFRS and this includes debt that RBS has in the money markets.  As RBS’ prospects improve 
the sale price of their debt increases, which causes an increase in the liabilities of the bank 
and an expense on the income statement (RBS, 2013).   For Lloyds, the loss was directly 
attributable to large scale provision for the PPI mis-selling scandal.   
The bottom line results in these cases were not generally the main focus of the news 
headline.  Rather they were used as contextualising information to locate the other angle the 
headlines were capturing.  This may reflect the time delay in newspaper printing and the 
requirement to offer something ‘new’ in the articles rather than reiterating information the 
consumer may have already received through 24 hours news media (Fairclough, 2010; 
Leach, 2006).  It may also contribute to sensationalism in the headlines (Molek-
Kozakowska, 2013). 
The following section considers the RBS results before moving on to Lloyds.  The 
consideration of the actual results is given to provide an insight into the original press release 
received by the journalists from RBS and Lloyds to provide a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between what is published by the organisations compared to what is published 
by the Press. 
RBS: 
Each announcement by RBS starts with the conventional ‘highlights’, which act as a concise 
summary of the announcement.  These function quite like headlines in that they can be 
viewed as relevance optimisers (Dor, 2003), although the genre and style are  different.  The 
headlines generated in the press release are shown below: 
“RBS reports a 2012 operating profit (1) of £3,462 million, up from £1,824 million in 
2011 
Core RBS 2012 operating profit £6,341 million versus £6,045 million in 2011 
2012 Core return on tangible equity 10% 
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2012 pre-tax loss of £5,165 million, after £4,649 million accounting charge for 
improved own credit 
Core Tier 1 ratio 10.3%, loan: deposit ratio 100%, Non-Core assets down to £57 
billion” 
(Royal Bank of Scotland, 2013c) 
The highlights exhibit many features previously associated with press releases.  The positive 
news is emphasised first in the press release (Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2012), with the 
operating profit announced before the statutory loss.  Pro-forma results are also used instead 
of the GAAP numbers (Marques, 2010).  On a closer linguistic analysis, it is notable that 
RBS is the subject of the first highlight and uses an active, yet ostensibly neutral verb of 
‘reports’.  The subject and use of active verb has been associated with positions of power 
(Montgomery, 2008; Fowler, 1991).  The first highlight is the only one which has a subject 
and verb.  All other highlights are without these, indicative of a list after the main part of the 
news, rather than news information.   
 RBS SELL-OFF NEXT YEAR, VOWS BOSS; But £5bn loss for bailed bank The Sun,  
RBS has return to private sector in sight despite suffering £5.2bn loss (The Times) 
RBS reprivatisation creeps closer as 'chastening' year delivers £5bn loss (Financial 
Times) 
£600m bonuses at RBS despite £5bn loss (The Herald) 
Looking at the dialectical relations between the source and the newspaper (Fairclough, 
2010), the result which is headlined is the pre-tax loss, rather than more prominent operating 
profit in the press release.  This suggests that there exists scepticism in the press releases 
from the financial journalists (Maat, 2007).  Moreover, there is consistency in this number 
being reported.  This contrasts to previous years where the bottom line result has been varied 
across the media.    
The makeup of these headlines is very similar, despite the cut across the tabloid/broadsheet 
markets. The Sun’s headline is more informal, representing the style of the paper (Fowler, 
1991) and its tabloid origins (Fairclough, 1995). They all start with the possible 
reprivatisation of the bank, and then caveat that against the poor profits of the past year.  In 
linguistic terms, ‘despite’, ‘but’ ‘as’ are all examples of local coherence relations 
(Fairclough, 1995). The clause invites the reader to question the feasibility of returning to the 
private sector when the banks are continuing to make losses.  The headlines are made up of 
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facts, which when taken together provide an overt critique of the information released by the 
organization.   
This may suggest something about accounting in general.  On the one hand, accounting is 
not the news.  Instead, it can be seen as adding context to debates which are started and 
continued elsewhere.  It also provides a credible and robust alternative counter-story to the 
self-promotional bias of the pro-forma operating profits, allowing the journalists and the 
readers to critique the official discourse being promoted.   
The accounting results are used in a different way in the Lloyds group results and these are 
discussed more below. 
10.7.3 Lloyds’ Bottom Line and the Headlines for 2013 
The discourse around LBG is slightly different to RBS.  RBS’ results the day before 
contribute to the perception of LBG’s results.  Furthermore, LBG was dealing with the 
historic PPI mis-selling scandal, which received a lot of press coverage. 
LBG’s press release takes a different style to RBS.  It starts off with a quote from the CEO 
and a bold headline in quotation marks: 
‘AHEAD OF OUR PLAN TO TRANSFORM THE GROUP, DESPITE THE 
CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENT’ 
This focuses on the strategic aspect of the news, rather than the financial results.  Next, the 
financial highlights are presented.  These list a number of bullet points with bold thematic 
leaders.  These are organized around income; balance sheet; positioning for growth; 
corporate citizenship; and future prospects.  The first set of bullets pertaining to income is 
shown below: 
“Significantly improved Group performance; continue to work through legacy issues 
 Substantial increase in Group underlying profit from £638 million to £2,607 
million 
 Full year Group net interest margin of 1.93 per cent, in line with guidance 
 Costs further reduced by 5 per cent to £10.1 billion, in line with strategic review 
target two years ahead of plan;  Simplification run-rate savings increased to 
£847 million 
 Credit quality continues to improve; 42 per cent impairment reduction to £5.7 
billion, significantly ahead of original guidance; impairment charge as a 




 Statutory loss of £570 million primarily due to PPI provisions of £3,575 million 
(including £1,500 million in the fourth quarter of 2012), and including £3,207 
million of gains from sales of government securities” 
Source: (Lloyds Banking Group, 2013b) 
Thus, the highlights for LBG cover many aspects of the income statement rather than just the 
final result.  The press release also uses a note format rather than prose to list the main points 
of the results for the year.  Similar to RBS, the press releases focuses on the underlying profit 
rather than the statutory loss.  It also features the net interest margin.  Focusing on pro-forma 
numbers rather than GAAP and emphasising sales is an established preference in the 
communication of results in press releases (Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2012; Marques, 2010). 
The headlines below show the way that the Lloyds results are portrayed in the next day’s 
newspapers.  The tabloids are shown at the top and the broadsheets follow: 
 LLOYDS LOSE £570m...THEN SPLASH OUT £365m IN BONUSES; BANK 
FATCAT TO POCKET £1.5m Chiefs minted as low-paid get crumbs (Scottish Daily 
Record) 
 BANK LOSSES: £570m BOSS'S BONUS: £1.5m (The Sun) 
£570M LOSSES: £570M £1.5M BONUS: £1.5M; Fury at payout for Lloyds banking 
boss (The Sun) 
Lloyds loses £570m but still hands £1.5m bonus to boss (i) 
Taxpayer stakes in bailed-out banks may be sold off cheaply: Lloyds records pounds 
570m loss but pays pounds 375m in bonuses Boss's payout...(The Guardian) 
Gilts sales cut Lloyds losses by £3.2bn; State–backed lender £570m in the red, but 
points to improving balance sheet Government may be... (The Daily Telegraph) 
As in the case of RBS, the profit results are used in conjunction with another aspect of the 
announcement.  In this case, it is almost exclusively focused on the bonuses of the Chief 
Executive.  The Daily Record headline reiterates the idea of ‘Fatcat’ which is not present in 
the broadsheet papers.  This is resonant of previous years’ stories which focused on the 
bonuses.  These cut across the private/public domain (Fairclough, 1995), but also adds a 
sense of drama to the results (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013; Chovanec, 2005).  In the Scottish 
Daily Record, there is reference to the rich bankers and the poorly paid.  The Sun’s headline 
is more minimal, using just the numbers tied into these two figures, to give it authenticity 
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(Bell, 1991).  It may also be indicative of the business section of the newspaper (Jucker, 
1992).  The conversational style of the papers is still resonant with the lexical choices of 
‘boss’ and ‘minted’.  It is suggestive of an ideology which is that the bosses take all the 
money whilst the low paid do the work.  This is akin to common sense and metaphors used 
in the text (Fairclough, 1995).   
Lloyds chief in line for GBP1.5m despite bank being GBP570m in red (The Scotsman)  
The Scotsman’s headline imparts the same sort of information as the Tabloids but the subject 
is the Lloyds loss rather than the payment per se.  Here the Boss is replaced with ‘chief’ who 
is ‘in line’ for his bonus rather than ‘pocketing’ the remuneration.  Nonetheless the use of ‘in 
red’ is more of a conversational phrase, confirming that the broadsheets also do use tabloid 
headline tactics such as punning (Chovanec, 2005).  Whilst the Chief is the subject of the 
headline and thus is in the powerful position, being ‘in line’ for the bonus suggest passivity 
(Fowler, 1991). 
10.8 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this chapter was to discuss the use of accounting results in newspaper discourse 
surrounding the failed banks.  The units of analysis here were the reporting of finances via 
the headlines of the national papers in the UK on the day after the results announcement.  
Results make the news across all segments of the Press.  The broadsheets were most engaged 
but the tabloids also had coverage on the accounting results.  This is important given the 
larger number of tabloid readers. 
Headlines were arranged by theme.  The contributing discourse to the headlines was 
considered, as well as the linguistic make up of the headlines themselves.  What is clear from 
the analysis is that accounting itself is a catalyst for talk on divergent issues. At the heart of 
all these debates is the insight accounting affords for contemporary popular debate in the 
printed press.  Sometimes accounting is not directly referred to in the headlines.   
Nonetheless, the accounting results represent a significant event on the organisational 
calendar and provide an important component of discourse with the media.  But the 
discourse is tempered by media factors: 
Media texts do indeed function ideologically in social control and social reproduction; 
but they also operate as cultural commodities in a competitive markets…are part of 
the business of entertaining people, are designed to keep people politically and 
socially informed, are cultural artefacts in their own right, informed by particular 
aesthetics; and they are the same time caught up in – reflecting and contributing to – 
shifting cultural values and identities.” (Fairclough, 1995, p47)  
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This meant that the headlines sometimes appeared to be tangential to the bottom line results 
being reported.   
A number of aspects came to the fore in the discussion on newspaper results.  First of all, 
accounting results are talked about.   The regularity of the announcements, the 
accommodation of the media by the banks and the ‘hard news’ aspect to the results means 
that headlines are extensive the day after the announcement.  This is largely positive for the 
banks in fulfilling democratic accountability.  Furthermore, the banks get the opportunity to 
update the Press and the readers about how the banks are doing and change the discourse 
surrounding them.   
Secondly, accounting is used very positively as well in discourse.  Selected profit or loss 
numbers were used in newspaper headlines..  There appears to be no preference for proforma 
or GAAP.  Numbers give authenticity to headlines (Bell, 1991) but also can be used for 
drama and sensationalism (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013).  There is evidence of critical reading 
of the press releases (Maat, 2007) and not verbatim reporting of a PR authored 
announcement (Sissons, 2012).  Using the accounting results, newspapers could voice 
authoritative scepticism of the corporate narrative occurring elsewhere in the news making 
process.  In 2012, the use of accounting numbers helped to provide a critique on the 
possibility for bank privatisation in the near future.  Accounting thus adds an alternative 
perspective to the discourse on strategy and business issues facing the banks.  The particular 
status of accounting is important in this regard: 
“The single figure provided by the calculative practices of accounting appears to be 
set apart from political interests and disputes, above the world of intrigue, and 
beyond debate.” (Miller, 2001) 
Accounting thus contributed to the democratic and corporate governance processes that the 
Press fulfils for the corporations (Jansson, 2013; Bednar, 2012). 
Thirdly, accounting is used in imaginative ways in the press.  There are established (Koller, 
2004) and unusual metaphors used to capture readers’ attention.  Word play is also 
commonly used to build a relation with the reader.  Language is used to add interest and 
drama to the accounts.  Yet these also contribute to the way that accounting is seen by the 
wider audience.  The newspaper coverage offers a perspective on popular ideas of 
accounting.  Previously accountants have been studied with regard to their image (Jeacle, 
2012; Smith and Jacobs, 2011).  Here, it is not persons, but techniques which come into 
focus.    Some important functions of accounting are working here, and that is being used as 
a stimulus for discussion and debate.   This is very positive.  It also has an active role in the 
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shaping of the banks fortunes.  This may seem role reversal as it is the underlying activities 
designed to generate the accounting numbers themselves.  However, it does also point to the 
concern that accounting rules have affected the success or otherwise of the banks so greatly 
in recent years.  Perhaps this is indicative of the respect and desire for accounting numbers.  
The numbers are seen as honest and trustworthy.   Vagaries of technical detail are not the 
discussion.  Accounting, not just accountants, are imbued with the characteristics of the 
profession (Carnegie and Napier, 2010). 
Finally, the discourse is dominated by headlines about bonuses.  Some minor differences 
emerge, such as the relationship with performance and bonus pots versus the pay of high 
earning individuals in earlier years.  CEOs contributed to the headlines and were a critical 
part of the leaders.  This resonates with the idea of CEO celebrity/infamy and excessively 
personalising the success or otherwise of the banks to its leaders (Hayward et al., 2004).  
Yet it is the easy relevance of the bonus number – and the large public interest in it – that 
encourages newspaper headlines in this regard.  The press have to entertain as well as inform 
the readership (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2010b; Miller, 2006; Fairclough, 1995; Entman, 
1989).   Moreover, the press are invested to create public panics (Leach, 2006).  This 
suggests that the press continue to have an agenda setting function (Bednar, 2012; McCombs 
and Shaw, 1972) and weed out ‘deviance’ (Leach, 2006). 
In some ways, then, the dominance of bonuses on reporting accounting results can be seen as 
a lazy route for journalists.   There has been sustained interest in bankers’ pay and it is easy 
to relate to readers.  Yet this would be denying that the press also fulfils an important 
corporate governance role in reporting pay.  The press reduces information asymmetry and 
allows informed shareholders to consider the fairness of performance related pay.  Thus, the 
response to the press could arguably be seen as appropriate.  In this case, the media 
collectively have been able to suggest considerable influence as both banks’ CEOs have 
waived bonuses in the face of public pressure (Bednar, 2012).  As Miller argues: 
“Executive compensation plans, based on accountancy's ideal of summarizing the 
individual in a single financial figure, make possible comparisons with an economic 
norm. The manager can be represented as an object, evaluated and acted upon by 
others as a result of the visibility, calculability, and comparability that accounting 
provides. And the actions of managers can be linked with the calculations of others, 
whether these are financial analysts seeking to advise on optimal investment 
strategies for their clients, governments concerned with national economic 
performance, or boards of management keen to weed out loss-making divisions of 
an enterprise and those managers who do not deliver.” (Miller, 2001) 
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There was a difference in reporting of bonuses amongst the broadsheet and tabloid 
newspapers.  The tabloids reflected on the greediness of the individual pay packets, whereas 
the broadsheets first moved to orient the bonuses in relation to the accounting results. Over 
time, however, the broadsheets diverted the discourse away from the bonuses to other items.  
This provides a consideration into how accounting is perceived and legitimated across broad 
sectors of newspaper readership.   
This resonates with the view that in a competitive market, the readers’ values are reflected 
back at them in the nature of headlines.  Prejudices are voiced through print (Kjaergaard et 
al., 2011; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005): 
“…certain dominant styles of linguistic construction prefer certain ways of seeing and 
thinking about an event.  And the more widely and pervasively a structure circulates, 
especially in privileged communicative contexts such as mass circulation daily 
newspapers, the more difficult it becomes to select differently – and hence to see 
and think differently about the depicted events” (Fairclough, 1995, p245) 
Whilst it may be effective to report on the bonus issues for newspapers, it does also divert 
attention from other areas of the business.  This can lead to considerable frustration for the 
banks themselves.  Moreover, it does not mean that more effective monitoring of the banks is 
taking place.  Nonetheless, the bonus debate is abating, with a move to privatisation 
considerations.  Discourse changes before ideology (Fairclough, 1995) so there may be a 
reduction in appetite for the bonuses story in the future.  
Understanding how accounting is reported in the headlines for these banks provides some 
insight into how the quasi-nationalised entities fulfil public and financial accountability.  In 
many cases, the ‘accounting’ is invisible as headlines.  Yet it is the financial reporting 
process which prompts the stories and the headlines on the banks.  The headline view is 
necessarily partial as the Press cope with various factors which may impact on reporting.  
These include the pressure to entertain, inform and affirm reader values.  The next chapter 




Chapter 11: Conclusion   
This thesis has looked at the quasi-nationalised UK banks, RBS and LBG, to analyse public 
accountability as a result of a change in ownership.  In so doing, it aimed to provide further 
insight into the UK banking crisis.  It looked at three broad research themes: 
1. The impact of Government intervention on the accountability of the UK quasi-
nationalised banks 
2. The banking crisis through the lens of financial reporting for RBS and LBG 
3. Media reporting of the banking crisis for RBS and LBG 
The findings of the research themes are now summarised in turn.  Property rights theory and 
agency theory were used to ascertain the implications of public ownership in the quasi-
nationalised banks.  Then the structure of quasi-nationalisation was assessed using these 
theoretical insights.  Property rights theory was generally favourable of quasi-nationalisation 
because it retained the benefits of private sector ownership, such as market scrutiny and 
monetary-based managerial incentives.  It also provided an analysis of the changing 
dynamics relating to Government objectives imposed as a condition of investment.  These 
showed that quasi-nationalisation was able to respond quickly to the different economic 
circumstances and allow the banks further operational discretion in trading through 
difficulties.  The State conceded some power in this regard, but retained a general capacity to 
intervene when required.  Property rights did provide some deeper implications of the public 
ownership but its predictive power was limited in the face of quasi-nationalisation.  Contrary 
to theory, the EU decreed the banks had undue advantage with Government ownership and 
required substantial divestments.  The efficiency of the banks relative to competitors under 
public ownership was inconclusive. Moreover, market scrutiny had failed, leading to such 
extensive public investment in the first place. 
Agency theory suggested that the disciplinary effects of the market were muted due to the 
particular circumstances of the banks.  However, there was a strong alignment of interests 
between principal and agent to increase the share prices and thereby attractiveness of the 
banks for private investment in the future.  In this regard quasi-nationalisation helped to 
foster success.  On the other hand, quasi-nationalisation had failed to make radical change in 
the banks’ cultures as scandals such as PPI and LIBOR fixing were identified.  There was a 
muted change in pay and awards for the chief executives for the banks but a high pay culture 
remained for a selected core of privileged staff, namely those involved in investment 
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banking.  Overall, quasi-nationalisation had been a pragmatic and successful arm’s length 
response to the deep crisis that the UK faced in October 2008 and beyond. 
The second theme looked at the banking crisis from the perspective of the banks.  Using 
Impression Management and Stigma (Goffman, 1968; Goffman, 1956b), an alternative view 
to the crisis was explored through the banks’ financial reporting.  There existed a tension 
between the corporate narrative and regulated accounting story therein.  Within the corporate 
narrative, both banks had quite distinct ways of reporting the crisis.  RBS responded to the 
crisis by a stark change in corporate strategy.  This was accounted for in the annual report 
via the set up a non-core division whose primary task was to divest and de-risk the bank. In 
contrast, LBG attributed its losses to ‘market dislocation’ and implied it had been acting in 
the public interest in taking over the failed HBOS.  Yet the accounts reveal another aspect to 
the story which was not politically salient for the bank to highlight – that it had made a 
substantial accounting gain on HBOS through negative goodwill.   
The financial reports also revealed some of the challenges of regulatory accounting.  Even 
when its methods have been centre stage in the crisis, the regulated accounting remains a 
performance only for the trained professional.  Furthermore, the audit report, expressing an 
opinion on the financial statements, has a limited role.  Indeed, its role is expressed through 
teamwork with the client and by implication, the necessity of keeping ‘team’ secrets.   The 
austere nature of both auditing and accounting put them in a peculiar position in crisis - they 
contribute to its definition and its impact but ultimately remain ‘dirty work’ (Goffman, 
1956b) where only selected bits of information penetrate through to be integrated into the 
corporate narrative.  Sometimes, these selected parts of the regulated accounting disrupted 
the performance being conducted using pro forma numbers.   
The banks engaged in shifting view of the crisis as understanding and hindsight built up over 
time.  It was only in 2009 that a fuller picture of crisis could emerge.   RBS presented many 
versions of its 2008 failure in subsequent years as it responded to corporate restructuring and 
accounting change.   LBG presented its full group results only in its 2009 accounts as the 
takeover of HBOS did not complete until January 2009.  Thus, understanding the crisis has 
been an incremental process in the corporations.  The overall tone in the RBS Chairman’s 
statement in 2012 shifts from a corporate, defensive tone used previously to that of a more 
readable, simpler ‘good bank’, appealing to customers and other stakeholders. 
The third empirical chapter extends the scope of financial reporting research and focuses on 
its presentation in the newspaper headlines and leaders the day following publication.  
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Drawing upon media discourse (Fairclough, 1995), the newspaper reporting of the banks’ 
accounting results is considered first as a broader contribution to public discourse on the 
quasi-nationalised banks.  It then uses linguistic analysis to highlight the implications of 
communicating the accounting results.  The banks’ financial results generate headlines.  
These occur across a broad spectrum of titles and through a number of articles in each 
broadsheet publication.  When it comes to headlines, the biggest accounting number is 
favoured for the corporation.  But other smaller numbers also generate much interest, 
especially bankers’ bonuses.  The need to turn the public information for private 
consumption is present here, with the self as reference point for the bankers’ bonuses 
(Fairclough, 1995).  When it comes to the commentary, there is evidence that press releases 
are not reprinted verbatim in the newspapers but are critically read before publication.  
Unusual analogies become popular in attracting readers’ attention, with novel metaphors 
cultivated by the corporation and published by the newspaper.  The annual reports provide an 
important counterpoint to the news context of the banks.  Increasingly, the headlines have 
focused on the possibility of privatisation against the large scale losses being incurred.  
Framed positively, accounting is portrayed as a neutral challenger to the public relations feel 
of the annual report and fulfils a democratic role in informing the electorate of the banks.  A 
more critical view would be that the respected nature of the accounts and their predictable 
routine for news making allows journalists to shoehorn their own personal agendas into the 
ostensibly new item of the results. It is in the interests of papers to create and sustain media 
panics (Leach, 2006) 
11.1 Contribution 
There are number of contributions made by the thesis.  In its subject, it provides greater 
understanding of a major crisis period in UK banking.  The thesis is concerned with the UK 
banking crisis but in so doing contributes to the wider debate regarding the global financial 
crisis, where Western capitalism faced great challenges.  The result is that a number of 
journals called for papers on the global financial crisis (CIGAR, 2013; British Accounting 
Review, 2012; Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2011).  The thesis responds to such 
calls, and particularly those who advocate qualitative research (Arnold, 2009) and multi-
theoretical research (Jacobs, 2012; Kurunmäki et al., 2003). 
The scale of Government investment at the height of the crisis justifies its perspective of two 
extremely large beneficiaries of UK Government support: RBS and LBG.  It takes a 
comprehensive look at understanding these two banks and their history; the challenges faced 
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in governing the corporations; and takes a holistic approach to researching their annual 
report publications.  The thesis contributes to the literature regarding the nature of public 
ownership.  Quasi-nationalisation in this case has been a successful response to the banking 
failures in that is has allowed the banks the commercial freedom to trade out of their 
difficulties.  Nonetheless, the opportunity for political interference means that there is a 
justified access to intervention in corporate policies when opportunity dictates.  This may 
have been dominated by the bonuses and remuneration but has also allowed economic 
policies such as a customer focus and SME lending to be given due consideration as the UK 
trades out of recession.  Again there have been problems with the details of the targets.  Yet 
there remains a renewed humility and sense of responsibility in the banking industry that 
they work for stakeholders and not just shareholder returns.   
The thesis provides a rounded approach to the study of financial reporting and impression 
management, which allows the interaction of words and images to be considered (Davison, 
2009).  It also contributes to the call for alternative methodologies to financial reporting 
generally (London School of Economics, 2011; Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Parker, 2007).  
In so doing, there has been some deep consideration for the statutory accounts as a whole as 
in the context of the annual report.  Despite being the reason for the annual report the 
statutory accounting figures are hidden at the back of publication and deter all but the most 
trained and determined shareholders to whom the report is addressed.  Moreover, the audit 
report has been shown in an alternative light – not as verification of the financial statements 
but rather as supporting act to validate the financial reporting performance of the 
corporations.   In this way, the auditors are conceptualised as part of a team of performers. 
Furthermore, the thesis has considered the increasing interest in media in accounting and 
finance research (Islam and Deegan, 2010; Deegan et al., 2000) and the calls to consider 
accounting in popular media such as tabloids (Jeacle, 2012).  Accounting is utilised in 
important ways in the media – not least as a means to encourage debate on the wider 
business issues that corporations face.  In this regard, accounting can act as an important 
counterpoint to the public relations authored documents which are produced in concert with 
annual reports.  Moreover, accounting is used in imaginative ways with interesting 
metaphors and monikers providing a critique on business discourse.  Negatively, however, 
the media can become self-referential and use accounting results as a justification for 
reincarnating prior media panics, e.g. bonuses (Leach, 2006; Bell, 1991).  These may not 
reflect the most important issues which would fulfil a democratic accountability ideal for the 
electorate but do allow for reader digestibility (Fairclough, 1995).  The study responds to 
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calls for linguistic analysis in accounting research (Evans, 2010) and in particular, the 
application of Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012). 
11.2 Contribution to Theory 
This section outlines in detail the contribution to theory made by the empirical work carried 
out in the thesis.  This is organised by research theme, below.   Firstly, a brief reflection is 
presented on what constitutes a theoretical contribution.   
Theoretical contributions to the social sciences may be defined by the ability of theories to 
withstand empirical testing in contexts beyond their original use (Rule, 1994), as well as 
being important to the understanding of a discipline or a sense of loss if the theory did not 
exist (ibid).   However, it is a positivistic view to consider theoretical advancement to hinge 
upon the production of a single universal theory (Cole, 2001).  Thus, progress may also 
hinge on multiple explanations existing under many  theories (Fitzgerald et al., 1995)  or 
indeed in the rejection of a particular theory (Cole, 2001). Furthermore, scholarship at the 
margins may ask different questions and produce different theories.  These new theories in 
turn can be used to re-explore past questions (Fitzgerald et al. 1995).   
Theory in management may be seen as offering either utility or originality (Corley and 
Gioia, 2011).  Originality may be incremental in theory building, such as adding a new 
variable to an existing theory or it may be more revelatory in nature (ibid, p16).   
Contribution may also be drawn upon through integration of different theoretical concepts as 
well.   Originality is not a sufficient criterion, however, and it must be useful to other 
researchers who work within the same theoretical framework (ibid, p19).   
With these reflections in mind, the contribution to theory in this thesis can be characterised 
as an incremental contribution.  The understanding of theory has been enhanced by applying 
theory to the UK banking crisis and illustrating their explanatory power in a new context.   
The multi-theoretical framework helped to address the organisational and institutional 
complexity of the case studies (Jacobs, 2012) and allowed a deeper understanding of the 
features of public accountability considered.  Taking each research theme in turn, the 
discussion below considers the contribution made to each theory utilised.  
11.2.1 Contribution to Property Rights Theory 
The main contribution to property rights theory is on its usefulness.  The cases used in the 
thesis challenged some of the underlying generalisations made about the nature of public 
sector ownership.  The discussion on quasi-nationalisation and negotiation of post crisis 
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accountability was explored using property rights theory.  The features of quasi-
nationalisation demonstrated that the predictive capabilities of property rights theory were 
limited.  Broadly supportive of the retention of private sector ownership, the theory does not 
recognise that private sector scrutiny and monitoring failed, resulting in banking failure in 
the first place.  Moreover, Government ownership was seen as creating inefficiencies, 
whereas the regulatory response was that State involvement would create a market advantage 
for the banks under consideration.  Furthermore, lobbying for the further specification of 
property rights was predicted by the theory.  In contrast, it was in deliberate attempts to keep 
targets vague that the banks secured maximum operational discretion, rather than for the 
State.   
Property rights theory may be developed by considering factors other than the identity of 
owners.  These may include the implications of competition for property rights for industries 
where SOE are present.   
11.2.2 Contribution to Agency Theory 
The contribution of the thesis to agency theory can also be characterised by an incremental 
approach to confirming the usefulness of the theory.  Agency theory was applied to the novel 
context of the UK banks and demonstrated its continued applicability to organisational 
change.  Agency theory provided deep insight into the potential of quasi-nationalisation 
amidst the banking crisis.  It not only provided some critique of the institutional set up of the 
banks, but was able to provide a window into the potential outcomes of the accountability 
decisions made at the time of the crisis.   In this way the usefulness of the theory has been 
enhanced by further testing with empirical evidence. 
Nonetheless, whilst predictions were insightful, agency theory was not able to provide a 
model of the processes of change in the quasi-nationalised banks.  In this way, the criticisms 
of agency theory as resting on the one dimensional concept of utility maximisation could be 
confirmed (Wright and Mukherji, 1999). 
11.2.3 Contribution to Impression Management and Stigma 
Impression management and stigma have been applied to financial reporting research 
previously.  However, this particular study demonstrated its robustness in the corporate 
reporting context.  The quasi-nationalised banks were a case which offered an opportunity to 
assess its usefulness at the margins, and to stretch the theory (Yin RK, 2003).  It was able to 
provide an explanatory framework to two performances related to the banking failure, even 
though these responses to the crises were quite distinct from one another.  Furthermore, the 
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holistic approach utilised in the study demonstrated that the multifaceted performances in the 
annual report could be analysed together to provide a coherent interpretive explanation of the 
performers’ intent.  This was even the case when aspects of the annual report, such as the 
accounting numbers, could be viewed through the theoretical lens as a back stage and front 
stage performance dependent on the audience.  Thus, the contribution to utility was to 
demonstrate its ability to explain phenomena beyond that originally worked upon by 
Goffman in face to face interaction (Goffman, 1956b).   
11.2.4 Contribution to Critical Discourse Analysis  
The thesis illustrates the usefulness of critical discourse analysis in a new context of 
accounting and banking.  The theoretical contribution of CDA is not in its ability to explain 
events, but to advance the understanding that explanation is rooted in the way that discourse 
occurs and is linguistically constituted (Fairclough, 2010).  A useful theory may emphasise 
generalities (Corley and Gioia, 2011).  Here, the contribution to theory can be understood as 
creating multiplicity in the theoretical frameworks applied to accounting research (Fitzgerald 
et al., 1995). 
Nonetheless, critical discourse analysis offers a somewhat vague explanation to events by 
itself.  This was attractive in the current empirical project, as it was unknown what the nature 
of the data may produce.  However, due to its lack of explanatory power, CDA can be used 
as an method of analysis only, with an accompanying, more explanatory theory to 
understand phenomena (Eshraghi and Taffler, 2012).  The use of Blame Avoidance as 
analysed by Hood (2010) may offer a potential further analysis of media discourse for the 
quasi-nationalised banks.   
11.3 Lessons for Accounting and Auditing Practice  
The global financial crisis has identified a number of issues associated with accounting and 
auditing practice.  These were discussed in further detail in section 2.4, including the 
implications of fair value accounting and the practice of auditing post crisis.  For audit in 
particular, this has resulted in a large degree of regulatory review, culminating in the Barnier 
Proposals currently underway with the European Parliament and the Competition 
Commission’s findings on audit market concentration. 
The thesis deliberately sought to consider public accountability in its broadest light.  Yet it 
offers a number of lessons for accounting and auditing practice which are discussed here.  
Accounting and auditing policy needs to consider the nature of communicating the numbers 
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which are produced by them.  It is not enough to consider the ‘true and fair view’ but also 
how these numbers are then reported onwards. 
Looking at the process of quasi-nationalisation, the use of accounting was heavily based on 
the private published accounts of the banks.  This was the basis for the UKFI’s analysis of 
the bank investments (UKFI, 2013b).  Moreover, HM Treasury decided upon non-
consolidation of the banks into the whole of Government Accounts.  The non-consolidation 
of the banks was the basis for qualifying the opinion on the whole of Government accounts 
(HM Treasury, 2012). 
Therefore, public sector scrutiny has lost an opportunity to subject the accounts to its own 
particular audit.  This includes analysis of the performance of these banks, not on the basis of 
bottom lines or profitability but on the basis of public sector service delivery.  A best value 
audit would perhaps subject the banks to a different type of scrutiny of financial stewardship. 
This would emphasise not only financial outcomes but outcomes such as service delivery 
and economic impact.  The analysis under agency theory noted the problem of the customer 
service delivery. Property rights theory demonstrated a sacrifice of control over the lending 
targets to customers and SMEs as well. 
Turning to the analysis of the financial reports themselves, impression management 
highlighted the back stage nature of the accounts.  In contrast, the corporate narrative told in 
words, pictures and pro-forma accounting displayed much more prominence.   Accountants 
are delegating their job to non-experts (Goffman, 1956b).  Alternative views of the annual 
report are that it is a public relations exercise (McKinstry, 1996; Lee, 1994) or a graphical 
design project (Neu et al., 1998).   In so doing, non-accountant input threatens the relevance 
of accounting in the very report which exists because of it.    
Lessons for auditing, particularly, should focus on the means of disclosure of statutory 
numbers.  Disclosure, by itself, does not increase transparency of organisations (Heald & 
Hood, 2007).  Thus auditors need to look beyond the act of disclosure to the characteristics 
of information given prominence.  Considerable negotiation skills may be required by audit 
partners to achieve this, and the need to maintain high levels of independence in the face of 
the resistance from the audit client (Beattie et al., 2004).  Certainly, some important steps are 
being taken in this regard with the call by professional bodies for positive assurance over 
management commentary in the financial report (ICAS, 2013) and the increasing 
commentary provided in the new form of audit reports (Financial Reporting Council, 2013b). 
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Accountants thus need to consider not only ‘spinning’ the image of the profession generally 
(Jeacle, 2012; Smith and Jacobs, 2011) but also the spin given to numbers within the 
financial reports, which may be picked up in the media.  Rightfully, the freedom of the Press 
underpins democracy.  The accountants’ aim, therefore, is ensuring that journalists get easy 
access to the important accounting numbers in a business story.  This may ensure that 
numbers are reported in a fairer manner, and reduce the stagnation of discourse within the 
media, in this case on bankers’ bonuses.  The right to speak for auditors, currently 
incorporated in the Companies Act 2006 for the AGM, could be extended to the press 
conference.  More prescriptively, a duty to speak on the numbers, by highlighting the 
differences in the ‘results’ presented could also improve the nature of the communication 
between the Press and the companies being reported upon.   
11.4 Overarching Themes 
There were a number of themes which bridged the empirical chapters.  It is argued that these 
can be considered the defining features of public accountability in the UK banking crisis. 
These are: 
o Bonuses 
o Banking’s Societal Responsibilities 
o RBS being more culpable than LBG 
o Profitability 
o Audit Reporting 
 
These may or may not be the most important causes of the crisis, or the recuperation since.  
However, they are the themes which contribute to the public understanding of the banking 
crisis.  In this way, they become the milestones by which the banking industry can restore its 
reputation and move beyond the crisis. 
 
Remuneration has been intimately wrapped up with the UK banking crisis since the 
Government opted to take an equity stake in the banks (Hansard HC, 2008).  The fall out of 
Fred Goodwin’s refusal to cut his pension entitlement in November 2008 flared up the 
backlash against bankers’ pay (Darling, 2011). It has continued to define the crisis and 
become part of the political discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012).  Moreover, it has 
been used to incentivise management with regard to share price and long term sustainability 
of the banks (Lloyds Banking Group, 2012; Royal Bank of Scotland, 2012b).  The financial 
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reporting process provides explicit detail on the remuneration of top executives.  As time has 
gone on, regulations have also required the publication senior staff remuneration and not just 
the board (Walker, 2009).  Bonus restraint has infiltrated amongst all members of the top UK 
banks.   Moreover, it has been the subject of a sustained media panic (Leach, 2006) over the 
greediness (and by implication, moral ineptitude) of bankers generally.  Media, political and 
public pressure have certainly driven down the receipt of performance pay as top executives 
waived their bonuses.   
 
In tandem with bonuses, there has been a positive move towards more explicit corporate 
social responsibility.  Banking services are a public good, providing people the options to 
purchase their own homes, store their money safely and earn interest on savings.  Pre-crisis, 
the public service nature of banking had become somewhat subdued in the face of 
shareholder returns.  Now, there is a return to the acknowledgement of responsibility to the 
community.  This has infiltrated all the big banks and not just the two corporations 
investigated closely here.  It has also allowed State support of the banking industry generally 
to be considered, through mechanisms such as the deposit insurance scheme and the State 
Aid endowed on RBS and LBG.   
 
There is a sense of proportionality applied to the ownership of RBS and LBG, with RBS 
receiving a lot more scrutiny by the State and Press than Lloyds Banking Group.  Arguably, 
this is fair as RBS received a great deal more money from the Government in order to 
continue to trade.  Chapter 9 demonstrated that its entire strategy was called into question 
and there has been a great effort to become once more a British bank whose focus was on de-
risking.  LBG did not have such a great change in business culture, as it was already very 
British focused.   Moreover, RBS’ prospects for reprivatisation remain a lot more distant 
than LBG, whose Government ownership has already decreased through a sale of a tranche 
of shares (UKFI, 2013c).  Nonetheless, this sense of proportionality perhaps detracts from 
the fact that LBG still required huge Government outlay at considerable cost to the economy.  
LBG were explicitly grabbing an opportunity to increase its UK market share and took 
advantage of the Government predicament in HBOS at the height of the crisis to achieve it 
by overriding competition rules.  This threat to competition was highlighted by the EU but it 
was the Independent Commission on Banking who also required the bank to respond to its 
huge market share (Independent Commission on Banking, 2011).  In addition, if it is 
accepted that banking is a public good and LBG is subject to the conditions of investment in 




Banking remains a profit making enterprise.  The success or otherwise of the Government 
intervention will remain on reprivatisation back to the private sector.  This depends on the 
future profitability of RBS and LBG.  Moreover, it is the focus on the bottom line which 
penetrates management commentary on the financial reports and the newspaper headlines on 
the banks’ performance over the years.  In this way, quasi-nationalisation does not represent 
a departure from the banks’ motivations in pre-crisis years.  The implementation of increased 
societal responsibilities provides a useful counterbalance to the profit maxim.  Policy would 
do well to encourage this sense of responsibility in future years and continue to nurture it 
amongst the wider banking profession.   
 
By its inertia, the audit report also produces a defining feature of the crisis.   In this case, it is 
what has been missed in terms of reporting developments which is of interest.  There is no 
response to Government ownership in the audit reporting process, despite the necessity of 
Government funding to continue to operate.  The audit report is considered in an alternative 
light in Chapter 9 on financial reporting.  And yet it stays out of the limelight completely in 
newspaper headlines.  This contrasts greatly with previous corporate scandals such as Enron 
(Sikka, 2009).  Nonetheless, the audit profession has had increasing scrutiny itself over 
independence and competition in the UK and EU (Competition Commission, 2013; EU 
Single Market, 2013).  The audit profession’s challenges to retain legitimacy continue in 
spite of a more benign press environment in the UK banking crisis.  Public policy should 
continue to consider the role of the audit in the smooth functioning of the markets. 
 
The perspective on crisis adopted in the thesis brings these themes of bonuses, societal 
responsibilities, profitability, audit and proportionality of Government ownership together.  
Public accountability is seen to be fulfilled through public understanding of the crisis.  It is 
these arenas whereby accountability is exercised most.  And in failure, it is those connected 
with the regulation of the banks – the Government agencies and the auditors – that also bear 
some responsibility for failure too. 
11.5 Limitations 
The thesis has a number of limitations.  Its findings are limited to two corporations during 
the UK banking crisis.  It is not a representative sample and thus, the findings are not 
generalizable (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).  The findings do provide some analysis of extreme 
circumstances and contribute to understanding of the nature of public ownership generally.  
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The very nature of the crisis thus makes it critical for investigation, moving beyond the 
positivist paradigm (Arnold, 2009; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).  Moreover, there is ample 
scope to extend the study as suggested in future research directions, below.   
The analysis on which the findings are based has been limited to documentary analysis.  It 
did not collect insider views on the corporations.  This was not extremely limiting during the 
study as it was public accountability which was of particular interest.  However, documents 
provide only a polished account of what occurs in organisations and in meetings/ 
conversations and does not give any background to the development of these reports (Irvine 
and Gaffikin, 2006).  Insider views may have provided further understanding of the 
phenomena investigated. 
The research on accounting in the headlines considered the headlines in isolation of the body 
of the article and its typographical layout on the newspaper page.  The story indicated in the 
headline and that which is told in the body of the article can differ (Andrew, 2007; Dor, 
2003).  The scope of the study could be increased to incorporate the body of articles by using 
computer software (Seale et al., 2007). Typography/layout may also indicate the relative 
importance of the story compared to other pieces (Althaus and Tewksbury, 2002).  
Finally, the research suffers from the subjectivity of qualitative research (Modell, 2010).  
This means that researcher bias will be present in the study as to what has been investigated 
and the nature of interpretation given thereon.     The quality of information was particularly 
important in the study and primary source documentation was utilised wherever possible to 
ensure validity of data.   
11. 6 Further Research Areas 
The thesis has explored many aspects of the UK Banking crisis.  There are a number of 
research opportunities for further study.  Three particular areas of interests are introduced 
below.  
The quasi-nationalisation of the banks has provided a fruitful ground for study.  Further 
research opportunities abound in their subsequent privatisation, one of a suite of 
privatisations planned by the current UK coalition Government in the next few years.  The 
State has already sold off a tranche of LBG shares in September 2013 (UKFI, 2013c).  In 
October 2013, Royal Mail Group shares were sold to the public (Royal Mail plc, 2013).  The 
Government is now a minority shareholder.  In addition, a Government company operating 
the East Coast main line will be re-privatised around February 2015 (East Coast, 2013). 
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These industries are already competitive with other private corporations.  Privatisation has 
been a controversial topic over the years, particularly with regard to whether it is ownership 
or control which may impact on its efficiencies.    The impact of privatisation in a new 
political context is worthy of future research. 
The nature of audit has already been highlighted as an important theme in the thesis.  
However, audit is also changing.  From October 2013, auditors will be required to report on 
the risks of material misstatement that they identified during the audit and discuss their 
concept of materiality (Financial Reporting Council, 2013b).  The notion of auditors as part 
of a team in the performance of financial reporting was noted in chapter 9.  It is argued that 
these changes to the auditor’s report resonate with this teamwork perspective.  Further 
research could be carried out on the nature of audit as members of a team, rather than 
presenting them as entirely independent of the client being audited.  The banks would be a 
naturally interesting and fulfilling place to start this research, given that the risks of material 
misstatement were apparently missed by the auditors, amongst others, leading up to the 
financial crisis. 
A further research opportunity arises through the discussion of the media.  It has already 
been noted that there is a trend towards discussing the relationship between media, 
accountability and markets.  The final empirical chapter aimed to show the importance of 
political accountability of the banks’ finances.  This is especially important for 
Governmental institutions as well.  As a result, further research is being conducted on the 
media accountability of Scottish Public Finances.  Thus, further questions have evolved 
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